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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to examine philosophical archeology and the feasibility of
knowledge that derives from researching it simultaneously through theoretical and artistic
practice.
Philosophical archeology essentially embodies one’s relation to history and
historiographic research—a research methodology at the core of which lies a “historical a
priori”, that which a priori conditions the historical development of a phenomenon.
However, this research conceives of philosophical archeology more broadly, as a
multifaceted term that traverses the discourse of the humanities at large.
By pursuing this doctoral research, my original contribution to knowledge is
twofold: (1) I historicize philosophical archeology—a term that has been in use throughout
humanities-based research since 1793, when it was formulated for the first time in this
manner; and (2) expanding on its history, I show how, in the broader context of
contemporary art and particularly in my artistic practice, philosophical archeology is
conceived and carried out as a modus operandi.

Section I outlines philosophical archeology in theoretical practice. Based on Giorgio
Agamben’s œuvre (and the work of other pertinent thinkers), it explicates Agamben’s
conception of messianic time that in turn conditions his conception of history. Messianic
time is conceived as the paradigm of historical time par excellence, mainly drawing on
Saint Paul’s text Epistle to the Romans (and in reference to Agamben’s work on it, The
Time that Remains) and Walter Benjamin’s text “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”
The concept of messianic time is further elaborated by discussing (under the framework of
aesthetics) Benjamin’s method of montage that likewise contributes to his theory of
historical signature/consciousness.

Section II is an integral component of my thesis exhibition titled Philosophical Archeology
Space 2009–2019—a space that is constituted as, and by, philosophical archeology in my
ongoing artistic practice; this archeological/historiographic operation, in the framework of
artistic research, resulted in the identification of three signatures comprising the (material-
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based) “historical a priori” of my artistic practice. The section contextualizes archeological
orientation in contemporary art, and examines whether philosophical archeology (as artistic
modus operandi) is in a position to distend history and historiography rather than vice
versa.
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Lay Summary
This doctoral research revealed philosophical archeology to be multifaceted—it is a
research methodology (a historiographic framework) in the humanities at large, which
essentially embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic research; a metaphor
(allegory); (art) content or subject matter as well as a material-based historiography or
method of historical inquiry in art; a critical force that conceives of its (past) objects as
(future) prototypes or blueprints; and, lastly, philosophical archeology embodies a certain
(messianic) conception of time that conditions a conception of history. The originality of
philosophical archeology, as a critical methodology, does not necessarily stem from the
nature of its tools, but from the integration of threads drawn from various disciplines and
broad fields of knowledge.

The first section explores philosophical archeology in theoretical practice. As a
historiographic methodology in use throughout research across the humanities at large,
philosophical archeology aims at researching the “historical a priori” dimension of a
certain historical phenomenon, a dimension that cannot be identified as the phenomenon’s
diachronic origin, but as an active tendency within it that conditions its development in
time.

The second section explores philosophical archeology in artistic practice. In its first part,
the historiographic turn in contemporary art, characterized by the metaphor of the
archeological dig and the need to look backwards, is depicted as contributing to artists’
historical consciousness and in particular with regard to the societal knowledge economy.
The second part unfolds from my artistic work, where I ask: What is an origin? I inquired
into the concept of the origin as such, but also into my personal origin: what gave birth to,
and still commands, my personal identity and meaning as self; what conditions my artistic
engagement in the world, and how? In this inquiry, I practiced philosophical archeology—
a research methodology that is nowadays associated mostly with the theoretical work of
Giorgio Agamben; however, in this research, I applied this methodology both theoretically
and artistically as two different but complementary means of generating knowledge.
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Preface
In his opening remarks to The Signature of All Things: On Method, Giorgio Agamben
claims, building upon an idea by Ludwig Feuerbach, that “the genuine philosophical
element in every work, whether it be a work of art, of science, or of thought, is its capacity
to be developed.”1 It is a tensive element within the work, a seed encapsulating future
realizations, whose unique nature enables its interpreter to also become its developer.
Upon encountering Agamben’s book for the first time, I identified this very element
in it. This element was referred to by the descriptor “Philosophical Archeology”—a term
that today is associated, to a large extent, with the work of Agamben, who identifies his
overarching research methodology as philosophical archeology and is working tirelessly to
systematize it. Though this is only a partial definition of its multifaceted nature,
philosophical archeology essentially embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic
research—a method of historical inquiry at the core of which lies a “historical a priori”
(conceptually tangential to the arche), that which a priori conditions the historical
development of the phenomenon, whether this phenomenon is an objective, historical one
or a subjective self.2 Initially, philosophical archeology seemed pertinent to my scholarly
work and—of at least equal importance—echoed central concerns of my ongoing artistic
practice. As my interest in it deepened, I identified an unexpected but nonetheless evident
correlation between Agamben’s philosophical archeology and my own research
methodology, albeit worked out by different means and in the different but tangential
discourse of visual art. It was as if, similarly to Agamben but unknowingly, I was exercising
an artistic modus operandi as philosophical archeology. I asked myself: What conditions
(as an arche or “historical a priori”) my artistic engagement in the world, and how? Thus,
philosophical archeology was selected as the Archimedean point of this present study; a
study that is therefore both objective and subjective, since, and in accordance with

1
Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 7.
2
Overall, this research conceives of philosophical archeology more broadly (the complexity of which
will gradually be revealed as the research unfolds): it is, as said, a research methodology (a historiographic
framework) in the humanities at large; a metaphor (allegory); (art) content or subject matter; a material-based
historiography; a critical force that conceives of its (past) objects as (future) prototypes or blueprints; and
lastly, philosophical archeology embodies a certain conception of time that conditions a conception of history.
1

Agamben, “[I]t is never the emergence of the fact without at the same time being the
emergence of the knowing subject itself.”3

The (above-mentioned) methodological correlation is also the reason that led to the
theoretical aspect of this doctoral thesis pivoting on Agamben’s œuvre. Due to the
methodological, philosophical, and historiographic characteristics of philosophical
archeology, theorizing it means (for me) not to write, as if externally, about philosophical
archeology, but to make it (with words), to do it in practice (through language). In this
sense, Agamben’s corpus also becomes the site (or the research object) where I practice
and execute philosophical archeology in writing, where I use language as an artistic
medium—a performance that illuminates the development of philosophical archeology,
and the manner in which it is constituted, within Agamben’s own multilayered, extensive
corpus. Thus, I apply the logic of philosophical archeology onto itself.
This form of archeological production parallels the ways in which I work in the
studio as an interdisciplinary artist; and specifically, it shows itself in the way that I
produced the thesis exhibition.4 Therefore, the other aspect of this doctoral thesis (that is,
the thesis exhibition) aligns with my ongoing artistic practice, which includes projects on
historical accounts, archives and documents, acts of excavating and unearthing, memorials
and testimonies, as well as processes of reconstruction and reenactment. What they all
share is not only storytelling, but also history telling (of self and other). This is equally true
also in regard to this artistic project on philosophical archeology.

The two-fold orientation of my research (theory on the one hand, practice on the other)
does not necessarily entail a dichotomous or binary conception of its subject matter; rather,
I research philosophical archeology both theoretically and artistically as two different but

3
Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 89.
4
The exhibition shows a large-scale installation comprised of interdisciplinary mediums. The gallery
is divided into two parts: an archive and its index. The archive, delimited in roughly one-third of the
exhibition space, is not fully accessible. A perforated metal door blocks the physical entry to the archive, so
that one can merely view and listen to (remotely behind the door) what is inside. The archive contains
previous works of mine: some of these works are boxed, some are fully exhibited, and some are displayed in
a manner in between. The index, situated in the main part of the gallery space, is a series of photo-litho prints
(Japanese Washi paper sheets, 30 x 55 in. each) infused with collage work, sounds, and ephemera, forming
a constellation rendered and conceived by archeological art-making.
2

complementary ways of generating knowledge. The relationship between the theoretical
and artistic knowledge-generation methods—or, in other words, the precise dialogue
between the exegesis and artefact—could effectively be described as one of analogy or
parallelism. Both avenues of research equally investigate philosophical archeology, albeit
from different orientations, and thus can be seen as two tensive polarities comprising one,
unified (bipolar) forcefield of research that is measured, echoing Agamben’s wording, “not
by extensive and scalable magnitudes but by vectorial intensities.”5
These polarities form a certain congruence. The studio work cannot become a
translation or merely a realization of theory in the discourse of art, and vice versa, a theory
to come cannot retrospectively explain or illustrate the artistic practice or body of work it
refers to. The theory is not an inquirer who sounds out a meaning supposedly concealed in
material practice; and, likewise, the studio work is not a vehicle to illustrate predefined
answers to questions.
Additionally, the relationship between theory and studio work cannot constitute
itself hierarchically—both realms are equally important and should be seen as
complementary to one another rather than as cancelling each other out. The challenge is to
find the right way, the suitable balance, that will enable both of their own, distinct
operative spaces while, at the same time, allowing each part to positively contribute to the
needs of the other part. Both are parallel responses in the research of philosophical
archeology, like light rays aligned in parallel, communicating as collimated spirits in nonlinear time.

Certainly, there are limits to this research. The discussion is chronologically framed—it
begins with the first appearance of philosophical archeology (as a term, in 1793), and ends
(though not concluded) with present time. Additionally, the discussion of philosophical
archeology in the field of contemporary art is based on my own artistic modus operandi,
although it is contextualized more broadly in order to correspond and resonate with works
of other artists. This delimitation results from the inability to include all the artistic
embodiments of philosophical archeology to date.

5

Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 20.
3

***

Part I (of section I) outlines philosophical archeology in theoretical practice. It is
particularly based on Giorgio Agamben’s œuvre (which characterizes his research
methodology as philosophical archeology), but, in order to thoroughly historicize
philosophical archeology’s development in time, the outline also includes various
references to other pertinent thinkers (Kant, Overbeck, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Foucault, to
name a few) who practiced philosophical archeology in their writings.

A few questions guide this part: What is the Agambenian research methodology of
philosophical archeology? What comprises it? How does it operate? What does it result in?
What can it take as a subject? What enables and prevents it? Can one trace its history within
Agamben’s œuvre or within others? What exactly does it consist of that can further be
developed?

One distinct quality of this part (as well as of Section I) is its textual structure. It is
comprised of five continuous paragraphs (1.1.1–1.1.5), and a series of nine subsequent
glosses that are integrated throughout. The readers are expected, once arrived at a gloss
mark (a red in-text hyperlink), to skip forward and read that certain gloss; and once
finished, to return back to the point in the text from which they “departed” and continue
the

reading.

These

glosses

(in

accordance

with,

as

noted

above,

the

Agambenian/Feuerbachian idea of the encapsulated philosophical element that awaits its
development) comment on key issues that are crucial to a thorough comprehension of

4

philosophical archeology.6
The glosses are marked with a descriptive title as well as with an image or graphic
sign; this sign has a two-part structure: it is comprised of the letter “aleph” (the first letter
in the Hebrew alphabet) and a certain vocalization point/mark (one out of roughly eleven
marks of the Hebrew grammar that, when combined with one of Hebrew’s four matres
lectionis, form the vowels in the language). Beyond the tribute it pays to Agamben’s use
of the “aleph” in his writing, these glosses’ form of marking has another aim that can be
efficiently explicated by referring to the following text.
An interview with writer Edmond Jabès (conducted by artist Bracha Ettinger
Lichtenberg) opens the accompanying catalogue to the exhibition Routes of Wandering:
Nomadism, Journeys and Transitions in Contemporary Israeli Art (1991). In her preface
to the interview, curator Sarit Shapira writes:
Jabès’ texts are a succession of fragments that purport to be quotations from
‘texts’ from different times and places, which are printed at times with
spaces between them that separate and fragment them; the sequence of the
text is impaired also in the parts attributed to Jabès himself—because they
are written in a technique that sabotages development of any kind, that
mixes together different levels and kinds of language, and uses diversified
generic formulas. ... [I]n this way his writing concretely demonstrates the
openness of the text—not only towards all prior texts, but also to the text
that will be written out of it, in an act analogous to reading it. All active
reading of this kind not only unites the foreign linguistic elements and fills
the gaps in the text; all reading is also tearing, which echoes the breakage
in the tablets of the covenant and the prolonged tearing that characterizes
the history of the Jewish people. ... [H]is view of the break as the source of
all things and of the point as the minimal graph from which speech and
writing grow, each time anew, brought Jabès close to the Kabbalah.7

6
Commentary is a discussion or expansion of a text in the form of writing (glosses, annotations) or
images (diagrams, miniatures) as features that can form part of the original program of work, but which can
also take a secondary or extraneous nature. A gloss is a marginal or interlinear annotation of a word or
wording in a text, commenting on, elucidating, or translating those of the main text. In the history of
commentary, glossing, and marginalia, the gloss (as an ancient genre of writing) is a creative form of
intellectual work. The gloss focuses, in most cases, on a single object, formally shaping itself to its object
while preserving the object’s structure. The gloss forms a relationship of “continuing discontinuity” with its
object; it digresses from it in order to open it from within. The gloss multiplies and synthesizes meanings,
ideas, and references without necessarily revolving around a central thesis, providing interpretive and
philological access into its object.
7
Routes of Wandering: Nomadism, Journeys and Transition in Contemporary Israeli Art, 255.
5

In the interview, Jabès says:

I see my books as a cycle of gathering cycles, in which the last circle is a
point. This is a reference to the Kabbalah, where it says that God, to
manifest Himself, will reveal Himself as a point. I think this is marvellous,
because the point in Semitic writing is the vowel. Hence, the point, which
is at the end, is the center, is the vowel.
Ettinger Lichtenberg: Why is the point a vowel?
Jabès: Because if you put three points under the consonant it’ll be ‘eh’, and
if you put one point below it’ll be ‘ee’. In writing, it’s the point. It’s
marvellous. The point is the meaning of the word. It’s the very life of the
word. Without vowels it’s impossible. All the writing is only consonants,
it’s like the name of God, unpronounceable.8 9
Part II (of section I) begins with the tenth gloss. It is an explication of Agamben’s
conception of time that conditions his conception of history; this conception of time is also
a system of thinking. The evolution of the Western conception of time, from ancient to
present time, is surveyed and a definition of an authentic conception of time is attempted—
for Agamben, this means messianic time. Messianic time is discussed as the paradigm of
historical time par excellence (as a time characterized by a cessation and by its redemptive
quality) mainly through Paul’s text the Epistle to the Romans (and in reference to
Agamben’s work on it, The Time that Remains) and Walter Benjamin’s text “Theses on the
Philosophy of History.”
Benjamin’s work serves as a further elaboration on the concept of messianic time.
His philosophical conception of history is articulated in the broader context of his thought,
and, principally, the aesthetic dimension and the possibility of redemption it might offer.
This part thus continues with an outline of Benjamin’s method of montage as it is
practiced—both in theory and in practice—in his writing and through the Agambenian
perspective of it. The montage formulates Benjamin’s theory of historical

8
Ibid, 248.
9
In “Hebrew Grammar,” Spinoza writes about vowels only in passing: “[A]mong the Hebrews
vowels are called souls of letters, and letters without vowels are bodies without souls.” (Spinoza, “Hebrew
Grammar,” 588.)
6

signature/consciousness and the methodological idea of “dialectical image” as a visual
vocabulary. The montage’s pertinent relation to Benjamin’s conception of language is also
discussed in the last, eleventh gloss. The Benjaminian image is explored as an image of
thought and as an image that is used in the discourse of aesthetics. The gesture of the artist
is discussed in this sense as well, with a nod to its possible epistemological implications
based on Agamben’s text Taste.

Section II is an integral component of my thesis exhibition. Its title, Philosophical
Archeology Space 2009–2019, is a paraphrase of Joseph Beuys’s pioneering work Das
Kapital Raum 1970–1977, made for the Venice Biennale in 1980. Referring to Karl Marx’s
magnum opus Das Kapital, Beuys’s work renders, in practice, a theoretical thought. Eugen
Blume and Catherine Nichols (who curated Beuys’s work to the exhibition Capital: Debt,
Territory, Utopia) write: “Art is not only the object of a historical discipline that
systematises, classifies and interprets works created over a long period, but also of
philosophy, which conceives the special essence of art as a challenge to thinking.” 10
Moreover, Beuys’s work is constantly and non-linearly developed—it is “a field of action,
a transformative terrain that unfolds in the space, in the opening, between the words Beuys
kept permanently separate, between Kapital and Raum.” 11 In this sense, the thesis
exhibition I present is likewise (to use Alan Badiou’s words) a “thinking through a form of
thought,”12 a space that is constituted as, and by, philosophical archeology in my ongoing
artistic practice: it is an archeological/historiographic operation, in the framework of
artistic research, that resulted in the identification of three signatures comprising the
(material-based) “historical a priori” of my practice, projects, and exhibitions.13

The discussion in section II (part of the discussion of philosophical archeology in artistic
practice at large) is framed in the context of what seems to be a historiographic turn in
contemporary art, where “the one sector of culture most commonly associated with looking

10
Capital: Debt, Territory, Utopia, 14.
11
Ibid.
12
Quoted in Capital: Debt, Territory, Utopia, 14.
13
In the documentation and articulation of my work, I always refer to (installation-based) exhibitions
as “fields” in order to emphasize (what I hope is) their exploratory, open-ended, and stratificational character.
7

forward should appear so consumed by a passion for looking not just the proverbial other
way but in the opposite direction―backwards.” 14 Part I of this section thus offers a
contextualization of the archeological orientation in contemporary art with several
references to works of other artists that are pertinent to the discussion.

The following questions reverberated in the making of Philosophical Archeology Space
2009–2019: If examined from the perspective of contemporary art practices, is
philosophical archeology at all a research methodology that (in part or entirely) can or
should be rethought, executed, or transformed into the different but related discourse of
art? In what sense could philosophical archeology be artistically used, or, better,
regenerated as an integral, organic part of artistic practices and productions? How can an
artistic act interpret and develop philosophical archeology (as a relation to history), both
theoretically and in practice? And consequently, how will it influence the knowledge
generated relationally at the intersection of the foregoing discourses of the humanities?
With the intention to illuminate philosophical archeology as a modus operandi, and
to examine whether this artistic practice is in a position to distend history and
historiography rather than vice versa, these questions are addressed by the process of
making the exhibition—by deciding upon (and constructing) the two-part structure of the
exhibition (archive and index), by choosing the previous artworks to be included and the
way to exhibit them, by the materials I used in the process (sound included), by the staging
of the archive and its positioning, by lighting, etc.
Furthermore, productive insights opened up by these questions are offered
throughout this section and (perhaps particularly) by the commentary in part II of section
II (2.2.3) where, as a supportive element to the exhibition, these insights are reached (in
the tradition of glossary) as part of a “creative form of intellectual work.”

Lastly, this section is also rendered partly as dossier that, due to the structural nature of
Philosophical Archeology Space 2009–2019, is a decade-long documentary (visual images
and sonic compositions) comprised by the various works included in the archive.

14

Roelstraete, “Field Notes,” 15–16.
8

Section I—Philosophical Archeology in Theoretical Practice

Part 1—Philosophical Archeology in Giorgio Agamben et alia

1.1.1
Chapter 3 of Giorgio Agamben’s book The Signature of All Things: On Method is titled
“Philosophical Archeology,” and outlines an overarching research methodology that
essentially embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic research. ֹ[ אAgamben’s
Methodology]
Philosophical Archeology, as Agamben acknowledges, has developed based on a
series of philosophical ruins in which “Jottings for the Progress of Metaphysics,” 15
Immanuel Kant’s appendix to his own treatise of 1793, is considered to be its point of
departure inasmuch as the term appears there for the first time.
Kant’s essay struggles between, on one hand, the empirical, temporal nature of
historical inquiry, and specifically, the history of philosophy that presents the empirical
and thus contingent, successive order of how thinkers philosophized up to the present; and,
on the other hand, the rational and necessary order of philosophical concepts, the ahistorical
nature of philosophical thought or, in other words, the unconditional and thus a priori
nature of a philosophical history of philosophy. A philosophical history of philosophy is
thus conceived as a special kind of historical inquiry that becomes possible, in Kant’s
words, “not historically or empirically, but rationally, i.e., a priori. For although it
establishes facts of reason, it does not borrow them from historical narrative, but draws
them from the nature of human reason as philosophical archeology [als philosophische
Archäologie].”16

17

Thus for Kant the idea of philosophical archeology entails coming to

15
Kant, “What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?,”
413–424.
16
Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 81; Kant, “What real progress has metaphysics
made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?,” 417.
17
A philosophical history of philosophy, in this regard, is already discussed (albeit somewhat
interchangeably or as a philosophical ruin) in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), where
it is referred to as the “History of Pure Reason.”
9

know the means and ways by which philosophy is articulated by reason itself, as well as to
know the history of philosophy as it is determined by the necessity of a priori principles.
Because philosophical archeology is not merely an empirical history, but also one
that becomes possible a priori, and since philosophizing (specifically, in this case, about
the history of philosophy) is a gradual development of human reason that could not have
begun upon the empirical path, it fundamentally implies that (due to its paradoxical
element) archeology runs the risk of lacking a beginning and putting forth, as Kant writes,
“a history of the thing that has not happened.”18 Thus we can derive, Agamben deduces,
that as an a priori history (which is, after all, a historical practice), philosophical
archeology’s origin, the arche it seeks, can never be given in chronology nor be dated since
it coincides with the complete development of reason; in other words, it is an arche that
will be given in its totality only at the end of philosophizing, while currently its history is
the history of the thing that has not happened. Philosophical archeology is therefore a
historiography of an incomplete gradation (a series of historical ruins, science of ruins—
“ruinology” in Agamben’s words) rather than of a given empirical whole, whose object or
archai “exist only in the condition of partial objects or ruins ... given only as Urbilder,
archetypes ... that can never be reached ... and serve only as guidelines.” 19

20

ֹ[ אFirst

Beginning] and ֹ[ אThe Before of the Book]

1.1.2
The archetypal and unreachable characteristics of the arche, as herein conceived, imply
that every authentic historical inquiry contains an “essential dishomogeneity,” a
constitutive gap between the arche it investigates (made of ruins or archetypes, not given

18
Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 81; Kant, “What real progress has metaphysics
made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?,” 419.
19
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cognition from pure reason.” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 692–93.) Additionally, in regard to a future
task that is currently left open, he writes: “I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely
transcendental point of view, namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto,
which presents to my view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins.” (Ibid, 702.)
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in its totality within chronology) and the phenomenon’s factual origin. ֹ[ אDishomogeneity]
This idea ,according to Agamben ,forms the basis of Foucault’s essay “Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History” (1971) where Genealogy [whose model Foucault finds traces of in
Nietzsche, particularly in Human, All Too Human (1878), The Gay Science (1882) and On
the Genealogy of Morals (1887)] is positioned against “the search for an ‘origin’.”21 At the
historical beginning of things, the Genealogist will never find “[T]he ‘inviolable identity
of their origin.’ ... [W]ill never neglect as inaccessible all the episodes of history.... [W]ill
cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning.... The genealogist
needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin.”22 The true object of Genealogy (or
genealogical research) is thus not the exact essence of things but, following the logic of the
“essential dishomogeneity,” what Foucault calls “descent” or “emergence, the moment of
arising,” which is qualitatively different from the empirical origin and what follows it
historically. The question remains: what kind of object is “the moment of arising,” and
where exactly is it located if never at the “non-place of the origin”? ֹ[ אGenealogy]
Agamben traces the discussion of Genealogy’s dishomogeneity (beyond Foucault
and Nietzsche) back to the German theologian Franz Overbeck. According to Overbeck,
Genealogy’s research object of “the moment of arising,” which is a fringe or heterogenous
stratum within the life of a historical phenomenon, “is not placed in the position of a
chronological origin but is qualitatively other.” 23 In his research on the origin of the
patristic literature, he names it “prehistory” (Urgeschichte), although the prefix “pre”
should not indicate chronology; it need not be understood as the most historically ancient
past, since prehistory’s past is not homogeneous with history’s past and “is not tied to any
specific site in time.” The original (somewhat untranslatable to English) German prefix
“Ur” is more apt in this instance since it is better equipped to convey prehistory’s
fundamental character, which is to be “the history of the moment of arising” rather than
the history of its development, as well as the idea that prehistory is “a constitutive
heterogeneity inherent in historical inquiry itself, which each time must confront a past of
a, so to speak, special type.” This means, for Overbeck, that every historical phenomenon
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splits itself into prehistory and history according to a qualitative difference that is not timedependent—a differentiation that is based on their different qualities thus requires
“different methodologies and precautions.” Agamben brings as an example to this required
precaution the case of the division between the religious and the profane juridical spheres:
should we hypothesize the existence of a more archaic stage beyond both spheres in which
they supposedly are not yet separated, we will in fact be at risk of projecting upon the
presupposed unified phase the characteristics defining both spheres, characteristics
“[W]hich are precisely the outcome of the split. Just as ... [W]hat stands prior to the
historical division is not necessarily the sum of the characteristics defining its fragments.
... In this sense, too, prehistory is not homogenous with history and the moment of arising
is not identical with what comes to be through it.”24
The distinction between prehistory and history means that the historical efficacy of
a phenomenon is bound up with this distinction, and that the dishomogeneity of every
historical inquiry is thus a subjective datum that is, according to Agamben, embedded
within the inquiry and guides it. Engaging this constitutive heterogeneity is crucial for
whomever wishes to practice historical research, and can be carried out as a critique of
tradition and sources. This critique concerns, above all, “the mode in which the past has
been constructed into a tradition,” not in terms of chronological projections, but in terms
of the very structure of historical inquiry. It constitutes a critical view on a certain tradition
in which the withdrawal to the past will eventually coincide with “renewed access to the
sources” (previously unattainable due to the mechanism of “canonization” in Overbeck’s
terms) and will thus enable new epistemological possibilities in the present. According to
Agamben, however, it is impossible to gain a renewed access, beyond tradition, to the
sources without putting into question the very historical subject who seeks access: “What
is in question, then, is the epistemological paradigm of inquiry itself.”25
Archeology is thus a historical inquiry that has to do with the moment of a
phenomenon’s arising, and that must engage anew with the sources and tradition, must
confront the various mechanisms through which tradition regulates and conditions what it
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transmits; it is a practice that eventually determines “the very status of the knowing subject”
because the moment of arising is situated at a threshold of undecidability between object
and subject, thus is both subjective and objective: “It is never the emergence of the fact
without at the same time being the emergence of the knowing subject itself: the operation
on the origin is at the same time an operation on the subject.” 26 The emergence of a
historical phenomenon (its moment of arising, its arche as we have outlined it thus far) that
archeology seeks to reach cannot be localized in a remote past nor beyond this in a
metahistorical, a-temporal structure. It represents a present and operative tendency within
the historical phenomenon that conditions and makes intelligible its development in time.
As Agamben concludes: “It is an arche, but, as for Foucault and Nietzsche, it is an arche
that is not pushed diachronically into the past, but assures the synchronic comprehensibility
and coherence of the system.”27 ֹ[ אarche]

1.1.3
The term “archeology,” which nowadays is largely associated with Foucault’s
investigations, appears in his texts (albeit in a somewhat different form) already in the
preface to his renowned early work The Order of Things (1966). ֹ[ אArcheology]
Archeology is presented there as an investigation into a dimension that is at once
paradigmatic and transcendent, a kind of “historical a priori” where knowledge finds its
structure and conditions of possibility (via the differentiation in the French language
between connaissance and savoir). ֹ[ אHistorical a priori]
This “historical a priori” dimension manifests the history of (a certain)
knowledge’s conditions of possibility; it is an epistemological field that Foucault termed
episteme: not so much a place where ideas are historically revealed, but where an inquiry
attempts to discover “on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what
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space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori ... ideas
could appear,”28 in other words, an unconscious category of the intellect that conditions
the formation of knowledge.
Foucault’s oxymoronic “historical a priori” attempts to underscore, according to
Agamben’s interpretation, that (although conditioning the historical experience) it is not a
metahistorical origin that founds and determines knowledge, but the episteme is itself a
historical practice.29 That is, “The a priori that conditions the possibility of knowledge is
its own history grasped at a specific level.”30 It is a concrete, ontological level of existence,
a “brute fact” of its existing in a given time for a given society, “or, to use the terminology
from the Nietzsche essay, the brute fact of its ‘moment of arising’ (or, in Overbeck’s terms,
its prehistory).”31
Yet how could the a priori itself be embedded in an historical constellation? And
how is it possible to gain access to it? Agamben asserts that the idea of the “historical a
priori” as such originates more from Marcel Mauss’s discussion of the idea of mana in his
book A General Theory of Magic rather than from Kant’s philosophical archeology:
Mauss defines this historical transcendental as ‘an unconscious category of
understanding[,]’ ... suggesting in this way that the epistemological model
required for such knowledge cannot be entirely homogeneous with that of
conscious historical knowledge.... But as with Foucault, it is nevertheless
clear that for Mauss the a priori, though conditioning historical experience,
is itself inscribed within a determinate historical constellation.... In other
words, it realizes the paradox of an a priori condition that is inscribed within
a history and that can only constitute itself a posteriori with respect to this
history in which inquiry—in Foucault’s case, archeology—must discover
it.32
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1.1.4
Agamben claims that Foucault did not question the unique temporal structure that seems
to be indicated by the idea of a “historical a priori.” Yet the past that is in question here,
echoing previous ideas of such past that we have seen so far (such as Kant’s, Nietzsche’s,
and Overbeck’s) is “a special kind of past that neither precedes the present chronologically
as origin nor is simply exterior to it.”33 In his attempt to articulate the specific temporal
structure of this past, Agamben assembles a series of paradigmatic examples out of which
I will concentrate on a few distinctive ones.
The first example, relatively limited in scope, is that of Henri Bergson’s conception
of the phenomenon of déjà-vu as it appears in his book L’Énergie spirituelle (1919).
Bergson understands déjà-vu as a phenomenon in which memory does not follow
perception chronologically, but occurs simultaneously with it, and thus is able to produce
“false perceptions” that he defines as “a memory of the present.” This is a kind of memory
that “is of the past in its form and of the present in its matter.”34 Similarly, according to
Agamben, the condition of possibility in the “historical a priori” that the archeologist is
seeking to reach is not only contemporary with the present and the real, but is an inherent
and continuous part of them. The temporal structure of the “historical a priori” exemplifies
a unique conception of the past that therefore enables the archeologist pursuing such an a
priori to “retreat, so to speak, towards the present.” It is as if every historical phenomenon
splits into prehistory and history (“a history of the sources and a historical tradition”),
which are “in actuality contemporaneous, insofar as they coincide for an instant in the
moment of arising.”35
Similarly, another example (as a matter of fact, merely a note in Agamben’s text,
but an important one in the overall context) concerns Walter Benjamin’s suggestion (in
convolute N—Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress) that “the entire past must be
brought into the present in a ‘historical apocatastasis’.” 36 Benjamin’s reference to
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eschatological reality (when a restitution of the origin will take place at the end of time),
while characterizing it as historical, means a temporal structure that is similar to the
“historical a priori.”
Lastly, an elaborated example to the temporal structure of the (“historical a priori”)
past is that given by the work of the Italian philosopher Enzo Melandri. Reflecting upon
the philosophical relevancy of Foucault’s archeology, writes Agamben, Melandri notices
that while the codes and matrices of our culture are usually explicated by referring to a
higher code that includes a mysterious explanatory force (this is the model of the “origin”),
Foucault’s archeology suggests to reverse the process, or better, “to make the explication
of the phenomenon immanent in its description.”37 This means refuting any metahistorical
structure (or metalanguage in Foucault’s case due to the centrality of language in his
perimetric analysis) and, instead, favouring the model of the “historical a priori” while
seeking (Melandri) to analyze its structure “vis-à-vis the Freudian opposition between the
conscious and the unconscious.” In order to perform his analysis—ultimately in order to
arrive at his own conception of archeology—Melandri first departs (just as Foucault) from
a point rooted in Nietzsche, in particular his concept of “Critical History,”38 indicating a
history that criticizes and destroys the past in order to enable the life in the present. 39
However, Melandri, according to Agamben, generalizes Nietzsche’s concept by
connecting it to Freud’s concept of regression, thus granting his concept of archeology
(which is based on a “Dionysian” regression in time) the role of the healer or the redeemer.
Melandri writes:

[Critical history] must retrace in the opposite direction the actual genealogy
of events that it examines. The division that has been established between
historiography and actual history is quite similar to the one that, for Freud,
has always existed between the conscious and the unconscious. Critical
history thus has the role of a therapy aimed at the recovery of the
unconscious, understood as the historical ‘repressed.’... [This archeological
process] consists in tracking genealogy back to where the phenomenon in
question splits into the conscious and the unconscious. Only if one succeeds
in reaching that point does the pathological syndrome reveal its real
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meaning. So it is a matter of regression: not to the unconscious as such, but
to what made it unconscious.40
In contrast to the pessimistic vision of regression (which is “incapable of overcoming the
original infantile scene”), Melandri’s archeology seems to be capable of a regression back
to the point where the dichotomy between history and historiography (or conscious and
unconscious when he relates his discussion to psychoanalysis) was produced, a regression
not to a previous state (bringing the repressed back to consciousness) but to the moment
which constituted it as such, to “the source of the split.” In this sense, it is the opposite of
rationalization, an archeological operation, Agamben quotes, that “requires a ‘Dionysian
regression’ ... To understand the past, we should equally traverse it à reculons [i.e.,
backwards].”41 This “Dionysian regression” is an advance in time, a singular manifestation
of the past’s temporal structure, that turns its back to its final destination. It is the inverse,
complementary advancement to that of the Angelus Novus—Walter Benjamin’s wellknown advancing “angel of history” described in his ninth thesis on the philosophy of
history.42 While Benjamin’s angel advances towards the future as it gazes at the past,
Melandri’s angel regresses towards the past as it gazes at the future. Both advance towards
an unidentifiable final destination—though we know that the destination of these two
images of historical process is the present. At the end point of the archeological regression,
at the point where the split (between conscious and unconscious; historiography and actual
history) produces the condition of our present experience, we realize that our way of
representing the moment before the split is governed by the split itself, and that we should
not presuppose or expect (or try to represent) a kind of “golden age” beyond the dichotomy
that is devoid of repressions. Rather, “before or beyond the split, in the disappearance of
the categories governing its representation, there is nothing but the sudden, dazzling
disclosure of the moment of arising, the revelation of the present as something that we were
not able to live or think.”43 ֹ[ אThe Contemporary]
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1.1.5
If we have conjured a somewhat psychoanalytic vocabulary, it is to help us form an analogy
to the archeological regression. The idea, writes Agamben, that the present might be given
in the form of a “constitutive inaccessibility” is bound up with Freud’s theory and
understanding of what repression essentially means. In the context of psychoanalysis,
repression is discussed through the event of trauma according to which an experience is
repressed due to its traumatic character or because the conscious mind is unable to accept
its consequences. Throughout the latent period of its repression, as if it had never taken
place, the event nonetheless keeps on living, somewhat in secrecy, only to reappear later
on in the form of “neurotic symptoms or oneiric content.” Only a successful analysis,
according to Freud, can go beyond the symptoms back to the repressed event and heal the
patient. The present’s form of “constitutive inaccessibility” is further supported by the
(psychoanalytic) idea, set forth by Cathy Caruth in Unclaimed Experience: Trauma,
Narrative, and History, that latency is constitutive of historical experience and that “the
traumatic event is preserved and experienced precisely and only through its forgetting.”44
In other words, the inherent latency, the inherent forgetting, within the traumatic
experience itself, made it available to be experienced from the outset. This is the trauma’s
historical power, and thus “history can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its
occurrence.” From these ideas (and previous ones we mentioned, such as Bergson’s
conception of déjà-vu), Agamben concludes, with reference to archeology, that both
memory and forgetfulness

are contemporaneous with perception and the present. While we perceive
something, we simultaneously remember and forget it. Every present thus
contains a part of non-lived experience. ... This means that it is above all the
unexperienced, rather than just the experienced, that gives shape and
consistency to the fabric of psychic personality and historical tradition and
ensures their continuity and consistency.45
In both cases (of psychoanalysis and archeological regression), the past, which was never
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really experienced and therefore “technically cannot be defined as ‘past’,” remains as a
present—either in the form of neurotic symptoms (as in the Freudian schema) or, in the
case of Genealogy, in the form of canonization that only patient work that focusing on “the
moment of arising” (rather than searching for an origin) can gain access beyond tradition.
Yet in contrary to the analytic work of psychoanalysis which, if successful, withdraws to
the originary event and brings back to consciousness all the content that has been repressed
in the unconscious, the archeological regression withdraws further and reaches “the fault
line where memory and forgetting, lived and non-lived experience both communicate with
and separate from each other.”46 In its withdrawal, genealogical inquiry does not search
for the phenomenon’s origin but focuses on its “moment of arising”; it does not wish, as in
Freud, to restore a previous stage but, as Agamben writes:

to go back not to its content but to the modalities, circumstances, and
moments in which the split, by means of repression, constituted it as origin.
... It does not will to repeat the past, ... it wills to let it go ... in order to gain
access beyond the past to what has never been. ... Only at this point is the
un-lived past revealed for what it was: contemporary with the present. It
thus becomes accessible for the first time, exhibiting itself as a ‘source’.47
For Agamben, this is why contemporaneity is rare and difficult, and why archeology
constitutes the only path of access to the present.
Agamben’s analysis thus far showed us that in regard to the specific temporal
structure implicit in philosophical archeology, we deal not so much with a past (in its
conventional sense) but with a “moment of arising,” and that the access to it (within the
“historical a priori” dimension) can only be obtained by returning back to the point where
it was covered over and neutralized by tradition (or in Melandri’s terms, to the split between
conscious and unconscious, history and historiography): “The moment of arising, the arche
of archeology is what will take place, what will become accessible and present, only when
the archeological inquiry has completed its operation. It therefore has the form of a past in
the future, that is, future anterior.”48 Gaining access to the present, beyond memory and
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forgetting (or rather “at the threshold of their indifference”), beyond their inverse,
reciprocal operation on (and in) time, is archeology’s aim; and that is why the space opened
towards the present is “projected into the future” while intertwining with it. Once the
archeological work has cleared away the blocked access to history, the future will be
realized as a “past that will have been”; the arche will become accessible once it is realized
as the past that “will have been,” and only in this form “can historical consciousness truly
becomes possible.”49
The relation between archeology and history becomes clear, writes Agamben, by
realizing that archeology moves backward through the course of history, representing a
regressive force that retreats towards the point “where history becomes accessible for the
first time, in accordance with the temporality of the future anterior.”50 Only then will this
relation [just as in the Abrahamic theological doctrines where the work of redemption
precedes in rank that of creation (while making it comprehensible and meaningful), and
even though seems to follow the latter it is in truth anterior] reveal itself as an archeological
a priori condition that is embedded within history, making it possible. It is a relation of
separation and, at the same time, unification. Benjamin, writes Agamben, “made
redemption a fully historical category,” making clear that “not only is archeology the
immanent a priori of historiography, but the gesture of the archeologist constitutes the
paradigm of every true human action.”51 ֹ[ אMessianic Time and History]
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ֹ[ אAgamben’s Methodology]
I
For Agamben, method and theory (and likewise practice and theory) are inseparable as
each theory contains within itself the way or path to itself. Theory, he marks, is practice
thus any proper destruction (during the investigation) is also a construction; they are also
inseparable.52 First methodological principle.
Moreover, “method shares with logic its inability to separate itself completely from
its context. There is no method that would be valid for every domain, just as there is no
logic that can set aside its objects.”53 Second methodological principle.
The third methodological principle, modestly ascribed to Walter Benjamin, is that
“doctrine may legitimately be exposed only in the form of interpretation.”54 It is in the
context of this principle that Agamben frames his scholarly relatedness to Foucault’s work,
as well as what may appear to be, across The Signature of All Things, as nothing more than
(though erudite) “investigations on the method of Michel Foucault,” 55 but in reality is
much more.
Foucault once commented that his “historical investigations of the past are only the
shadow cast by theoretical interrogation of the present.”56 Accessing the present is possible
only by following the shadows these interrogations cast on the past. Foucault often draws
relationships between his archeology and historical inquiries—for him they are distinct but
also connected; archeology needs history and vice versa. This is likewise for Agamben, in
accordance with philosophical archeology’s meditation on the relation between history and
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archeology. He writes: “[E]very inquiry in the human sciences―including the present
reflection on method―should entail an archeological vigilance. In other words, it must
retrace its own trajectory back to the point where something remains obscure and
unthematized.”57 Fourth methodological principle.
According to the fifth methodological principle, which further explains Agamben’s
position on the interlocutory role of the interpreter, “the genuine philosophical element in
every work, whether it be a work of art, of science, or of thought, is its capacity to be
developed, which Ludwig Feuerbach defined as Entwickklungsfähigkeit.”58 This German
expression is ambiguous: it signifies both a passive capacity as well as an active capacity;
an expression that forms a buffer zone or a no man’s land that cannot be exclusively
appropriated by author or reader, original or annotated text.59 Because of this principle,
putting one’s finger on a clear difference between the author of the work and its interpreter
“becomes as essential as it is difficult to grasp.”60 Elsewhere Agamben writes:

Why does this search for the element liable to be developed fascinate me?
Because if we follow this methodological principle all the way, we
inevitably end up at a point where it is not possible to distinguish between
what is ours and what belongs to the author we are reading. Reaching this
impersonal zone of indifference, in which every proper name, every
copyright, and every claim for originality fades away, fills me with joy.61
In his lecture “What is a Paradigm?,” 62 Agamben refers to the work’s capacity to be
developed as an adequate representation or definition for philosophy at large—something
that exists in literature, art, or science, which lacks a concrete territory in and of itself, but
nonetheless exists as an element to be developed within them.63 Philosophy always exists
in exile and requires to be assembled. For Agamben, the methodological principle of
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Entwickklungsfähigkeit corresponds with Benjamin’s idea of messianic time that is
prevalent throughout the length and breadth of “secular time,” or to the hermeneutical idea
according to which one is required to understand a certain author more than the latter
understands itself.64

II
In his introductory notes to Agamben’s book Potentialities, Daniel Heller-Roazen
highlights one of the systematic pillars of Agamben’s methodology—the Agambenian
method thinks the historical and the philological as inseparable. Referring to Benjamin’s
concept of “redemption,” and his prefatory notes to the “Theses on the Philosophy of
History,”65 the Agambenian historical method is always involved, writes Heller-Roazen,
“in a messianic moment of thinking, in which the practice of the ‘historian’ and the practice
of the ‘philologist,’ the experience of tradition and the experience of language, cannot be
told apart.”66 In this moment, the past is saved not in its past form, but in being transformed
into something that never was, in being read as “what was never written.”
The transmission of tradition, for Agamben, is conditioned by the transmission of
language. Every communication between human beings must presuppose the fact that there

64
Considered from a historical perspective, the Agambenian methodology is in this sense part of a
corpus of techniques of interpretation. This corpus, which can be dated back to the Greek grammarians, was
somewhat in suspension throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was relaunched not before
the nineteenth century. As Foucault indicates in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, the corpus opened up once again
the possibility of interpretation and hermeneutic. This new possibility, still relevant today, is characterized,
according to Foucault, by the way these techniques of interpretation (including that of Agamben) were able
to range signs “in a much more differentiated space, according to a dimension that could be called that of
depth.” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, 272.) The interpreter is, for example as per Nietzsche, “‘the
good excavator of the lower depths’,” (Ibid, 273) thus the signifier “archeology” (in philosophical
archeology) makes evident its belonging to this tradition. Another aspect that characterizes the techniques of
interpretation, according to Foucault, emphasizes the idea that interpretation became an infinite task since
signs are linked together in an inexhaustible network framed by an irreducible gaping and openness. This
aspect of incompleteness of interpretation “is found once again ... in the form of the refusal of beginning.”
(Ibid, 274.) Agamben’s methodology, as we shall see in due course, renounces the beginning much in the
same way as Foucault’s or Nietzsche’s, but simultaneously renders it a categorically discoverable within, and
at the end of, its archeological dig.
65
“Historical method is a philological method, a method that has as its foundation the book of life.
‘To read what was never written,’ is what Hofmannsthal calls it. The reader referred to here is the true
historian.” (quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, I.) The quotation refers to Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften,
vol. I, pt. 3, 1238.
66
Quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, 1.
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is language,67 for without it there is no transmission nor signification, and it is this fact
that cannot be communicated in the form of statements. Statements are possible only after
speech has already begun. Philology, as Agamben states in Infancy and History, from the
outset has the role of abolition between the thing to be transmitted and the act of
transmission, “and since this abolition has always been regarded as the essential character
of myth, philology can thereby be defined as a ‘critical mythology’.”68
“What was never written” in all communication (linguistic and historical),
according to Agamben, is the fact that there is language, and the fact that it was never
written derives from the fact that it can enter into “writing” only in the form of a
presupposition. Yet this fact can be “‘read’: exposed, it can be comprehended in its
existence as potentiality.” 69 “To read what was never written” means to bring back
everything that has ever been said to the event of its taking place, to its pure potentiality.
Language, in Benjamin’s terms, is thus “redeemed”; though brought to its pure potentiality,
speech has nothing to say.
Reduced to its speechless capacity for speech, the pure existence of language shows
its own potentiality for expression, it shows its own existence, that there exists a medium
in which communication takes place, and that what is communicated in this medium is not
one thing or another but communicability itself. To examine the pure existence of language,
free from any form of presupposition, is to consider a community inconceivable according
to any representable condition of belonging, a “coming community” without identity
defined by its existence in language as irreducible, absolute potentiality.

III
In addition to its archeological element, the Agambenian method consists of two other
intertwining elements: the paradigm and the signature.70

67
This claim is echoed throughout Agamben’s books Infancy and History, Language and Death, The
Sacrament of Language and What is Philosophy? as well as in his essays “The Idea of Language” and
“Philosophy and Linguistics,” (Agamben, Potentialities, 62–76) to name a few.
68
Agamben, Infancy and History, 146.
69
Quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, 22.
70
See Watkin, 2014 (a and b).
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1) Agamben’s dealing with paradigms (or prime examples)71 begins specifically on the
background of the discussion of the relationship between the whole and the part, the
common and the proper, or the general and the particular.72 This antinomy of the general
and the particular “has its origin in language,”73 where we name a particular object and by
that transform it into a member of a general class defined by a property held in common.
This procedure closely resembles the formation of political communities, thus both politics

71
For a discussion of the paradigm as a particular mode and function of a historical example see
Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, 119–137. Additionally, Agamben dedicates the first
chapter of The Signature of All Thing: On Method to the question “What is a paradigm?” where he attempts
to clarify a few misunderstandings or criticisms raised against him on the account of using facts as metaphors
and vice versa, thus failing to act as a responsible historian. However, he insists on using concrete historical
examples as paradigms that attempt to articulate a broader set of problems.
72
This relationship is also known in interpretive processes of knowledge as the hermeneutic circle—
the idea that the part can be understood only by means of the whole and every explanation of the part
presupposes the understanding of the whole; or in other words, that knowledge of a single phenomenon
presupposes knowledge of the whole (and vice versa), thus a paradox prevails and the epistemological
procedure cannot begin.
Agamben refers to the idea of the hermeneutic circle a few times throughout his oeuvre, often in an
attempt to come to terms with its interpretive complexity, which adheres as a challenge to the human sciences
at large.
In his essay on Aby Warburg’s research methodology, “Aby Warburg and the Nameless Science,” for
example, he explains that philological and historical disciplines consider the hermeneutic circle to be the
epistemological process that is proper to them and is the foundation of all hermeneutics. However, contrary
to the common belief, this is not necessarily a vicious circle that sabotages processes of knowledge (it is, he
claims, in fact the rationality of the humanities) because if this science wants to remain faithful to its own
law, it needs to “stay within it in the right way” (as per Heidegger). The passage from the part to the whole
(and back) never returns to the same point; at every step it broadens its radius, discovering a higher
perspective that opens a new circle: “The curve representing the hermeneutic circle is not a circumference ...
but a spiral that continually broadens its turns.” (Agamben, Potentialities, 96.)
In The Signature of All Things: On Method this theme is interrogated once again specifically in the
context of the current discussion, that is, the paradigmatic method. Tracing the hermeneutic circle in the
discourse of Philology, from Georg Anton Friedrich Ast to Martin Heidegger, Agamben emphasizes the
latter’s crucial contribution to understanding the hermeneutic circle not as a vicious circle but as a virtuous
one: “Grounding this hermeneutical circle in Being and Time on pre-understanding as Dasein’s anticipatory
existential structure, Martin Heidegger helped the human sciences out of this difficulty and indeed guaranteed
the ‘more original’ character of their knowledge.” (Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 27.)
However, Agamben claims, if the interpreter's activity is always already anticipated by a pre-understanding
that is elusive, it seems as if the inquirer must be able to recognize in phenomena the signature of a preunderstanding that depends on their own existential character, thus “the circle then seems to become even
more ‘vicious’.” (Ibid.) The aporia, according to Agamben, is resolved if we understand that the hermeneutic
circle is, in fact, a paradigmatic circle: “There is no duality here between ‘single phenomenon’ and ‘the
whole’ as there was in Ast and Schleiermacher: the whole only results from paradigmatic exposition of
individual cases. And there is no circularity, as in Heidegger, between a ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ between preunderstanding and interpretation. In the paradigm, intelligibility does not precede the phenomenon; it stands,
so to speak, ‘besides’ it (para). ... The phenomenon, exposed in the medium of its knowability, shows the
whole of which it is the paradigm. ... With regard to phenomena, ... it stands neither in the past nor the present
but in their exemplary constellation.” (Ibid, 27–28.)
73
Agamben, The Coming Community, 9.
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and language are caught between universality and singularity. The concept of the paradigm
nonetheless escapes this antinomy: “Neither particular nor universal, the example is a
singular object that presents itself as such.”74 An example is simultaneously both a simple
member of a set and the defining criteria of that set. By providing its own criteria of
inclusion, the example remains ambiguously positioned alongside the class of which it is
most representative, neither fully included in a class nor fully excluded from it. The
paradigm is always both suspended from its group and belonging to it. Thus, the separation
of exemplarity and singularity is false or impossible. All groups are immanent to their
paradigmatic members, never presupposed.75
Based on Aristotle’s description of the special logical movement of the example
(which he distinguishes from both induction and deduction),76 Agamben writes that the
paradigm constitutes a peculiar form of knowledge that calls into question the particulargeneral relation as a model of logical inference. The paradigm is a mode of knowledge that
moves between singularities. It refutes the general and the particular as well as
dichotomous logic in favour of a bipolar analogical model.77 As the example moves from
particular to particular, its epistemic character remains unconnected to general categories
of any kind, thus must be understood as analogical inasmuch as analogy is a cognitive
process in which particulars are associated without reference to generalities. The example
is the deactivation of a particular from its normal usage such that it both constitutes and
makes intelligible “the rule of that use, which cannot be shown in any other way.” 78
Paradigms make intelligible the analogical form of knowing, which can neither be
explained with reference to an origin nor conveyed by way of rules. Herein lies its power
to illuminate the present.
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Ibid, 10.
75
Agamben further discusses the relation between an example and an exception in Agamben, Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 21–23.
76
Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 69.
77
Paradigms do not constitute the transfer of meaning, but rather an analogical model. Analogy refers
to the third order of relationality; metonymy is relation due to proximity (or contact); metaphor due to
meaning transfer; while analogy is a deactivated relationality where it is neither proximate nor transferable,
but a mix of both occupying a space of suspensive mediation. Analogical paradigm is the process by which
identity and difference (or common and proper) is suspended in a state of indispensability.
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Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 18.
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Following Agamben, a paradigm is at once embedded in a given historical
situation and a tool for better understanding ‘the present situation.’ These
paradigms must then walk a fine line between past and present, and for this
reason they require the most careful understanding—at once historical and
hermeneutical—if they are to achieve their end.79
In other words, paradigms draw on historical occurrences of the past, while being
crystallized and concretized in the real time of the present, though directed towards a future
point in time when the (future) present will be rendered inoperative and free to be reused.

2) Signature is the mode of distribution of paradigms through time and discourses, thus it
is the exposition of intelligibility (the signature is akin to the paradigm and contains a few
elements that refer back to the logic of the paradigm). It is characterized by a signatory
displacement: “Signature is something that in a sign or concept marks and exceeds such
sign or concept, referring it back to a certain field without leaving the semiotic to constitute
a new meaning... [S]ignatures move and displace concepts from one field to another,
without redefining them semantically.”80 Signatures operate as pure historical elements
precisely because they connect different fields and times. 81 In their historical work,
signatures function “anachronistically” as they operate outside or against chronology. The
signatures function on the basis of random interconnectedness, where one does not
identifies a mythic origin but determines when signs first emerged on the horizon of
perceptibility.82
A signature guides the interpretation of a sign or a concept in a specific direction,
similarly to Benjamin’s idea of “secret indices,”83 where the past carries with it a secret
index to be deciphered in the present when perceived.84 The meaning of a signature is not
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De La Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 350.
80
Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 4. “Oikonimia,” one of the book’s themes, for example, is
a signature whose meaning remains the same but whose location alters (domestic-theology-politics). More
broadly, Foucault’s Archeology; Nietzsche’s Genealogy; Derrida’s Deconstruction and Benjamin’s Theory
of Dialectical Images are all “sciences of signature.”
81
On what claimed to be the Heideggerian precedent (Spur) to the Agambenian concept of signature,
see Östman, “Philosophical Archeology as Method in the Humanities. A comment on Cultural Memory and
the Problem of History,” 84–86.
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Collili, Agamben and the Signature of Astrology: Spheres and Potentiality, 24.
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Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 390.
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Collili, Agamben and the Signature of Astrology: Spheres and Potentiality, xvi.
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found in the sign or the semantic meaning, but in the manner in which the signature allows
things to be said or understood. The signature has a specific origin, a historical “moment
of arising,” and a large number of historical presentations, all of them paradigmatic.
Additionally, a system of reading signs is based on signatures where the
relationship between them is not that of cause and effect but of resemblance and analogy.
For Agamben, a signature is not a sign but that element which makes the sign intelligible.
The signature is a sign without a content and thus gives rise to a pure identity deprived of
any meaning or signification.85 The relation between the signature and the thing that it
semiotically marks is analogical—this is why signatures, which (according to the theory of
signs) should appear as signifiers, always already slide into the position of the signified.
Thus, “signum and signatum exchange roles and seem to enter into a zone of
undecidability.”86 The signature is an impotentiality that permits potentiality to be altered
through a movement to actuality (without actuality being a semiotic fullness). This
movement brings two major Agambenian concepts together: the logic of potentiality
(which includes impotentiality) and the ontology of potential.87

The common-proper relationship is also at work within the relationship between paradigms
and a signature. The metaphysical tradition presents any concept as a split structure (or as
a bi-conceptual structure) between two heterogeneous elements: the common
(unconditional power, founding element, signature) and the proper (singularity, a series of
subsequent, dependent elements or paradigms, what's founded), which appears to actualize
this original element. Thus, research into a certain phenomenon reveals a multiplicity of
paradigms that can be organized under a single overarching concept (signature) such as
power, language, potentiality, poetry, life, etc.

85
The idea that the signature is a pure, historical, and self-referential element brings to mind Pierre
Nora’s conception of “Lieu de mémoire” (Site of Memory), according to which a site of memory does not
have a reference in reality; in other words, it is the reference of itself, a sign that points merely to itself as a
sign in its pure state. This does not mean, according to Nora, that a site of memory lacks content, physical
presence, or history, but what constitutes it as a site of memory is also the same thing that “de-historicizes”
it as such. Thus, a site of memory is of a twofold character: a site of excess, sealed within itself, within its
identity, folded around its name, and simultaneously attentive to reverberated space of its meaning. (Nora,
Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past.)
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This structure is illogical, paradoxical, and self-negating due to the common’s selffounding fiction of presence. For example, what seems to be the founding element of the
law is a product of the law itself. The common founds the realm of the proper, which itself
invents the constant need for a fiction of foundation through the modes of its operation.
Our ability to distinguish between the common and the proper becomes confused
in a space that Agamben constitutes as a zone of indifference. There, we can no longer
point to that which is the common and that which is the proper, and which one of them is
the founding element. At this place, the energy of this dialectical system is eliminated
because it depends on oppositional difference. This could be said to be the case for any
metaphysical concept of Western thought, since any concept is traditionally split, as we
state above, into two elements (common-proper). A system that depends on the commonproper distinction becomes inoperative once this distinction breaks down. The signature is
the act of presenting as necessary what is, in fact, an historical contingency, thus rendering
it inoperative (in other words, rendering Metaphysics indifferent)—and such escape from
false necessities—is Agamben’s aim.88
Thus, this structure can become inoperative by (1) showing that its illogical; (2)

88 In this sense, Agamben’s methodology has a very precise and ambitious aim—to paradigmatically trace
the arches, as identity-difference constructs (or signatures), in order to suspend them, and thus to render
historiography (as a mode of metaphysical signature) indifferent; or in other words, to render indifferent the
two oppositional methods of Western epistemological thought: logical deduction and empirical induction.
Agamben’s methodology tries to go beyond the metaphysics of presence and difference through an
archeological excavation of paradigms; thus, through the exposition of paradigmatic order and its signatory
distribution (through common-proper dialectics), it tries to render inoperative the conditioning, binary logic
of Western thought. Moreover, Agamben’s claim that all concepts (signatures) are historically contingent
and not logically necessary also applies to the very concept of “difference.” Thus the “common” and the
“proper” are not actual, existent ontological or transcendent states, but a result of the philosophy of difference.
In contrast to the somewhat overly common interpretation of Agamben’s aim, his work (in my view) does
not offer merely a negative or nihilistic critique, but wishes to constitute an epistemology that tries to allow
us to see things differently than we are usually forced to.
Another way to speak about Agamben’s attempt to articulate a philosophy that is based on a different
type of logic is perhaps offered by David Kishik in his book on Agamben. He writes: “Though he usually
immerses himself in meticulous and systematic scholarly studies, Agamben likes to present his findings in
the form of miniature sketches, images, or scenes—each of which can stand both still and alone. When he
collects these vignettes into a monograph, they sometimes resemble a flip book, which gives the fleeting
illusion of a moving image by the quick turn of the pages with the thumb and index finger. ... Agamben
speaks about ‘brachylogy as a form of philosophy’ without developing this idea any further. Brachylogy
comes from the Greek brakhus and logos, or ‘short speech.’... But if we consider this concept in logical rather
than grammatical terms, ... [B]rachylogy could also be said to stand for a form of philosophy without logical
operations (not, and, or, if/then).... This is ... that his thought does not pretend to lead us from point A to point
B by means of an argumentative apparatus.” (Kishik, The Power of Life, 62–63.)
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demonstrating that every concept, being historically contingent, operates as a founding
fiction of oppositional division, but nonetheless has an origin that can be revealed and thus
will become inoperative; and (3) identifying the constant communication between the
common and the proper (the identity-difference opposition), and the way to suspend the
difference between them. Nonetheless, Agamben’s attempt to free our intelligibility from
our dependency on the structure of identity-difference does not necessitate the messianic
future return to an ideal state of pre-divisive unity.
[Continue Reading]
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ֹ[ אFirst Beginning]
It should be noted that in an earlier text Kant argued that a history of the first development
of any phenomenon that has its original predisposition “in the nature of the human being”
(reason, freedom, etc.) is fundamentally different from the history of the phenomenon “in
its progression, which can be grounded only on records.”89 Attempts to outline the first
beginning of a certain (natural) historical phenomenon may legitimately include [the
insertion of] conjectures regarding the phenomenon’s arche, “insofar as nature makes it,”90
since it can be based on experience as we assume it “was not better or worse than what we
encounter now,” thus the beginning need not be invented by fiction. This, however, will be
an illegitimate act in relation to outlining the first beginning of the history of human deeds
since “to let a history arise simply and solely from conjectures does not seem much better
than to make the draft for a novel.”91

92

[Continue Reading]
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Kant, “Conjectural beginning of human history (1786),” 163.
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For a complementary discussion of the end of all things and phenomena (and therefore of history),
see Kant, “The End of All Things (1794)”.
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ֹ[ אThe Before of the Book]
“To let a history [of human deeds] arise simply and solely from conjectures does not seem
much better than to make the draft for a novel.”93
In his relatively short meditations on literature, compiled under The Fire and the
Tale, Agamben refers to Roland Barthes. Referring to any creative work, Barthes highlights
the problem of the relation between “the fantasy of the novel” and the preparatory notes
and fragments, and about the similar relation between the fragmented novel and the proper
novel. The period that precedes the finished work is named by Agamben, paraphrasing
Barthes, as “the before of the book”94—a limbo, pre- or sub-world of fantasies, sketches,
notes, copybooks, drafts, and blotters.95 The problem with this world, according to Barthes,
is that it is “poorly defined, and poorly studied”; to that Agamben adds that our culture is
not able to give it “a legitimate status nor an adequate graphic design.”96 The reason for
this cultural situation stems from the thesis, put forward by Agamben, that “our idea of
creation and work is encumbered with the theological paradigm of the divine creation of
the world,” according to which the world was created ex nihilo in an incomparable manner,
and not only that, but was also instantaneously accomplished without hesitation and
through an immediate act of the will. God thus had no preparatory draft nor initial matter
for creation; and in fact, the very problem of the “before of the creation” is, in theology, a
forbidden topic. 97 In Romanticism we find the idea that fragments and outlines were
superior to the completed work, and for this reason writers intentionally left their writings

93
Kant, “Conjectural beginning of human history (1786),” 163.
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Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 84.
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Perhaps the most outstanding example for that, in modern literature, is by another author closely
related to Agamben’s thought—Walter Benjamin. Volume IV of Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften
(Collected Writings) presents a mass of preparatory notes, quotations, photographic and bibliographic
citations that were collected in preparation for his Arcades Project, and were never assembled into coherent,
finished narratives.
96
Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 84.
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The theological traditions, both Christian and Jewish, refer to this problem. In the Christian tradition
(having a Platonic origin and exerting its profound influence on the Renaissance conception of artistic
creation) God always had an “outline” of the “ideas of all the creatures he then created,” (Ibid, 85) always
possesses something that precedes creation, an immemorial “before” the work that was eventually
accomplished in the biblical Hexameron. The Cabalistic tradition understands creation ex nihilo to mean that
nothingness is the matter with which God made its creation, that the divine work “is literally made of
nothing.” (Ibid.)
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in a fragmented form. 98 The way in which we conceive the identity of the work has
transformed radically in recent decades, a tendency that can be witnessed in the field of
“ecdotics” (the science that deals with the edition of texts) where, in comparison with the
past when the aim was the reconstruction of a single definitive critical text, nowadays we
encounter the reproduction of all the layers of the manuscript without distinguishing the
different versions. Thus the “text” becomes an infinite temporal process, towards both past
and future, whose interruption at a certain historical point is purely contingent. 99 The
caesura that ends the drafting of the work does not confer on it a privileged status of
completeness; it just constitutes it as another fragment of a potentially infinite creative
process. The “so called completed work is distinguished only accidentally from the
uncompleted one.” If each version of the work is a fragment, we can speak also about “the
after of the book,” that is, the process of retraction to previous “finished” works and the
reworking of them in order to amend their flaws or clarify their meanings and aims.100 This
is the other side of the theological paradigm of divine creation according to which creation
is an infinite continuous process that, if stopped by God, will be destroyed.
The ontological status of the book and the work is governed by insufficient
categories that our culture has accustomed us to think with. From Aristotle onwards,
according to Agamben, we think of the work (ergon) by relating two concepts: potentiality
and actuality, virtual and real. We tend to think the potential and virtual as the “before of
the work” that precedes the actual and real (completed) work. This means that in notes or
outlines “potentiality has not been transferred to the act ... [and thus remains] unrealized
and uncompleted.”101 But, Agamben asks, “[I]s it not the case that every book contains a
remainder of potentiality, without which its reading and reception would be impossible?”
A work whose creative potentiality was totally exhausted would not be work but “ashes
and sepulcher of the work.” If an author can go back to his work, the reason is not, like the
Romantics believed, that the fragments are more important than the work itself, but that
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This idea is described in Edgar Wind’s essay “Critique of Connoisseurship” (Wind, Art and
Anarchy, 30–46.)
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In accordance with Cézanne’s formula that “one never finishes a painting, but simply abandons it.”
(Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 89.)
100
Augustine’s Retractationes (of 427) and Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo (of 1888) are just two of the most
famous examples.
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Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 93.
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the experience of matter (or for the ancients, potentiality) is immediately perceivable in
them.
The implications of the materiality of the book are vast and extend to both historical
directions. The book as we know it today appeared in Europe between the fourth and the
fifth century. The codex (technical term for book, introduced with Christianity) replaces
the volumen and the scroll (the norm in Antiquity). The disappearance of the volume also
reflects the conflict between the church and the synagogue: the Torah as a volumen as
opposed to the New Testament as a book (a shape no different than any profane book). The
codex introduces the page which was a real material and spiritual revolution for the West.
The unrolling of the volume revealed a homogeneous and continuous space, while the
codex presents a discontinued, delimited unity. This implies a different conception of time:
from the cyclical (of Antiquity) to the linear (of the Christian world). Time of reading
reproduces the time of life.102
[Continue Reading]
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For a detailed discussion of how in the early centuries AD the roll was replaced as the vehicle for
literature by the codex, see Roberts and Skeat, The Birth of the Codex.
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ֹ[ אDishomogeneity]
The idea of “essential dishomogeneity” mirrors the old philosophical problem of
discontinuity. From its ontological perspective, we recall Jabès’ view of the break as “the
source of all things”. In the context of the following discussion, that is, a Foucauldian
epistemological context, the problem of discontinuity establishes the background against
which Foucault’s archeology (and later genealogy) must be thought, since his selection of
different “moments” and the concentration on precise historical timeframes serve as the
essential support for his analyses. The discontinuity element of Foucault’s archeology
(which is characterized as Foucault’s research methodology at least up until the beginning
of the 1970s) designates not a historical investigation in the formal sense (a reconstitution
of a historical field, outlining the continuous evolution of ideas), but, by bringing together
diverse dimensions together, an attempt to “obtain the conditions of emergence of
discourses of knowledge in general in a given epoch.”103 Such an attempt emphasizes the
emergence of the new rather than the rediscovery of former conditions of possibility: “It is
a discourse of historical emergence rather than philosophical origin.”104
[Continue Reading]
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ֹ[ אGenealogy]
I
In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Genealogy is described as “gray, meticulous, and
patiently documentary. ... [It is a practice that] must record the singularity of events outside
of any monotonous finality; must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we
tend to feel is without history.”105 Foucault distinguishes, among the terms employed by
Nietzsche, between Ursprung (which is reserved, somewhat ironically, for “origin” albeit
negatively) and the two terms that are more exact than Ursprung in recording the true
object of Genealogy: Herkunft (“descent”) and Entstehung (“emergence, the moment of
arising”).106
The Genealogist who examines the descent (with its “subtle, subindividual marks”)
constructs “cyclopean monuments,”107 not by a regression in time in order to restore “an
unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of oblivion,” nor by an attempt to
demonstrate “that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate
the present,”108 but by revealing “the myriad events through which they were formed,” and
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maintaining these events “in their proper dispersion” only to realize that “truth or being
lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of accidents.”109
The search for the descent does not wish to secure foundations, but conversely to “disturb
what was previously considered immobile ...[,] to fragment what was thought unified”110;
and if the Genealogist “listens to history,” he finds that “there is ‘something altogether
different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no
essence,” that their origin has no inviolable identity. Thus the Genealogist rummages in
history, in the “concrete body of becoming,” not searching for any “distant ideality of the
origin”111 as the metaphysician does, but for all the imprints left on the historical body up
to the point of its destruction.
Genealogy (“seen as the examination of Herkunft and Entstehung” 112 ), writes
Foucault, as opposed to history in the traditional sense is, for Nietzsche, a kind of
“historical sense” that, contrary to a form of history that reintroduces a “suprahistorical
perspective” and strives for a presentation of completed development based on its “belief
in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always
identical to itself,”113 can evade metaphysics if it refuses the certainty of absolutes; but if
otherwise, if “mastered by suprahistorical perspective,” it can be bent by metaphysics to
its own purposes. “The traditional device for constructing a comprehensive view of history
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(on the basis, as will become evident later on, of its future anterior’s movement in time). One notices,
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ponders the account of time Kant proposes in the Critique of Pure Reason, “transforming it from a pure form
of intuition—a transcendental condition of all possible experience that can be known a priori—to a dispersed
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and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically
dismantled.” 114 Historical sense, as opposed to a historical tradition that aims at
“dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity,” deals with events “in terms of their
most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations.”115

II
For Foucault, one of Genealogy’s leading goals is to show specifically how the various
“ways of life” come to be as they are and how they oppressively marginalize other people.
The context of Entstehung (“emergence, the moment of arising”) is that of power
dynamics, systems of subjection and dominations, and it is “always produced in a particular
state of forces”

116

where a battle was won against certain concrete conditions:

“[e]mergence is thus the entry of forces.” 117 A second leading goal is to develop
interruptive knowledges that can lead to liberating options for those marginalized people.
Having its roots in Nietzsche’s thought, Foucault’s Genealogy accepts the former’s insight
that “formations of knowledge and values are always also formations of power (in
Foucault’s jargon, formations of power relations)” 118 ; thus knowledge creation is a
phenomenon that must be described in terms of power. Archeological and genealogical
studies are not mutually exclusive in Foucault’s view; rather their different emphases are
mutually supportive (“Archeology focuses on the emergence and formation of various
mutational, regulatory, and guiding structures. ... Genealogy focuses on relations of power
and their dynamic mode of operation”)119
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, thus Foucault’s Genealogy has both political

and ethical dimensions.
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Stephen Howard reflects upon the relation between archeology and genealogy in
Foucault as well as in Agamben, in an attempt to articulate the influence of Foucault’s
method on Agamben’s work (especially since the latter formally declares such influence,
being a stepping stone for his own methodology, in the preface to The Signature of All
Things).
Howard’s argument 121 is as follows: although Agamben claims to develop
Foucault’s archeological and genealogical methodology at large (mainly in Foucault’s
works on governmentality, power and biopolitics), the fact is that Agambenian
methodology deviates significantly from Foucault’s.
In Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1970–1971 (which
marks Foucault’s methodological shift around 1976), Foucault defines Genealogy as the
coupling together of the two elements of what he terms “subjugated knowledge,” that is,
the buried historical conditions of possibilities of modern institutions (on the one hand) and
disqualified knowledge of marginalized subjects (on the other hand). This coupling of, in
other words, scholarly erudition and local memories “allows us to constitute a historical
knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics.”122
The aim of Foucault’s Genealogy is to de-subjugate historical knowledges, to reactivate
local knowledges against scientific hierarchization of knowledge, to free subjugated
knowledge from its marginalized position and reactivate it for political ends. Foucault
succinctly summarizes the relation between archeology and genealogy: “Archeology is the
method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which,
once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the subjugated knowledges
that have been released from them.”123 Genealogy demands relentless erudition because it
first requires archeology’s technical analysis; and after the analysis unveils the buried
conditions of what had become the norm, genealogy then connects this analysis to the
reactivation of marginalized knowledge. Foucault, as we have seen, builds upon
Nietzsche’s idea of Entstehung by claiming that Entstehung is the “entry of forces” and
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“play of dominations,”124 thus norms have history and arise in particular contexts. The
insurrection of subjugated knowledge made possible by the genealogical combination of
archeological erudition and a politically motivated reactivation of marginalized
knowledge.125
Throughout his entire œuvre and specifically in The Signature of All Things,
Agamben conflates archeology and genealogy; and his understanding of these terms
distances his methodology from Foucault’s. Although Agamben claims that their
methodologies differ only in terms of the length of the historical shadow rather than in
anything essential and intrinsic to their corresponding methodologies, it seems as if
Agamben remains, methodologically, within the archeological period of Foucault’s
thought. Agamben’s patient scholarly attention to literary sources and manuscripts amounts
to Foucault’s idea of the work of the archeologist. If this is true, asks Howard, can Agamben
“be accused of ultimately indulging in what Foucault called the ‘great, tender, and warm
freemasonry of useless erudition’?”126 His answer is no; and to demonstrate this, he looks
into Agamben’s method as manifested in The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Formof-Life, highlighting the political significance of Agamben’s conflation of archeology and
genealogy (and thus showing that he is not merely an archeologist in Foucault’s sense).
Agamben’s work in The Highest Poverty demonstrates that he does not subsume
genealogy under archeology, but draws the two methods into equivalence or understands
them as indistinct. In this book, Agamben had a political ambition—to return to a path not
taken in the history of the West, to reactivate a conception of “use” that was available to
the Franciscans but which they failed to develop. He accomplishes this through an
archeological reading of texts, a scholarly operation that should be in itself political. In
what manner is this operation political? The answer lies, according to Howard, in the
methodological importance of Benjamin to the Agambenian method (even though it might
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seem, in The Signature of All Things, that Foucault has the most significant influence; thus
Foucault is less the source of Agamben’s method than the subject of interpretation).
Benjamin provides not only Agamben’s undiscussed methodological principle (as
stated in the introduction to The Signature of All Things), but also the key to Agamben’s
interpretation of the Foucauldian method. Agamben’s Benjaminian principle of
“messianic-time” or “now-time” (explained and elaborated in a later part of this thesis)
entails that archeology (the patient, erudite attention to dusty texts) can itself have political
effects, thus no further genealogical step is required (in contrast to Foucault’s approach
that combines, in his Genealogy, archeological erudition with the reactivation of
marginalized knowledge). Howard writes: “In Agamben’s conflation of Foucault’s
archeology and genealogy, subjugated knowledges are reactivated not through genealogies
of modern institutions and forms of knowledge; but through the archeological analysis
itself.” 127 Agamben and Foucault differ in their account of the forces of history: for
Foucault these are contingent forces, which determine the historical shift in the meaning of
our notions, real forces that are the struggle of power; for Agamben the force of history is
not a real, historical struggle over meaning, but rather the force of the arche (as origin)
itself, which is neither chronological nor empirical. Agamben’s archeology and genealogy
is thus an interpretation of Foucault’s methodology conditioned by the influence of
Benjamin. Agamben’s (Benjaminian) interpretations of the methodologies of archeology
and genealogy conflate what in Foucault are two distinct approaches. Foucault’s
Genealogy aims for a more direct political intervention than his archeology by “saving”
oppressed knowledge, while Agamben’s detailed readings manifest an archeological
method that intends to be in itself political without the need for a further genealogical step.
Although Agamben considers Foucault and Overbeck to be his sources for the concepts of
“origin” and “emergence,” which underpin his philosophical methodology, Howard’s
claim is that they stem more from Benjamin (specifically Benjamin’s idea of “messianictime” and the eruption of the past into the present in an object’s “now if knowability”).
Agamben’s methodological transformation of Foucault requires the acceptance of
Benjamin’s conception of history if it is to share the political ambitions of Foucault’s
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Genealogy.
[Continue Reading]
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ֹ[ אarche]
I
In Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit
(originally published, in French, in 1947 as Introduction à la lecture de Hegel), Alexandre
Kojève puts forth the somewhat ironic idea that Homo sapiens has reached a final moment
in its history in which there are only two possible options left open for it: on one hand, the
“Post-Historical Animality” exemplified, according to Kojève, by the American way of life
(this was just an ironical-metaphysical remark) and, on the other hand, what he called
“Japanese Snobbism,” by which he meant a continuation of historical rituals devoid of any
historical content. 128 We can try to imagine a third possibility of a relation to the past
beyond Kojève’s two suggestions, one in which a culture remains human, even after its
history has supposedly finished, because it is able to confront its own history in its totality,
and find a new life in it. This is a conception that finds a historical phenomenon most
interesting and alive when it is, in fact, finished. Once the history had reached its
fulfillment, it can gain a new life precisely because one has managed to remain in the
correct relationship with it, thus the ability to remain in a relation to the past means it is
still alive and becomes present again.

II
This idea approximately resembles Walter Benjamin’s idea of “the now of legibility” or
“the now of knowability.” Agamben explores this Benjaminian concept in relation to the
arche (or the origin) in his essay “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and
Historical Redemption,”129 where two forms of historical consciousness are depicted: one
that understands all human work (and the past) as an origin destined to an infinite process
of transmission “that preserves its intangible and mythic singularity”; the other, as the
inverted specular image of the first, liquidates and flattens out the singularity of the origin
“by forever multiplying copies and simulacra.”130 These attitudes are not in opposition but
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rather are two faces of a cultural tradition in which the content of transmission and
transmission itself are so irreparably fractured that this tradition can only ever repeat the
origin infinitely or annul it in simulacra. The origin itself can be neither fulfilled nor
mastered, the idea of the origin contains both singularity and reproducibility, and as long
as one of them remains in force, writes Agamben, “every intention to overcome both is
doomed to fail.”131 It is as if for Benjamin the revolutionary value that is implicit in the
image of the eternal return can exasperate mythical repetition up to the point of bringing it
to a halt.
In his book The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, Benjamin conceives of the
origin not as a logical category but as a historical one:

Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has,
nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is
not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being,
but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and
disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its
current it swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. That
which is original is never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of
the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight. On the one hand it
needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and re-establishment, but,
on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something imperfect and
incomplete. There takes place in every original phenomenon a
determination of the form in which an idea will constantly confront the
historical world, until it is revealed fully, in the totality of its history. ... The
category of the origin is not ... a purely logical one, but a historical one.132
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The idea of origin here is tangential to Goethe’s concept of Urphänomen:133 it is not a
factual event nor a mythical archetype, but rather a vortex in the stream of becoming,
manifesting itself through a double structure of restoration and incompleteness. In the
origin, there is a dialectic that reveals every original phenomenon to be a reciprocal
conditioning of “onceness” and repetition. In every original phenomenon, what is at play
is an Idea that confronts the historical world until it is completed in the totality of its history
(the theory of origin is tied to the theory of Idea).134
Benjamin speaks about his concept of origin as a transposition of Goethe’s
Urphänomen (which belongs to the domain of nature) to the domain of history; in other
words, origin is in effect the concept of Urphänomen extracted from the pagan context of
nature and brought into the Jewish context of history.
Benjamin’s explicit morphological awareness enables him to oppose the historicalchronological genesis to the morphological origin. This opposition highlights a possible
polar tension working within the concept of temporality and/or that of history: on one hand,
there is the historical dream of the traditional, historical quest for the first element of the
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iconic linear chain from which every other element can be drawn through proper
transformation; on the other hand, the morphological gaze presents a radial structure where
the various manifestations gather around the Urphänomen in a non-linear manner.
Agamben revisits the Benjaminian concept of the origin-as-vortex in “Vortexes,”135
beginning with a similar, slightly deviated statement:

The origin [Ursprung] stands in the flux of becoming as a vortex and rips
into its rhythm the material of emergence [Entstehung]. ... On the one hand,
that which is original wants to be recognized as restoration and
reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as
something incomplete and unconcluded. There takes place in every original
phenomenon a determination of the figure in which an idea will constantly
confront the historical world. Origin is not, therefore, discovered by the
examination of actual findings, but it is related to their pre- and post-history.
The category of origin is not therefore, as Cohen holds, a purely logical one,
but a historical one.136
Origin, for Benjamin, does not precede phenomenon’s becoming nor is separated from its
chronology; and although it autonomously dwells in it, it also and at the same time derives
its matter from it. Origin accompanies historical becoming, and like a vortex, is still present
in it. The whirling origin that archeological investigation tries to reach, writes Agamben,
is an arche, a “historical a priori that remains immanent to becoming and continues to act
in it. Even in the course of our life, the vortex of the origin remains present until the end
and silently accompanies our existence at every moment.”137 For Agamben, the “correct”
relation to the past138—this dialectic in the origin—echoes the arche in archeology, which
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is not simply a historical fact that exhausts itself (as it is situated in a chronology) nor a
meta-historical archetype, but something immanent within history, internal to it, which
cannot coincide with a precise chronological moment nor is simply a historical fact given
in chronology.

III
This conception is evident in the arche’s double meaning (in Greek)139 which has its origin
in the theological idea according to which God created the world but also continuously
governs it. The word arche entered philosophical language approximately with Plato and
Aristotle. Aristotle historically innovated the use of the concept in the sense of uniting both
meanings into the same single abstract concept, and until the end of antiquity it remained
“a technical term for designating the constitutive, abstract, and irreducible element in
being, becoming, and knowing,” 140 an abstract element that cannot be surpassed. The
doctrine of origin, for Aristotle, “is a doctrine of a material substance from which things
arise in order to return to it as to their primordial element,”141 but the arche itself is not an
entity (nor supreme being) that creates and governs change, “but only the common trait of
the different types of causes.”142

Jewish identity, according to Pines, should be regarded more as a problem rather than a fact, since
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identity of cultures) is a problem and should not be taken for granted or as a given. Cultural identity in presentday Europe is, as we witness, discontinuous and fragile.
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In the second half of the twentieth century, three important attempts were made to
theoretically wedge this dual meaning of the arche. The first was that of Reiner Schürmann
in his interpretation of Heidegger in Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principals to
Anarchy (Le principe d’anarchie: Heidegger et la question de l’agir, 1982). He tried to
separate the two meanings of the arche, to reach an arche only as a pure coming to being
(to the present) without any pretention of commanding an historical development. This is,
according to Schürmann, an anarchical interpretation of Heidegger, as Heidegger (perhaps
paradoxically) was trying to reach an anarchical principle that would not command any
historical development. The second attempt (and second interpretation of Heidegger) was
that of Derrida, and his idea/methodology of deconstruction. He also tried to separate the
origin from its commanding function, but unlike Schürmann, who opposed the two, Derrida
put in question the notion of the origin. For Derrida there is no origin, only trace, but
precisely because of that, one can infinitely deconstruct. The third possibility of dealing
with this dichotomy or duality comes from Foucault and his idea of the historical a priori:
Foucault’s critique of the origin in history and the favouring of the idea of the “point of
emergence,” that is, the point when something appears with no consequences or aspirations
of commandment. He draws this idea most probably from Husserl’s in Origin of Geometry,
but while for Husserl this idea (of the historical a priori) means a universal category, for
Foucault this implies a very concrete meaning (for example, the Indo-European language
as an historical a priori: it is a priori because it makes understandable concrete historical
phenomenon, and it is historical not because we have a written evidence of its existence
but because we have to presuppose that it had existed).

IV
The earlier remark that the word arche was introduced into philosophical jargon roughly
in the times of Plato and Aristotle requires slight amendment, since one can retrace its
appearance even farther back in time. In his essay on the arche (and its relation to the
apeiron, the infinity, and the current socio-political order in the West), Stathis Gourgouris
maintains that the word arche first appears as a philosophical principle in the well-known
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Anaximander fragment,143 written around 570 BCE (although the word itself is already
present in textual traces going back to Homer), where it is conjugated with a new concept:
apeiron (infinity). Reading Anaximander’s fragment, Gourgouris makes the clear
argument: “[T]he notion of archē (origin and rule) is first used philosophically in order to
identify what has no origin and no end and over which there can be no rule.”144 He thus
establishes two essential elements: The first is that the arche is infinite but at the same time
is understood as the source of all things, a source not external to all things since (as finite
things) they eventually decay and return to become source again. Source is not Ursprung
in terms of being the one and only origin, but “an infinite space of interminably enacted
beginnings of an indefinite array of ‘things’ that have one thing in common: they
terminate.”145 The apeiron is not only limitless, but also cannot be completed; the infinite
is also incomplete. Thus, the paradox is that the incomplete/infinite enables the emergence
of the complete/finite, an emergence that is a disturbance of the infinite, thus “the finitude
of existence is thus justified by its very violation of the infinite.”146 The infinite (apeiron)
is not only the unlimited and incomplete, but also whatever exceeds experience (peira) and
cannot be empirically determined. Thus, the infinite (apeiron) cannot be empirically
known; it is interminable and indeterminable—it has no telos, no finality, no termination:
“it lacks de-finition, de-limitation, de-termination.” 147 The second of Gourgouris’s
elements is that the disturbance of the infinite by finitude also means that the infinite is not
omnipotent, for it is thus crossed by time. Time decays things and by doing so opens
infinity to their re-admittance and return; thus, the infinite source is “a sort of repository, a
burial ground, of what has come into the world and has gone out of it.” 148 The condition
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of things entering the world, and necessarily going out of it, constitutes injustice (adikia).
In other words, “time itself constitutes an injustice, which the infinite, though an archē,
can neither overrule nor alleviate.”149 Worldly things unsettle the “cosmic balance” that
the relation between infinity and time attempts to maintain [that is, infinity holds together
a balance of contentious forces, where one kratos (power) cannot overcome another], since
matter is subject to time and thus defies the infinite, but simultaneously, matter returns to
infinity and thus defies time. “This unsettling of balance, this injustice, is life itself—the
tragic life, from which there is no redemption.”150 This archaic Ionian imaginary, writes
Gourgouris, for which finitude itself constitutes an injustice,151 provides justice (dikē) by
determining that one makes its own limits in the course of life, “while submitting
unredemptively to the ultimate limit of death.” 152 Throughout man’s life, potentially
unlimited, one’s infinite imagination partakes in the abyssal infinite, and therefore is
required to authorize one’s own limits, to create or poietize (poiein) these limits.
Gourgouris quotes Jean-Pierre Vernant’s reading of Aristotle 153 regarding the
apeiron, according to which infinity is not another force in the cosmos, but the intermediary
between the elements, what exists in the middle (meson) of them: “[T]he mediating space
of the elements—the medium of a limitless abyssal terrain—on which the limit and capacity
for self-limitation in every element is tested ... [:] the limitless is a mediatory field that
enables limits to be self-instituted.”154 Thus, the importance of the middle (meson) is not
only figurative, as a mediatory space, but should also be considered in geometric terms, as
a central space from which all elements are equally distanced due to the balance they are
forced to maintain at all times; the geometrics of meson, of mediation and middle, thus
“irrevocably alters an understanding of archē as the fixed point of origin and primary
rule.”155 Not only is the arche not constituted as a primordial whole, but simultaneously it
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is cleft and permeated, and this condition renders it as a condition of mediation. “The archē
becomes a shared space of mediation that thereby disrupts the constitution or reconstitution
of absolute singular (literally monarchical) rule/origin,” and moreover, “the archē’s
interminable generation from the matrix of the infinite is preserved by finitude, the same
finitude that its necessity is expressed by the ‘ordinance of time.’”156

V
In The Use of Bodies, Agamben advances the claim that the structure of the arche, in
Western culture at large, is determined and constituted by a “structure of exception”; in
other words, the structure of exception has been revealed more generally to constitute in
every sphere the structure of the arche. According to this idea, the originary structure of
Western culture consists in an ex-ceptio, in an inclusive exclusion of human life.157 The
dialectic of the foundation that defines Western ontology is understood only as the function
of this exception: “The strategy is always the same: something is divided, excluded, and
pushed to the bottom, and precisely through this exclusion, it is included as archè and
foundation.”158 The mechanism159 at work is always the same [whether in relation to the
juridico-political (State of Exception); or between rule and governance and between
inoperativity and glory (The Kingdom and the Glory); or between the human being and
animal (The Open)]: the arche is constituted by dividing the factual experience and pushing
down to the origin—that is, excluding—one half of it in order then to rearticulate it to the
other by including it as foundation. Thus, for example, “the city is founded on the division
of life into bare life and politically qualified life, the human is defined by the exclusioninclusion of the animal, the law by the exceptio of anomie, governance through the
exclusion of inoperativity and its capture in the form of glory.”160 If the structure of the
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arche of our culture is such, claims Agamben, then philosophical archeology is not a matter
of thinking new articulations of the two elements (playing them against each other), nor a
matter of an archeological regression to a more originary beginning: “[P]hilosophical
archeology cannot reach a beginning other than the one that may perhaps result from the
deactivation of the machine (in this sense first philosophy is always final philosophy).”161
Moreover, according to Agamben, the anarchist tradition and (parts of) twentiethcentury thought are pertinent but insufficient attempts to go back to a historical a priori in
order to depose it. The practice of the artistic avant-garde and political movements of our
time was often a miserably failed attempt to actualize a destitution of work, an attempt that
ended up recreating in every place the museum apparatus and the powers that it pretended
to depose, “which now appear all the more oppressive insofar as they are deprived of all
legitimacy.”162 If it is true that the bourgeois is the most anarchic (Benjamin) and that true
anarchy is that of power (Pasolini), then the thought that seeks to think anarchy (as negation
of “origin” and “command,” principium and princeps) remains imprisoned in endless
aporias and contradictions. “Because power is constituted through the inclusive exclusion
(ex-ceptio) of anarchy, the only possibility of thinking a true anarchy coincides with the
lucid exposition of the anarchy internal to power. Anarchy is what becomes thinkable only
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at the point where we grasp and render destitute the anarchy of power.”163

164

[Continue Reading]
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ֹ[ אArcheology]
In Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question, Leonard Lawlor
claims that French philosophy in the sixties felt a need to rethink history without end and
without origin. Perhaps for the first time in the history of philosophy, he writes, an entire
system of thought was governed by a profound spatiality that came to be known as
“transcendental topology,” or, in other words, “archeology.”165
The word “archeology” belongs (at least philosophically) to Michel Foucault, but
no less, also to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who characterized his own thinking using the same
terminology already in the fifties. Merleau-Ponty’s proximity to Foucault lies in a concern
for the profound spatiality of “archeology” that is characterized by a lack, gap, hollow, or
divergence. An increasing distance between them lies in their characterization of this lack
in terms of transcendence or immanence. Philosophy of immanence is based on three
propositions: (1) the world is all that exists, is the entirety of existence, and for us, this
entirety is the only horizon that can be known; (2) existence is the only source to any moral
decrees, to legitimacy of political power, etc.; and (3) recognizing and assimilating the
previous two propositions is the only available key for liberation that humans are capable
of. There exists a philosophy of immanence that we can name “dogmatic” (Spinoza, Hegel,
or the pantheistic religions are just a few examples) and another that we can name “critical,”
which first and foremost recognizes human finitude and the incapability of our reason to
reach the absolute, while recognizing that this immanence is finite rather than infinite. If
we seriously consider the idea of finite immanence, we must also remain open to a
dimension of transcendence which appears as a question rather than answer, an empty
dimension of transcendence devoid of substances or ideas, whose sole function is to reflect
back at us the sheer fact of the finitude of our existence. One does not address this
dimension by speech but by silence, and this is where the primary distance between our
French protagonists fundamentally manifests itself. Despite this distance, both Foucault
and Merleau-Ponty put the past at the centre of their archeological projects, a past that is
still effective, still present, a past that “has always already been present,” thus a past that
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was never present, a past free for the future.
But as in most cases where we can identify someone who preceded the supposedly
first one to have conceptualized a certain matter, the case of the kind of past we are here
interested in is no different. This past is, more or less, what Kant (1724–1804) called “a
priori,”

what

Husserl

(1859–1938)

called

“transcendental

subjectivity”

or

“Phenomenological Archeology” (including Eugen Fink’s writings on Husserl), and what
Freud (1856–1939) called “the unconscious.” These three thinkers thus constitute the
prehistory of the concept of “archeology.” Therefore, a concise summation of their ideas
of archeology is apposite and will be carried out in reverse chronology in order to come
full circle to Kant, who is the main influence on Foucault’s concept of archeology [though
Foucault is not always in keeping with Kant, and at times even contradicts Kant and Husserl
(for example, his accusation of phenomenology being a “transcendental narcissism” or his
wish to “free history from the grip of phenomenology.”]166
According to Lawlor, by means of investigating the past, archeology concerns itself
in the transformation of the present. This concern comes from psychoanalysis (which is
concerned, among others, with curing the hysteric, and not for investigating the past for its
own sake), thus paradoxically archeology is, in fact, interested in the future. This means
another two characteristics of archeology: on the one hand, as Freud says, the past that one
returns to is always incomplete (and so the curing of the hysteria is always incomplete),
thus the future cure is based (in addition to an incomplete past) on a reconstruction that is
inventive; on the other hand, in order to find a future cure, the past must remain as a present
and not really as a past—it must be conserved. Freud draws an analogy between the concept
of the mind and ancient Rome, where everything is preserved, and thus the historical
sequence of the mind is represented by juxtaposition in space; however, this is not a perfect
analogy since in Rome there are intentional demolitions, whereas in the mind there are
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unintentional traumas (that can destroy remains of the past).167 Although the past has an
incomplete nature, the past remains intact in the unconscious (the processes of the
unconscious are timeless for Freud, thus we should accept that there is an absolute memory,
memory not relative to consciousness). The idea of an absolute memory implies the fourth
characteristic of archeology: the displacement of the conscious subject. The analyst is like
an explorer who finds ruins and who can operate in two ways: either to ask the inhabitant
(patient) about the history and meaning of these remains or to encourage the inhabitant to
excavate the scene; then things are deciphered (Freud's slogan is “stones talk”). This leads
to the fifth characteristic: the dead monuments that nevertheless speak.
In sum, the philosophical concept of archeology is characterized by the following:
its investigation of the past concerns the future; the past it investigates is incomplete; yet,
the past is conserved, juxtaposed, and simultaneous with the present; present consciousness
is not the object of archeological investigation; and the object of interest is the monument
that speaks for itself.
In his interpretation of Husserl, Fink defines Husserl’s phenomenology in terms of
the problem of Being or human access to Being through experiences. These experiences
are not given (to consciousness) immediately but are mediated by tradition and
forgetfulness, and in order to overcome this distance phenomenology engages in a
regressive inquiry which aims at “re-establishing” what Fink calls “the initial knowledge
forgotten in the buried traditions” and even aims at “returning to the immediate knowledge
of the Being from which the traditions, even though they obscure, derived.” 168 This
regressive inquiry is not the psychical origin, a genesis of human thought, or psychological
development. Instead, the phenomenological regressive’s question concerning the
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beginning of knowledge attempts to grasp the human intellect in its movement towards the
Being. The consciousness or subjectivity that phenomenology interrogates is
transcendental and also includes the unconscious. Fink distinguishes Wissen from
Erkenntnis, thereby anticipating Foucault’s distinction between savior and connaissance.
Kant speaks of archeology in (at least) three places: in Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View, the context is the “faculty of designation” and thus concerns
signs; in The Critique of Judgment, he speaks about the “faculty of Nature” that concerns
signs and traces (archeology of nature distinguishes from natural history—the first
describes past genera and species and thus passes through signs and traces, while the latter
describes present ones and takes place by means of intuition); and in Progress in
Metaphysics, as we saw earlier, he distinguishes between a mere history of philosophy
(which presents the empirical and thus contingent order of how thinkers philosophized up
to the present) and a philosophical history of philosophy (which is rational and necessary,
thus a priori). Thus, Kant’s philosophical archeology concerns not the contingent,
successive order of the history of philosophy, but the rational and necessary order of
philosophical concepts. Yet this order would still be historical since it would account only
for this factual or singular set of concepts. Philosophical archeology will constitute, with
this necessary and yet factual order, a historical a priori. This archeology, like that of
nature, will proceed not by intuition but by means of signs. Kant’s concept of philosophical
archeology implies that archeology is a method of reading signs.169
The prehistory of the concept of archeology, before Foucault and Merleau-Ponty,
is summed up by Lawlor as follows: (1) archeology concerns signs and traces of the past—
that is—mediation, thus archeology is not a form of intuition but a form of interpretation
or regressive inquiry; (2) in the reading of signs, consciousness is displaced towards the
unconscious that precedes it and had been conserved, and thus is incomplete. Therefore
philosophical archeology is a kind of an-archeology—the complete origin is missing; (3)
archeology thus investigates the space of the unconscious, a spatial order that precedes
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consciousness or empirical/psychological genesis, thus is an order that can be called a
priori; (4) although prior, this order is not an abstract a priori, but an a priori for these
singular historical facts or signs; (5) in the investigation of this historical a priori,
archeology overcomes a kind of forgetfulness that implies it consists in memory; and (6)
this memory is not really a memory of the past (it is not interested in the past for its own
sake) but rather its interest is the future.170
Archeology, in Foucault, means the description of a record. The word “record” does not
designate a mass of texts that have been collected at a certain period for a certain social
group, but means and entails a discussion of rules. These rules define the limits of the forms
of expressibility, of conservation, of memory, of reactivation, and of appropriation—these
are the rules that a certain archeology seeks to describe, and therefore to analyze, a
discourse’s conditions of existence.171
In an interview, Foucault refers to his conception of archeology, understood as the
science of an archive of a given period:

By archeology I would like to designate not exactly a discipline, but a
domain of research, which would be the following: In a society, different
bodies of learning ... refer to a certain implicit knowledge (savour) special
to this society.... This knowledge is profoundly different from the bodies of
learning that one can find in scientific books, ... but it is what makes possible
at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice.172
From this discussion derives the discourses’ status of potential knowledge. Thus the
Foucauldian archeology means (in this sense, and not exclusively) an archeology of
knowledge where the archeological metaphor signals knowledge as a substratum that “lies
beneath a surface and needs to be uncovered before it can be understood.” 173 It is the
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practice of an inquirer that deals with contingent historical facts regarding systems of
knowledge, essentially through their lingual manifestations in written corpuses. These are
not the formal rules of language, but the material rules that condition what can be said
about the domain in question and thus condition the boundaries of a given “historical mode
of thought”174 or what Foucault calls the episteme.
Generally the concept of episteme is understood not as a world view, theory, or
framework, but a set of elements from which a variety of conflicting world views,
frameworks, and theories can be developed; in other words, the episteme reflects the
relation that exists between discourses (a term that differs from another Foucauldian term,
the Archive, which designates the set that encompasses these discourses). 175

176

The

historiographic method of archeology aims to reveal the differences or forms of nonidentity between the discourses rather than an underlying common identity that unites
them.
Foucault’s archeology of knowledge does not have a purposely epistemological aim
(reflecting upon the nature of knowledge in general), nor is it “épistémologie in the French
sense ... a philosophical account of the nature of scientific knowledge,”177 rather it is a
historical project that by going deep into a given field’s cognitive structure, into its level
of savoir (rather than operating merely at the level of connaissance, that is, “the concepts
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and theories of particular sciences”),178 also has epistemological repercussions.179
At the level of individuals, the episteme “provides a place from which subjects
speak and know,”180 by limiting their potential for development. In The Archeology of
Knowledge (1969), Foucault gives a methodological reflection designed to provide
historical accounts that “are not centered around the activities of human subjects and ...
have no place for a transcendental subject that is the source of historical meaning.”181
In his account of the “Foucauldian subject,” Alain de Libera maintains that an
unequivocal link exists between Foucault’s rejection of the subject and his views on
history; therefore criticizing (in the footsteps of Foucault) the role played by the
sovereignty of consciousness (and by the sovereignty of subject) in history, and opposing
the idea of continuous history. He quotes from The Archeology of Knowledge at length:

Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function
of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be
restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without
restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject ―
in the form of historical consciousness ― will once again be able to
appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a
distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode.
Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making
human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and
all action are the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system,
time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more
than moments of consciousness. In various forms, this theme has played a
constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all
decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of
anthropology and humanism.182
Thus, according to de Libera, Foucault’s archeology not only aims to free history from the
grip of the twin figures, that is, the constituent consciousness, but also challenges the
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transcendental dimension as such.
[Continue Reading]
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ֹ[ אHistorical a priori]
The second part of The Use of Bodies (titled “An Archeology of Ontology”), Agamben’s
final publication in his celebrated, decades-long series Homo Sacer, proposes to ascertain
the current possibility to access first philosophy, or as Agamben synonymously
paraphrases it, ontology.183

184

First philosophy “opens and defines each time the space of

human acting and knowing, of what the human being can do and of what it can know and
say;”185 however, this space, the access to first philosophy, at least since Kant, has become
so problematic that it is thinkable, as per Agamben, only in the form of an archeology. In
Agamben’s studies, any archeological movement necessarily involves a relation, or is
necessarily executed in relation, to language (that is beyond the obvious fact that a
theoretical study is usually realized in and through language), thus ontology is considered
by him as the originary place of the historical articulation between language and world,
and preserves in itself the memory of the anthropogenesis (the becoming human of the
human being), of the moment when that articulation was produced.186 Anthropogenesis is
not a completed event of the past, but rather the event that never stops happening, a
continuous process of the becoming human and remaining (or becoming) inhuman of the
human being. First philosophy is the memory and repetition of this event: “it watches over
the historical a priori of Homo sapiens, and it is to this historical a priori that archeological
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research always seeks to reach back;”187 and additionally:

[w]hat is in question ... in the Aristotelian ontological apparatus—and more
generally, in every historical transformation of ontology ... is the
articulation between language and world that anthropogenesis has disclosed
as ‘history’ to the living beings of the species Homo sapiens. Severing the
pure existent (the that it is) from the essence (the what it is) and inserting
time and movement between them, the ontological apparatus reactualizes
and repeats the anthropogenesis event, opens and defines each time the
horizon of acting as well as knowing, by conditioning, in the sense that has
been seen as a historical a priori, what human beings can do and what they
can know and say.188 189
Shortly thereafter Agamben remarks succinctly: “In the preface to Les mots et les choses
(1966), Foucault uses the term ‘historical a priori’ to define that which, in a determinate
historical epoch, conditions the possibilities of the formation and development of
knowledges.”190 He continues (in a long footnote):
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Why do we have the idea of historical a priori? Why does philosophy seem to need the historical a
priori? And additionally, why is the historical a priori linked to language? In Agamben’s thought, the
connection between the two indicates a definition of what is at stake in philosophy. The connection exists
because philosophy is not simply a set of conceptual statements (doctrine, cognitive formulation), but is
constitutively linked with the anthropogenesis, with the becoming human of man, and this archi-event
(anthropogenesis) is the historical a priori of philosophy. First philosophy (or Metaphysics) has to do with
the becoming speaking of the animal homo. Philosophy is a remembrance, each time, of the articulation
between man and language and between language and the world. The word “remembrance” does not mean a
memory in the common sense, but a repetition, a renewed experience, of the junction between language and
man and between animal and man (between the inhuman and man; between becoming human in man).
Anthropogenesis is the “archi” historical a priori since it is always in the process, we can never consider it
as completed, we are always in the process of becoming human therefore we are always animals. Thinking
(or philosophy) for Agamben means to experience anew the connection between becoming human and
remaining inhuman (and therefore this connection is kept, in philosophy, in question). Thus, philosophical
archeology is immanent and constitutive to philosophy; it means going back (archeologically) to the
repetition and remembrance of this event.
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“concrete a priori”) is used in The Order of Things to demonstrate that the prominent nineteenth-century
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breakdown of representation in the early modern period.” (Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 201.)
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The expression is problematic, because it brings together two elements that
are at least apparently contradictory: the a priori, which entails a
paradigmatic and transcendental dimension, and history, which refers to an
eminently factual reality. It is possible that Foucault had drawn the term
from Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, which Derrida had translated into
French in 1962, but certainly not the concept, because while in Husserl the
historisches Apriori designates a sort of universal a priori of history, it
instead always refers in Foucault to a determinate knowledge and to a
determinate time.191
The footnote continues—

And yet, if it does not in any way refer back to an archetypal dimension
beyond history but remains immanent to it, its contradictory formulation
brings to expression the fact that every historical study inevitably runs up
against a constitutive dishomogeneity: that between the ensemble of facts
and documents on which it labors and a level that we can define as
archeological, which though not transcending it, remains irreducible to it
and permits its comprehension. Overbeck (as was articulated, somewhat
similarly, earlier) has expressed this heterogeneity by means of the
distinction, in every study, between prehistory (Urgeschichte) and history
(Geschichte), where prehistory does not designate what we usually
understand by this term—that is, something chronologically archaic
(uralt)—but rather the history of the point of emergence
(Entstehungsgeschichte), in which the researcher must settle accounts with
an originary phenomenon (an Urphänomen in Goethe’s sense) and at the
“Although knowledge’s pose of objectivity conceals the historical nature of Man from our normal view,
Foucault’s archeology is intended to provide a clear perception ... that allows us to see the entire framework
of social institutions tied to the human sciences as a transient historical development. Foucault’s view of the
repressive nature of modern society makes this awareness of transience a liberating one.” (Wartenberg,
“Foucault's Archeological Method: A Response to Hacking and Rorty,” 361.)
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science developed by Bachelard and Canguillhem, and from Husserlian phenomenology, but also (and
essentially) from the historical turn that German philosophy took around the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, beginning with Kant’s idea of “philosophical history of philosophy” [first explicated in the first
edition to the Critique of Pure Reason (though by the wording “history of pure reason”) and later in his essay
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(McQuillan, “Philosophical Archeology and the Historical A Priori: From Kant to Foucault,” 153.) This
Foucauldian archeological approach is a trace back to a small set of principles, and has resonance with Kant’s
essay on the “Progress of Metaphysics,” which suggests some a priori principles that make certain ways of
thinking necessary.
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same time with the tradition that, while it seems to transmit the past to us,
ceaselessly covers up the fact of its emergence and renders it inaccessible.
One can define philosophical archeology as the attempt to bring to light the
various historical a prioris that condition the history of humanity and define
its epochs. It is possible, in this sense, to construct a hierarchy of the various
historical a prioris, which ascends in time toward more and more general
forms. Ontology or first philosophy has constituted for centuries the
fundamental historical a priori of Western thought.192
According to Agamben, from an archeological perspective that herein attempts to reopen
access to a first philosophy, the fact is that it is precisely the impossibility of a first
philosophy that has become the historical a priori of the present time, beginning with Kant.
This impossibility (which Kant called Metaphysics) is the true Copernican turn of Kantian
critique (rather than the position of the subject).193 Foucault, claims Agamben, had tried to
rescue the survival of the impossibility of metaphysics with the stronghold of the
transcendental (that is, “Being”), but the transcendental “necessarily entails a displacement
of the historical a priori from the anthropogenesis event (the articulation between language
and world) to knowledge, from a being that is no longer animal but not yet human to a
knowing subject.”194 First philosophy becomes philosophy of knowledge.
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Philosophy is not usually conceived in terms of the “archi” historical a priori, with the becoming
human of man, mainly due to the current primacy of the cognitive paradigm in Western culture. Especially
since Kant, philosophy has become a doctrine of knowledge or condition of knowledge, as if what is at stake
in philosophy is the definition of the possibility of knowledge. We can think of the historical a priori as a
specificity of individual philosophers. For example, Kant’s historical a priori is the impossibility of
metaphysics (or the impossibility of first philosophy). Kant starts from the impossibility of metaphysics and
tries in some way to make it possible again, but in order to do so he has to confine metaphysics to the
transcendental, exclude it from any empirical and historical reality. This is the idea of the “Noumenon”—the
space of metaphysics is a void space, transcendental space. Thus, by trying to save metaphysics, he in a way
eliminated it, because philosophy after Kant was under the assumption that Kant had found a fortress in the
transcendental, but this fortress eventually turned out to be a trap (as post-Kantian philosophers remained
trapped in this fortress). Trying to escape from conceiving metaphysics as a concrete empirical science, Kant
transformed metaphysics into the transcendental, but remained trapped in what he thought was a fortress.
Philosophy, in the second half of the nineteenth century, until Heidegger, is an attempt to escape from the
transcendental towards Ontology (for example, the work of Nietzsche, also with his attention to language, as
well as consecutively, the linguistic turn as the historical a priori which substitutes for the transcendental).
In a way (as Agamben suggests us), our task today is to get rid of the transcendental and understand it
in a different way. From a Kantian point of view, the experience of the transcendental is that of a void space
that one cannot make any empirical statement about; on the contrary, we can say that the experience of
language is an archeology, a concrete investigation of language, etc. No longer is the metaphysical space a
void space, but now archeology can be considered as a proper metaphysical field.
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Philosophers such as Nietzsche, Benjamin, Foucault, and Benveniste sought a way
out of the transcendental by shifting the historical a priori back from knowledge to
language, by isolating each time a dimension that called into question the pure fact of
language, the pure being given of the enunciated, before or beyond their semantic content.
“The speaking being or enunciator has thus been substituted for Kant’s transcendental
subject, and language has taken the place of being as historical a priori.”195
Moreover, according to Agamben, language has superimposed itself over being.
Language no longer functions as a historical a priori that determines and conditions the
historical possibilities of speaking human beings, but becomes totally identified with being,
puts itself forward as a neutral ahistorical or post-historical effectuality that no longer
conditions any recognizable sense of historical becoming or any epochal articulation of
time. This means that our time is not determined by any historical a priori; in other words,
we find ourselves at a post-historical time. From this perspective, Agamben’s attempt is to
trace out an archeology of ontology, or to make a genealogy of the ontological apparatus
that has functioned as the historical a priori of the West.196
[Continue Reading]
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“The Aristotelian ontological apparatus, which has for almost two millennia guaranteed the life and
politics of the West, can no longer functions as a historical a priori, to the extent to which anthropogenesis,
which it sought to fix in terms of an articulation between language and being, is no longer reflected in it.
Having arrived at the outermost point of its secularization, the projection of ontology (or theology) into
history seems to have become impossible.” (Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 133; Agamben, The Omnibus
Homo Sacer, 1147.)
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ֹ[ אThe Contemporary]
An early indication for thinking about the time structure of philosophical archeology can
perhaps be found in an earlier text by Agamben titled What is the Contemporary? 197
Constructing his arguments on the basis of Nietzsche’s ideas of historical time, and
specifically on Nietzsche’s understanding of the contemporary as the untimely, Agamben
writes that those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who
neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands; but precisely
because of this condition, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping
their own time. Contemporariness is, then, a singular relationship with one’s own time,
which adheres to it and, at the same time, keeps a distance from it. Those who coincide too
well with their time, those who are perfectly tied to it in every respect, are not
contemporaries precisely because they do not manage to see it, they are not able to firmly
hold their gaze on it.
Those who are contemporary, according to Agamben, are the ones who firmly hold
their gaze on their own time so as to perceive not its light but rather its darkness. To
perceive this darkness is not a form of inertia or passivity, but rather it implies an activity
and a singular ability. This ability amounts to a neutralization of the light that comes from
present time in order to discover its obscurity, its special darkness. The ones who can call
themselves contemporary are those who do not allow themselves to be blinded by the lights
of the century, and so manage to get a glimpse of the shadows cast by those lights, of their
intimate obscurity. But there is a second, reverse and complementary movement or
perception: it is to perceive, in the darkness of the present, the light that strives to reach us
but cannot—this is what it means to be contemporary. It is, first and foremost, a question
of courage because it necessitates the ability not only to firmly fix one’s gaze on the
darkness of the era, but also to perceive in this darkness a light that, while directed towards
us, infinitely distances itself from us. Our time, the present, is in fact not only the most
distant but that which cannot in any way reach us. Attempting to grasp it requires courage,
and indeed as Agamben writes elsewhere (though in the broad context of the Church, in
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reference to Benedict XVI’s resignation of office—only the second resignation in the
history of the Catholic Church): “[C]ourage is nothing but the capacity to keep oneself
connected with one’s own end.”198
There is another aspect, according to Agamben, to this special relationship with the
past in which we can see how contemporariness carves itself into the present “by marking
it above all as archaic. Only he who perceives the indices and signatures of the archaic in
the most modern and recent can be contemporary.”199 Being archaic amounts to being
close to the arche, that is to say, the special type of origin that was already herein discussed,
an origin that is “contemporary with historical becoming and does not cease to operate
within it, just as the embryo continues to be active in the tissues of the mature organism,
and the child in the psychic life of the adult. Both this distancing and nearness, that define
temporariness, have their foundation in this proximity to the origin that nowhere pulses
with more force than in the present.”200 In order to “enter” the present, we must perform
archeology, a practice that does not, however, regress to a historical past in a mere
genealogical fashion, but returns to that part within the present that we are absolutely
incapable of living:

What remains un-lived is therefore incessantly sucked back towards the
origin without ever being able to reach it. The present is nothing other than
this un-lived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access
to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason (its traumatic
character, its excessive nearness) we have not managed to live. The
attention to this ‘un-lived’ is the life of the contemporary. And to be
contemporary means, in this sense, to return to a present where we have
never been.201
However, we should not naively assume a supposedly one directional, archeological
movement in time. Our conception of contemporariness must also assume time’s ability to
re-penetrate or refold back onto itself as if formed by porous structure, that is, being able
to think time as splitting into several times, thus introducing to it an essential dis-
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homogeneity, a kind of caesura in which time is being inscribed. But, claims Agamben,
“precisely by means of this caesura, this interpolation of the present into the inert
homogeneity of linear time, the contemporary puts to work a special relationship between
the different times. If, as we have seen, it is the contemporary who has broken the vertebrae
of his time, then he also makes of this fracture a meeting place, or an encounter between
times and generations.”202 Thus the contemporary is not only the one who manages (via
the double, two-sided movement in time) to capture, in the present, the darkness and the
light that can never reach its destiny, but is also:

the one who, dividing and interpolating time, is capable of transforming it
and putting it in relation with other times. He is able to read history in
unforeseen ways, to ‘cite it’ according to a necessity that does not arise in
any way from his will, but from an exigency to which he cannot not respond.
It is as if this invisible light that is the darkness of the present cast its shadow
on the past so that the past, touched by this shadow, acquired the ability to
respond to the darkness of the now.203
[Continue Reading]
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Part II—(Messianic) Time—History—Aesthetics: from Saint Paul to Walter
Benjamin

1.2.1
ֹ[ אMessianic Time]
Agamben’s philosophical archeology, as it is conceived with its postulations and purposes,
its paradoxical necessity and precarious logic, its temporal structure and spatial
architecture, archai and multiple nows, constitutes a comprehensive conception of history
that is based on, and determined by, a certain understanding of time deeper and more
elaborated than revealed thus far. Paraphrasing Agamben’s own words, we can therefore
ask: what is the Agambenian conception of time that is profoundly implicit in the
Agambenian conception of history?

In Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, Agamben addresses this very
question to Marx in an attempt to clarify why historical materialism has failed to elaborate
a conception of time that compares with its concept of history, and as a result, retained a
conservative temporal framework which supposedly withheld the fulfillment of a
promised, yearned revolution. Based on the assumption that every conception of history is
accompanied by a certain experience of time that conditions it, and likewise that every
culture adheres to a particular experience of time that requires a corresponding alteration
of this experience once a new culture or revolution is undergoing, Agamben claims that
Marx’s dictum of “changing the world” also required the changing of time, a change that
unfortunately never occurred since Marx made recourse to ancient theses and the concept
of time dominant in Western culture. Eventually Marx harboured a revolutionary concept
of history and a traditional experience of time: “The vulgar representation of time as a
precise and homogenous continuum has thus diluted the Marxist concept of history.”204

Thereafter, in order to show how Marx reached his conception of time, the (vulgarly
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represented) time of the West is historically drafted (albeit briefly) by Agamben. 205 He
describes the evolution of the Western conception of time beginning with the Greco-Roman
epoch, which conceived of time as circular and continuous: “Circular movement, which
guarantees the unchanged preservation of things through their repetition and continual
return, is the most direct and most perfect expression (and therefore the closest to the
divine) of the zenith of the hierarchy: absolute immobility.”206 For example, in Plato’s
Timaeus, time is measured by the cyclical revolution of the celestial spheres and defined
as a moving image of eternity. Aristotle, in the Physics, confirms the circular nature of time
which has no direction, no beginning, middle, or end; and in the Problemata, Aristotle
concludes that from this perspective we cannot say whether one lives before or after, for
example, the Trojan War.
However, the fundamental character of the Greek experience of time, which for two
millennia dominated the Western representation of time, is its precise, infinite, quantified
continuum. Aristotle defines time as “quantity of movement ... and its continuity is assured
by its division into discrete instants [the now], analogous to the geometric point. ... The
instant ... is a pure limit which both joins and divides past and future. As such, it is always
elusive, ... in dividing time infinitely, the now is always ‘other’; yet in uniting past and
future and ensuring continuity, it is always the same.”207 This is the instant’s paradoxically
nullified character, and the basis for the radical “otherness” of time and for its “destructive”
character.
Western man’s incapacity to master time and its obsession with handling it,
according to Agamben, originate from this Greek conception of time as a quantified and
infinite continuum of precise fleeting instants; thus man, based on this representation of
time, has no real experience of historicity.208
Greek philosophy deals with time often through Physics—things in the world are
“inside” time (that is objective and natural), each thing inhabits a place, so it inhabits time.
Time (with its destructive character), for the Greeks, destroys things. Thus,
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Herodotus in Histories, which marks the beginning of the modern conception of time,
writes that he “puts forth the fruit of his researches, so that time may not erase men’s
undertakings,”209 and by that confirms the ahistorical nature of the ancient concept of time.

The next major metamorphosis in the conception of Western time, analyzes Agamben, was
initiated with the rise of Christianity. The Christian experience of time is the antithesis to
the Greco-Roman one, as it conceives of time as a straight line. The world is created within
time, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, while (according to French historian Henri‒Charles
Puech) “[i]ts duration comprises neither the eternal nor the infinite, and the events which
unfold within it will never be repeated.”210 Moreover, this conception of time has direction
and purpose, and a central point of reference, that is, the incarnation of Christ. The eternal
repetition of Paganism, where nothing is new, is replaced with the idea that everything
happens only once, that every event is unique and irreplaceable. The history of humanity
is the history of salvation and the progressive realization of redemption whose foundation
is God.
Christianity, claims Agamben, thus lays the foundation for the experience of
historicity, although the (ancient) idea of time as continuous and quantifiable has not been
abolished, just displaced from the movements of the celestial stars to that of man’s interior
duration. Nonetheless, “time thus interiorized remains the continuous succession of precise
instants of Greek thought.”211 The ancient circular representation of Greek metaphysics
returns to Christian thought: eternity, the regime of divinity, with its static circle, tends to
negate the human experience of time; the discrete, fleeting instance intercepts the wheel of
eternity.

A further development in the conception and representation of time, as Agamben describes
it, was introduced by the modern age. The modern conception of time is a secularization
of rectilinear, irreversible Christian time, albeit devoid of the notion of an end or any
meaning except for regulating our sense of before and after. This homogeneous, rectilinear,
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and empty representation of time is a result of modern mechanics, which, according to
Agamben, prefers rectilinear over circular motion. Notions of before and after were vague
and empty for antiquity and for the modern they seem to have meaning in and of
themselves.
As Nietzsche grasped:

the idea governing the nineteenth-century concept of history is that of
‘process’. Only process as a whole has meaning, never the precise fleeting
now; but since this process is really no more than a simple succession of
now in term of before and after, and the history of salvation has meanwhile
become pure chronology, a semblance of meaning can be saved only by
introducing the idea [...] of a continuous, infinite progress.212
Under the influence of the natural sciences, progress becomes the guiding category of
historical knowledge, and behind the apparent triumph of historicism213 in the nineteenthcentury lies a hidden negation of history that is modelled on the natural sciences.214

The last, crucial transformation (prior to Marx) occurred, as one can expect, with Hegel.
Hegel based his idea of time on the Aristotelian model of the precise instant, conceiving
the now as a point. This now (“which is nothing other than the passage of its being into
nothingness” and vice versa) is eternity as true present. “The conjunction of spatial
representation and temporal experience which dominates the Western concept of time is
developed in Hegel as a conception of time as negation and dialectical dominion of
space.”215 For Hegel, the instance (or time) is a negation of negation. “Time,” he writes,
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“Historicism” refers to the study of the past in the past’s terms; it seeks to understand the meaning
and value of the past as it would have been understood at the time it happened. By contrast, “Presentism”
(See Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experience of Time) means to interpret and evaluate the
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understand events in terms of their “historicity,” while historicism holds that events can and should be
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“is the thing existing which is not when it is, and is when it is not: a half-glimpsed
becoming.”216 In the Hegelian system, time is the necessity and destiny of the unfulfilled
spirit, which must fall into time, and history is essentially a gradual process. “Like time,
whose essence is pure negation, history can never be grasped in the instant, but only as
total social process.”217

218

Marx’s conception of history is different. He understands history not as something into
which man falls, but as man’s original dimension as species-being, as being with the
capability of generation, producing itself from the start as a universal individual. History
is not determined (as in Hegel and the historicism that derives from him) by an experience
of linear time as negation of negation, but by praxis, “concrete activity as essence and
origin of man.”219 Praxis is the founding act of history, the means by which the human
essence becomes man’s nature and nature becomes man. History is man’s nature—man’s
original belonging to himself. “Man is not a historical being because he falls into time, but
precisely the opposite; it is only because he is a historical being that he can fall into time,
temporalizing himself.”220

Agamben concludes the historical layout by claiming that although Marx never elaborated
a theory of time adequate to his conception of history, it is clear that it cannot be reconciled
with the Aristotelian and Hegelian concept of time as a continuous and infinite succession
of precise instants. The fundamental contradiction of modern man is that he has yet to
develop an experience of time adequate to his idea of history, thus man is split between his
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being-in-time (as an elusive flow of instants) and his being-in-history (as the original
dimension of man). The modern conception of history is twofold: diachronic reality and
synchronic structure; and this double structure exemplifies the impossibility for man to
take possession of his own historical nature.

In the timeframe depicted by Agamben, there were substantial attempts to criticize and
challenge the common, dominant conceptions of time (respectively for each epoch), in
particular the characterization of time as a “point” 221 alongside its properties of
“continuity” and “quantifiability.” Agamben mentions just a few of these attempts, perhaps
the ones most pertinent to his own thinking:
(1) In Gnosticism there appears an experience of time that is in radical opposition
to both the Greek circular experience and the straight line of Christianity. It posits a concept
whose spatial model can be represented by a broken line, thus striking against Antiquity’s
unaltered duration, precise and continuous time. Based on Gnosticism’s (that is, as a
religion) differentiation from both Greek cosmology and Christian redemption, the time of
Gnosticism is an incoherent and inhomogeneous time: in an experience of interrupted time,
when man (in a sudden act of consciousness) takes possession of its own condition of being
resurrected, the Gnostic attitude is revolutionary as it “refuses the past valuing in it, through
an exemplary sense of the present, precisely what was condemned as negative, ... and
expecting nothing from the future.”222
(2) In Stoicism, too, we find a different conception of time, one that refuses the
astronomical time of Plato’s Timaeus, an image of eternity, and the Aristotle’s notion of
the mathematical instant. Against a homogeneous, infinite and quantified time that divides
the present into discrete instants (thus producing an unreal time and an experience of
deferral), the Stoics think of the experience of time as something neither objective nor
removed from our control, but derived from the actions of man. Its model is the kairos,
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“the abrupt and sudden conjunction where decision grasps opportunity and life is fulfilled
in the moment.”223
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(3) In Heidegger, the critique of time as continuous and quantified is subjected to a
radical critique in terms of repetition-destruction, which invades Western metaphysics as a
whole. The originality of Sein und Zeit is that of the foundation of historicity alongside a
more authentic experience of time. At the core of this experience there is no longer the
precise, fleeting instant throughout linear time, “but the moment of the authentic decision
in which the Dasein experiences its own finiteness, ... throwing itself forward in care, ...
freely assum[ing] the destiny of its primordial historicity. Man does not fall into time, ‘but
exists as primordial temporalization’.”225

Man can experience a new concept of time, in our time, according to Agamben. He gives
a preliminary hint for this cognitive change—it might be (as an ancient Western myth
makes it humankind’s original home) pleasure. Pleasure was understood by Aristotle as
heterogeneous in relation to the experience of quantified, continuous time. The form of
pleasure is perfect, whole, and complete, and does not occur in a dimension of time. Based
on the postulate that the Western experience of time is split between eternity and
continuous linear time, the dividing point through which the two relate is the instant as a
discrete, elusive point. Pleasure is outside of any measurable duration but likewise its place
is not in eternity. Against this conception there must be the true site of pleasure that is
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neither precise, continuous time, nor eternity, but history. It is only as a source to happiness
“that history can have a meaning for man. ... For history is not ... man’s servitude to
continuous linear time, but man’s liberation from it: the time of history and the cairós in
which man, by his initiative, grasps favourable opportunity and chooses his own freedom
in the moment.”226 The full, discontinuous, finite, and complete time of pleasure is set
against the empty, continuous, and infinite time of vulgar historicism; the chronological
time of pseudo-history is set against the cairological time of authentic history.227
In a final return to Marx, true historical materialism (ideally) objects to continuous
progress along finite linear time, and instead is ready to stop time because it acknowledges
that pleasure is man’s original home. This is the experience of time in authentic revolutions,
experienced as the halting of time and the interruption of chronology. Yet how can one
conceive pleasure as a new conception of time, outside of both measurable duration and
eternity? What is the pleromatic and cairological time of pleasure, appearing as the
liberating time of history? What exactly does Agamben mean by “the halting of time”?

***

Agamben conceives of time (the authentic, liberating time of history) as exemplified by
the idea of messianic time. Interpreted as the paradigm of historical time par excellence,
messianic time is discussed, in Agamben’s corpus at large, based on a hybridization of two
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illuminating historical manifestations of it: the one, in contemporary thought, is positioned
in Benjamin; the other, as its origin, is traced back to an apostolic text of Paul.
In Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” one finds the idea of Jewish
messianic intuition. In this text, Benjamin criticizes the conception of time that is based
upon continuous and quantified properties, seeking a concept of history where instead of
the nullified present of the metaphysical tradition, one can posit “a present which is not a
tradition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop.”228 Against the notion of
historical progress, Benjamin puts forward the idea that makes the continuum of history
explode; against the empty, quantified instant, he advances “the time of the now”
constructed as a messianic cessation of happening. This “full time” is, for Benjamin, “the
true site of historical construction.” 229 The messianic time of Judaism becomes (for
Benjamin and others) a model for the conception of history. At this point it should be noted
that the messianic is not a person, but an idea. The (Jewish) messianic concept means a
defiance—it proclaims that the arbitrary historical circumstance that we find ourselves in
is merely a coincidence and a temporary state. From creation to salvation, the belief is that
everything could turn out otherwise; even if the present experience is difficult, it is not the
end. The hope, the future, and the open horizon of potentiality signify the messianic idea.

***
We will come full circle back to Benjamin’s understanding of the essence of history, but
in order to do that, we first need to turn to that which Agamben identifies as the origin of
Benjamin’s conception positioned, as said above, in Paul. Agamben dedicates The Time
that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans specifically to the idea of
messianic time. The book is based on a seminar given by Agamben in which, throughout
its six days course, each day was dedicated to an individual part of the Epistle to the
Roman’s opening sentence: “Paulos doulos Christou Iēsou, klētos apostolos aphōrismenos
eis euaggelion Theou” (Paul, a servant of Christ Jesus, called to be an apostle and set apart
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for the gospel of God.)230
The first day is dedicated to “Paulos doulos Christou Iēsou” (Paul, a servant of Christ
Jesus) and opens with Agamben’s declaration that the book attempts, in part, to restore
Paul’s Letters to the status of the fundamental messianic text for the Western tradition,
since anti-messianic tendencies were operating (through translation and commentary acts)
within the Church and the Synagogue in the past two thousand years. Both the Church and
the Synagogue, according to Agamben, had a mutual interest to cancel out Paul’s Judaism,
to “expunge it from its originary messianic context.”231 For example, Jewish studies were
until recently dominated, in regard to Paul, by Martin Buber’s book Two Types of Faith
(1951), which advances a thesis that opposes the Jewish emunah (objective trust in the
community, the faith of Jesus) to the Greek pistis (subjective recognition of a faith one
judges to be true, the faith in Jesus), which is Paul’s faith. However, in recent years,
scholars have re-examined Paul’s Jewish context and evaluated his letters as “the oldest
and most demanding messianic texts of the Jewish tradition.” 232 In order to closely
examine and demonstrate Paul’s Jewish messianic context, one needs to realize messianic
institution’s paradoxical task of confronting an aporia concerning the very “structure of
messianic time”—in order to understand the Pauline message, one needs to be able to fully
experience such time; thus, we need to understand the meaning and internal form of the
time he defines as ho nym kairos, “the time of the now,” then raise the question of how
messianic community is possible.
The first step Agamben takes in the unfoldment of ho nym kairos (the time of the
now) is to contextualize it in terms of language. Paul’s language (of the Letters) is Greek
rather than translated Aramaic (as in Matthew and Mark); not belonging to any school or
model, it “flows directly out of his heart” and is a “classic of Hellenism.” Paul was part of
a Jewish diaspora community that thought and spoke in Judeo-Greek (as is the case with
Ladino and Yiddish), read and cited the Torah in the Septuagint. The community was
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subject to distrust since it was imbued with Greek culture and read the Torah in the
language of Aristotle and Plato. “Yet,” claims Agamben, “there is nothing more genuinely
Jewish than to inhabit a language of exile and to labor it from within, up to the point of
confounding its very identity and turning it into more than just a grammatical language:
making it a minor language, a jargon, or a poetic language. And yet, in each case it is also
a mother tongue.”233 Being neither Greek nor Hebrew; neither lashon-ha-qodesh (Hebrew
for “sacred language”) nor a secular idiom, is what makes Paul’s language so interesting
and what allows for its relation to the structure of messianic time.
For Paul, as will become clear, the contraction of time (the “remaining” time)
represents the messianic situation par excellence, the only real time. Agamben’s hypothesis
supposes that the words of the incipit (first verse only, comprised of ten words in total:
“Paulos doulos Christou Iēsou, klētos apostolos aphōrismenos eis euaggelion Theou”)
contract within themselves the complete text of the Letter, recapitulate it (recapitulation is
an essential term of the vocabulary of messianism). Thus, the understanding of the incipit
guarantees the understanding of the text as a whole.
Language plays a significant role not only in the illumination of the opening
sentence of the Romans but also for each individual word Paul makes use of. In the Hebrew
context, the archetype for metanomasia (the changing of a name of a character) is found in
Genesis 17:5, where God intervenes and changes the name of Abraham and Sarah by
adding a single letter. Paul also changes his own name, from Saulos to Paulos, having, so
it seems, a “new harmony” in mind—from Saulos, which is a regal name, to Paulos, which
is insignificant, from grandeur to smallness (Paul in Latin means “small, of little
significance”), defining himself as “the least of the apostles.” Paul is a surname, the
messianic signum (surname; ho kai in Greek, or qui et in Latin, is the formula that normally
introduces a surname, “who is also called”) that the apostle takes upon himself as he fully
assumes the messianic vocation. Agamben writes: “Metanomasia realizes the intransigent
messianic principle articulated firmly by the apostle, in which those things that are weak
and insignificant will, in the days of the Messiah, prevail over those things the world
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considers to be strong and important.”234 The messianic separates the proper name from
its bearer, thus we have only nickname or surname; Paul is also linked to the word doulos,
“slave,” in the sense that slaves did not have any juridical status in antiquity, thus did not
have a proper name. The apostle, like a slave, transformed from a free man into “the slave
of the Messiah,” loses his name, thus calls himself by a simple surname.
Tracing the semantic history of the term doulos (servant, slave, the “slave of the
Messiah”), New Testament lexicographers are habitually contrasting its juridical meaning
(acquired in the classical world) to its religious connotation exemplified by the Hebrew
word “Eved” (acquired in the Semitic world). In Paul, however, doulos refers to a profane
juridical condition and the transformation this condition undergoes in relation to the
messianic event. Doulos is opposed to eleutheros (free): “‘Slave of the Messiah’ defines
the new messianic condition for Paul, the principle of a particular transformation of all
juridical condition.”235
In the attempt to cancel out Paul’s Judaism, Agamben claims, language too plays a
crucial role. From the Vulgate onwards, he writes, several terms are not translated from the
Greek but are substituted with a loan translation: apostle for apostolos; evangel for
euggelion; and Christ for Christos. One should remember that christos is not a proper name
but is, already in the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew term mashiah,
Messiah. Paul is not familiar with Jesus Christ but rather with Jesus Messiah, and he never
uses the term christianos (which at any rate only means “messianic”): “A millenary
tradition that left the word christos untranslated ends by making the term Messiah
disappear from Paul’s text ... We will therefore always translate christos as ‘Messiah’.”236
Agamben concludes the first (lecture) day as follows: “Our seminar ... seeks to
understand the meaning of the word christos, that is ‘Messiah’. What does it mean to live
in the Messiah, and what is the messianic life? What is the structure of messianic time?”237
The second day revolves around the word Klētos. Klētos means “calling.” It is positioned
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at the centre of the verse, as a conceptual pivot, since the messianic calling is a central
event in Paul’s individual history. Klēsis (vocation, calling) indicates the particular
transformation that every juridical status and worldly condition undergoes because of its
relation to the messianic event. It is a change, almost an internal shifting of each and every
single worldly condition by virtue of being “called.” According to the apostle, this
movement means a nullification (by vocation).
Paul’s messianic life concerns the formula Hōs mē (“as not”), which is the ultimate
meaning of Klēsis. Vocation calls for nothing and to no place, “the messianic vocation is
the revocation of every vocation,”238 the vocation calls the vocation itself, as if it were an
urgency that worked it from within and hollowed it out, nullifying it in the very gesture of
maintaining and dwelling in it. This is what it means to live in messianic Klēsis.239
The meaning of comparison (or of the comparative), expressed by the particle Hōs,
was for medieval grammarians not something of an expression of identity or simple
resemblance, but rather was interpreted240 “as an (intensive and remissive) tension that sets
one concept against another.”241 The Pauline Hōs mē is a special type of tensor; it does not
push a concept’s semantic field into that of another, but sets it against itself in the form of
the “as not.” Thus, the messianic tension does not tend towards elsewhere, nor exhaust
itself in the difference between two things; according to the principle of messianic Klēsis,
a condition is set in relation to itself, thus it revokes the condition and undermines it without
altering its form—the messianic “makes it pass, ... prepares its end.”242
In Paul, the messianic nullification performed by Hōs mē is completely inherent
within Klēsis and does not happen to it at a second time, nor does it add anything to it. The
messianic vocation is a zone of absolute indiscernibility between immanence and
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transcendence, between the world and the future world. “Factical Klēsis,” writes Agamben,
“set in relation to itself via the messianic vocation, is not replaced by something else, but
is rendered inoperative.”243
Paul uses the term chrēsai, “make use,” in order to define messianic life in the form
of the as not, thus to live messianically means “to use” Klēsis. Conversely, messianic Klēsis
is something to use, not to possess. Paul contrasts messianic usus with dominium; thus, to
remain in the calling in the form of the as not means never to make the calling an object of
ownership, only of use. The messianic vocation is not a right nor an identity; it is a generic
potentiality that can be used without ever being owned. To be messianic, to live in the
Messiah, signifies the expropriation of any juridical-factical property (for example,
free/slave, man/woman) under the form of the as not. As Agamben concludes the second
day: “The coming of the Messiah means that all things, even the subjects who contemplate
it, are caught up in the as not, called and revoked at one and the same time. No subject
could watch it or act as if at a given point. The messianic vocation dislocates and, above
all, nullifies the entire subject.”244
The third day reflects on the idea of separation, as exemplified by the word aphōrismenos,
while relating this idea to Paul’s dialectic and the messianic event. Aphōrismenos is the
past participle of aphorizō which means “separated.” Paul’s use of the word seems to be
paradoxical since, on one hand, he characterizes his vocation in these words, referring to
himself as the separated one, though on the other hand simultaneously calls for
universalism, announcing the messianic end of all separation between Jews and pagans.
How is it possible that Paul’s messianic announcement of non-division coexists with his
self-definition as a “separated” one?
In order to understand the exact meaning of aphōrismenos, Agamben articulates
the need to correctly situate the fundamental problem of universalism (or Paul’s supposed
universalism and the “Catholic” vocation of the messianic community). Aphōrismenos, he
writes, is the Greek translation to the Hebrew term parush or the Aramaic p’rish

243
244

Ibid, 28.
Ibid, 41.
83

(“Pharisee”). Paul denounces himself, being a Jew, as a “Pharisee,” that is, as someone
who was separated. Pharisees were separated ones who “in distinguishing themselves from
the mass while being essentially laypeople, insisted on scrupulous attention to rules of
sacerdotal purity.”245 This is how they “separated” themselves from both pagans and amha’aretz (“the ignorant farmers who do not follow the law”). Pharisaism became a
dominant class within Judaism around the end of the first century BCE, and distinguished
itself from other factions by claiming that the law did not solely consist of the Torah (that
is, as a written law) but also as the oral Torah (that is, in a tradition conceived as a “dividing
wall” surrounding the Torah that prevents contact with any impurity).
By defining himself as aphōrismenos (“separated”), Paul alludes to his status as a
“Pharisee,” referring and negating it in the name of another separation—no longer a
separation according to the nomos (law), but to the messianic proclamation: “The wall that
the messianic proclamation brings down, the one announced in aphōrismenos, is the same
wall that the Pharisee had once maintained around the Torah in order to protect it from the
am-ha’aretz and the goyim, the non-Jews.”246
The principle of the law is thus division. The fundamental partition of Jewish law
is the one between Jews and non-Jews (in Paul’s words between Ioudaioi and ethnē). In
the Torah, the concept of “people” is already divided between am and goy (the Septuagint
translates am with laos and goyim with ethnē). The term yehudi (the Greek Ioudaios),
which was once designated to the inhabitants of the kingdom of Juda, extends to all the
members of the am. The term ivri (the Greek is Hebraios), which initially had a juridical
overtone to it, designates in the rabbinical literature lashon ha-qodesh (“sacred language”)
but was later on extended to the whole of Israel. Paul uses all three terms: Israel, Hebraios,
and Ioudaios; thus, one can say that the name itself divides, that “the law constituting Israel
as am is the principle of incessant division.”247
What is Paul’s strategy when confronting this fundamental division? How, from
the messianic perspective, does he manage to neutralize the partitions of the law? This
problem, according to Agamben, cannot be separated from the Pauline critique of the law,
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in which its aporias culminate in the messianic theologoumena. Confronting these
partitions, Paul puts another division to work that does not coincide with the preceding
ones, but that is not exterior to them either. The messianic aphorism works on the divisions
of the laws themselves, imposing upon them a further cut, the cut of “flesh/breath.” Paul
takes the fundamental division of the law, Jew/non-Jew, leaving no remainder or remnant,
and further divides it in two via a new division, that of flesh/breath, a (new) division that
divides the division itself. However, the messianic division introduces a remnant into the
law’s overall division of the people, and Jews and non-Jews are constitutively “not all.”
The significance of the “division of divisions” is that it involves an operation that divides
the divisions of the law themselves, and renders them inoperative without ever reaching a
final ground: “The messianic vocation separates every Klēsis from itself, engendering a
tension within itself, without ever providing it with some other identity.”248
In order to illuminate this division, Agamben cites Maurice Blanchot, who writes:
“Man is the indestructible that can be infinitely destroyed.” 249 This paradoxical saying
means that if man is indestructible, there is no human essence to destroy or recover, but if,
at the same time, man can be infinitely destroyed, it also means that something other than
this destruction remains, and that “man is this remnant.” In regard to Paul, there is no sense
in speaking about universalism (thought of as a principle above cuts and divisions, and the
individual as the ultimate limit of each division)—there is neither beginning nor end in
Paul, only division of division, and then a remnant.
Paul receives the concept of the remnant from the prophetic tradition. The
corresponding term in Hebrew is she’ar and she’erit. In this tradition the prophets address,
supposedly, the whole of Israel but claim that only a remnant will be saved. The “remnant
of Israel” is not a numeric remainder or portion, nor is it identical to Israel in the sense of
survivals of a human catastrophe. The remnant “is closer to being a consistency or figure
that Israel assumes in relation to election or to the messianic event. It is therefore neither
the all, nor a part of the all, but the impossibility for the part and the all to coincide with
themselves or with each other. At a decisive instant, the elected people, every people, will
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necessarily situate itself as a remnant, as not-all.”250
This is the ultimate meaning of Paul’s aphorism (the messianic–prophetic concept
of the remnant, his division of divisions): it is not a concept turning toward the future, but
a present experience that defines the messianic “now”: “In the time of the now a remnant
is produced.”251
Paul’s dialectic brings three elements together without mediation. First, the all
(pas), is the expression proper to the eschatological telos. At the end of time, as it is said,
God will be “all in all.” Second, the part (meros) defines the secular world, the time under
the law. Everything here is divided, is “in part.” Third, the messianic remnant that does not
go beyond the part (as it results from the part’s division) is initially linked to this division.
The messianic world, being the secular world, means that it is still in some way partial.
“Nevertheless,” writes Agamben, “the remnant is precisely what prevents divisions from
being exhaustive and excludes the parts and the all from the possibility of coinciding with
themselves. The remnant is not so much the object of salvation as its instrument, that which
properly makes salvation possible. ... The remnant is therefore both an excess of the all
with regard to the part, and of the part with regard to the all.” 252 In the telos, when God
will be “all in all,” the messianic remnant will exhaust its meaning, but in “the time of the
now,” the only real time, there is nothing other than the remnant. Thus, the messianic
remnant is the unredeemable that makes salvation possible.

On the fourth day, Agamben addresses the term apostolos (which, according to Agamben,
is grammatically dependent upon aphōrismenos and defines its specific function). The
meaning of apostolos comes from the Greek verb apostellō, to send forth. The apostle is
an emissary of the Messiah Jesus and the will of God for the messianic announcement. The
Hebrew antecedent found in lexicons is Shaliah253—a man who holds a mandate and is
sent on his specific assignment (Sheluhim, in plural, are those who are sent to the Diaspora).
Why does Paul define himself as an apostle rather than a prophet? The explanation
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to Paul’s self-definition, according to Agamben, lies in the differences between the two
figures. The legacy of the prophet (the navi) in Judaism, and in general in Antiquity,
extends over the threshold of modernity and never completely vanished.254 The prophet
has an unmediated relation to the “ruah Yahweh” (“the breath of Yahweh”) and speaks on
his behalf; the apostle, on the other hand, on his mission, searches independently for the
words of the message. This is the first difference between them.
The second difference concerns their relation to the future: the prophet always
speaks about a time to come, a time not yet present, while the apostle declares from the
arrival of the Messiah, when prophecy is kept silent as it is now truly fulfilled. The time of
the apostle is thus the present, and is the reason why Paul’s technical term for the messianic
event is ho nyn kairos, “the time of the now.”255
The apostle must be distinguished from another figure, the visionary, with whom
he is often confused, just as messianic time is often confused with eschatological time. The
messianic announcement is often confused not so much with prophecy (which concerns
the future) but with apocalypse (which contemplates the end of times). The apostle,
however, does not live in the time of the eschaton (the end of time). The difference then
between messianism and apocalypse, between the apostle and the visionary, is that the
visionary sees the day of judgement, the last day, and describes what he sees, whereas the
messianic is not the end of time but the time of the end.256 The messianic is the relation of
every moment, every kairos, to the end of time and eternity. The apostle is not interested
in the last day, but in the time that contracts itself and begins to end; or, in other words, the
time that remains between time and its end. The messianic time, the time that the apostle
lives in and is interested in, is neither the ordinary present (olam hazzeh, chronological
time, the time between creation and the last day) nor the time that will come after the end
of the world (olam habba, the time after the world, the apocalyptic eschaton). 257 The
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apostle is interested in the remnant, in the time that remains between the two times, “when
the division of time is itself divided.”258 Therefore, messianic time should not be mistaken
for eschatological time, thus making the specificity of what constitutes messianic time
unthinkable. As opposed to attempts to understand the Christian conception of time (time
oriented toward eschatological salvation, toward final end) as antithetical to modernity’s
conception of time and history, Paul’s messianic time puts into question the very possibility
of a clear division between the two worlds.
Additionally, the time between the Resurrection and the end of time (that is, the
time that remains, the messianic time) means a radical transformation of our experience of
time—it cannot be conceived in chronological terms but as time within (chronological)
time, a time that transforms chronological time from within. Agamben writes (elsewhere):
“On the one hand it is the time that time takes to end. But on the other hand it is the time
that remains, the time which we need to end time, to confront our customary image of time
and to liberate ourselves from it.”259 The time in which we believe we live in makes us
powerless spectators of our own lives; the messianic time, however, is the time we
ourselves are, when we grasp that we are nothing but that time. This is the only real time
and to experience it we need to go through a transformation of ourselves and of our ways
of living.
Agamben’s next step confronts the crucial need for an adequate representation of
messianic time. How should this time be represented? The secular time, the chronos, spans
from creation to the messianic event, that is, the resurrection of Jesus in which thereafter
time contracts itself and begins to end. This contracted time, which Paul calls “the time of
the now,” lasts until the parousia,260 the full presence of the Messiah, which coincides with
the end of time (and which is nonetheless a point in time that remains indeterminate even
if it is imminent). According to this description, messianic time does not however coincide
with either the end of time nor with the secular chronological time (but is not outside the
chronological time either). Messianic time is that part in secular time that undergoes an
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entirely transformative contraction. Thus, messianic time might be better represented as a
“caesura which, in its dividing the division between two times, introduces a remainder into
it that exceeds the division.”261 In this schema, messianic time is part of secular time (but
exceeds it chronologically), and at the same time, is part of eternity (but exceeds the future
time). It is situated as a remainder with regard to the division between the two worlds. The
problem with this representation of time is that it is based on spatial order (in the form of
lines, points, and segments) that renders unthinkable the lived experience of time (the
confusion between eschaton and messianic time is a prime example for that): spatial
representations represent perfectly but make it also unthinkable; whereas reflecting upon
the lived (or real) experience of time makes it thinkable but unrepresentable. Where does
this gap between representation and thought, image and experience, come from? Is another
representation of time possible?

In order to resolve this perplexity, Agamben draws on the idea of operational time
(formulated in full by the French linguist and philologist Gustave Guillaume in his work
Temps et verbe, which deals, in this sense, in the temporality of verbs). According to this
idea, “the human mind experiences time, but it does not possess the representation of it,
and must, in representing it, take recourse to constructions of a spatial order.” 262 The
representation of time as an infinite line made out of two segments (past and future)
separated by the cutting of the present (a representation he names “time-image”) is
inadequate, according to Guillaume, since it presents time as if it were always constructed,
but does not show time in the act of being constructed in thought. One needs to represent
something not only in its achieved state but also in its various phases through which thought
had to pass constructing it, thus: “Guillaume defines ‘operational time’ as the time the mind
takes to realize a time-image.”263 As per Guillaume, language (which he investigates from
the point of view of the Aristotelian distinction between potential and act) can organize the
constructed image by referring it back to the operational time in which it was constructed;
and in regard to the chronological representation of time, the process of forming the time-
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image can be cast back onto the time-image itself (adding a projection to this process). The
result is a chronogenetic time, “a time which includes its own genesis,” 264 a new
representation of time that is no longer linear but three-dimensional (pure state of
potentiality, process of formation, and the state of final construction).
In his introduction to Guillaume’s book, Canadian linguistic Walter Hirtle
maintains that in his attempt to reach a deeper level of language, Guillaume determines an
insight that provided the cornerstone for all of his later theorizing, that is, “that something
is potential before it is actual.”265 This led Guillaume to theorize about how we think the
possible and the real, realizing that in order to represent an event (in subjunctive mood)
one needs to give it precedence, must think it prior to thinking it as real (in indicative
mood). The only time this becomes possible is the “‘thinking time’ required by the mental
process of representing a verb.” 266 Thus, the system of mood, as Guillaume names it,
means that is it essentially a single, subconscious operation of thought, determined by the
underlying principle of analysis: operative time. The grammatical system is a mechanism
in the mind that produces successive morphemes (i.e., the smallest grammatical unit that
carries meaning, in a certain language) at different moments in the operation of thought,
“as a potential meaning determined by its relative position in the operation involved.”267
Each morpheme is defined according to its position in the micro-stretch of time required
for a mental process to unroll. The operative time of the system determines the “notional
chronology” of the morphemes involved and their respective potential meaning as the
consequences of their position within the system. The processes of language, for
Guillaume, thus determines everything that can be understood regarding it. Language
resides in the depth of the mind as an organized set of possible processes. The potential
and the actual in language thus link in a subconscious morphogenetic process in order to
produce a word, showing that a word (once described as a “miniature of art”) must be
assembled by the speaker before being used in a sentence. Guillaume’s perspective of
operative time enabled him a holistic view of language in which the potential and the actual
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are parts of a single phenomenon. Exploring further the passage from the potential to the
actual, from system to sentence, Guillaume analyses the grammatical systems within the
word, specifically those concerned with representing time within verbs (which he termed
chronogenesis). His studies indicated that “all the individual grammatical systems of a
language can be seen as particular cases of one general system of representation.”268 He
thus looked for the most general system that provides the underlying structural mechanism
of the word, and finally found it in the most transparent of all words—the article. The
mental operation underlying the system of the article consists of double movement: the
first, from the universal to the particular; the second, following on the first in operative
“thinking,” from the particular to the universal. To each movement corresponds a sign: for
the first (contractive movement), the indefinite article (un, a); for the second (expansive
movement), the definite article (le, the). This form of the movements or this mechanism,
for Guillaume, “could provide a representation of any variable relationship based on
quantity ... and he evoked it to depict the relation within the verb between time as an infinite
stretch and time as a finite stretch (the present).” 269 This all-embracing language
mechanism reflects one of the basic capabilities of human thought: the ability to generalize
and to particularize.
Guillaume further writes: “Science is founded on the insight that the world of
appearances tells of hidden things, things which appearances reflect but do not resemble.
One such insight is that what seems to be disorder in language hides an underlying order
— a wonderful order.”270 Guillaume speaks in terms of spatiality both in regard to things
and order, thus it comes as no surprise to encounter his claim that “already to be found in
Temps et verbe is the idea that time is constructed in terms of space on n dimensions.”271
The monograph exemplifies, according to Guillaume, the construction of time on the model
of space, according to the principle that time is not representable by itself but requires to
base its representations on spatial characteristics. The representation of time, the
chronogenesis, is a spatialization of time. When the human mind does not carry out the
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representation of time according to these measures, time has no representation; it does not
mean that it does not exist but rather that it exists in thought only as our experience does:
“The human mind ... has the experience of time, but has no representation of it (it must,
therefore, invent this representation, which will be a spatialization, representability being
a property of space, and of space alone).”272

Once applied to the problem of messianic time, the paradigm of operational time implies
another time that is not entirely consumed by the “previous” representation of time,273 as
if man produces, in regard to chronological time, an additional time that prevents him from
perfectly coinciding with the time out of which he is able to make images and
representations. The idea of operational time demonstrates our inability to coincide with
our image of time since it effects a gap between our experience and conception of the
present moment. This is not a time added from the outside of chronological time nor a timesupplement; it is a time within time, an interior time that measures the disconnection (and
being out of synch, being non-coincidental) from our representation of time, 274 “but
precisely because of this, allows for the possibility of my achieving and taking hold of
it.”275 The space that the messianic time opens between ourselves and our representations
of time permits us access to this transformative force at every instant, and thus we take
hold of chronological time in a manner determined by the messianic event.
Agamben proceeds and offers a first definition of messianic time: “[M]essianic time
is the time that time takes to come to an end, or, more precisely, the time we take to bring
to an end, to achieve our representation of time.”276 It is an operational time pressing from
within chronological time, working and transforming it internally, “the time we need to
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make time end: the time that is left us [il tempo che ci resta].277 Operational time, the time
that remains, is what’s left of time (as a remnant) once it has exhausted itself in the actual.
Whereas our representation of chronological time separates us from ourselves as impotent
spectators, messianic time, an operational time in which we take hold of ourselves, is the
time that we ourselves have, “the only real time, the only time we have.”278
Agamben reaches a point in the analysis where he can now better articulate the
structure of messianic time in Paul. The messianic event is decomposed into two times:
resurrection and parousia (the second coming of Jesus, and the full presence of the Messiah,
both occur at the end of time). This decomposition implies the paradoxical tension between
an already and a not yet that defines the Pauline conception of salvation, meaning that the
messianic event has already happened (salvation has already been achieved), but in order
to truly be fulfilled requires an additional time (thus not yet). This unusual scission
introduces a constitutive delay or deferment into the messianic.

279

The Pauline

decomposition of presence thus finds its true meaning from the perspective of operational
time: as operational time, as the amount of time needed to end representations of time, the
messianic ho nyn kairos (“the time of the now”) can never fully coincide with a
chronological moment internal to its representation (the end of time as a time-image
represented by a final point on a continuous line of chronology). But as an image devoid
of time, it can never be grasped and thus tends to infinitely defer itself. The fallacious and
inadequate representation of the end lies in changing operational time into a supplementary
time added onto chronological time in order to infinitely postpone the end. Parousia does
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not mean the “second coming” of Jesus (a second messianic event that follows and
subsumes the first one), it does not signal a supplement added to something in order to
complete it nor a supplement that follows that can never reach fulfillment. Parousia for
Paul highlights the innermost structure of the messianic event, inasmuch as it is comprised
of two heterogenous times (kairos and chronos, operational time and represented time)280
that are coextensive but that cannot be added together. Agamben writes:

Messianic presence lies besides itself, since, without ever coinciding with a
chronological instant, and without ever adding itself onto it, it seizes hold
of this instant and brings it forth to fulfillment. ... The Messiah has already
arrived, the messianic event has already happened, but its presence contains
within itself another time, which stretches its parousia, not in order to defer
it, but, on the contrary, to make it graspable. For this reason, each instant
may be, to use Benjamin’s words, the ‘small door through which the
Messiah enters.’ The Messiah always already had his time, meaning he
simultaneously makes time his and brings it to fulfillment.281
Moreover, Paul expresses messianic time via two complementary notions: Typos and
Recapitulation. Typos means figure, 282 prefiguration or foreshadowing, and is used by
Paul to establish a typological relation between every event from past time and ho nyn
kairos, messianic time. The important thing, however, is not this symmetry but the
transformation of time implied by this typological relation. The problem here is mainly
concerned with a tension that clasps together and transforms past and future in an
inseparable constellation. The messianic is not just one of two terms in this typological
relation, it is the relation itself. The two ends of the olam hazzeh and the olam habba are
contracted into each other without ever coinciding—this contraction is messianic time.283
For Paul, the messianic is not a third era situated between two times but rather a caesura
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that divides the division between times and introduces a remnant, a zone of undecidability,
in which the past is dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past.
Messianic time, according to Agamben, is neither the complete nor the incomplete, neither
the past nor the future, but the inversion of both.284 This inverse movement is perfectly
rendered in the Pauline typological relation as an area of tension in which two times enter
into a constellation that the apostle called ho nyn kairos. The past (the complete)
rediscovers actuality and becomes unfulfilled, and the present (the incomplete) acquires a
kind of fulfillment.
A recapitulation of all things, from creation to the messianic “now,” is what
messianic time does. This recapitulation of the past produces a plērōma, a saturation and
fulfillment of kairoi (messianic kairoi are full of chronos, but abbreviated, summary
chronos) that anticipates eschatological plērōma when God “will be all in all.” Messianic
plērōma is therefore an abridgement and anticipation of eschatological fulfillment. The
plērōma of kairoi is understood as the relation of each instant to the Messiah (each kairoi
is immediate to God and not just the final result of a process, as in the case, writes
Agamben, with the model Marxism inherited from Hegel). Each time is the messianic now,
whereas the messianic is not the chronological end of time “but the present as the exigency
of fulfillment, what gives itself ‘as an end’.”285
The widespread view of messianic time as oriented solely toward the future is
fallacious. For Paul, the moment of salvation is not solely about the future, but on the
contrary, recapitulation means that ho nyn kairos is a contraction of past and present, that
the entire past is summarily contained in the present, that we will have to “settle our debts,
at the decisive moment, first and foremost with the past.”286 The Pauline gesture has a
double movement as it produces a tension (toward what lies ahead) on and out of what lies
behind. This is why Paul, caught in this double tension, can neither seize hold of himself
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nor be fulfilled.287
In the “Epistle to the Ephesians” (Eph 1:10), Paul writes: “[F]or the economy of the
plenitude of time, all things, both in heaven and on earth, recapitulate themselves in the
messiah.”288 Messianic time thus recapitulates all times, summates the whole history, now
appears in the messianic now. The whole past is summarized and unfolds itself as a
“figure,” not in the sense of simple foreshadowing but as “a constellation and a contraction
of the two times, so that the whole past, the whole of history is, so to say, summarily
contained in the present, and the claim of a remnant to posit itself as a whole finds here its
foundation.”289 The summarized past of the messianic pertains to a special kind of memory
where at its core one finds “the economy of salvation,” that is, a past that is exclusively
individual past, thus a past that potentially opens up for man a new (past) possibility that
enables him to “take leave from this past.”

The last two days of the seminar (fifth and sixth) unfold the phrase ending eis euaggelion
Theou (“for the gospel of God”). In Paul, the Greek punctuation eis, which signals a general
movement toward something, can take on a terminological quality. Euaggelion (like the
Hebrew bsora) means the “announcement” and “joyful message” announced by the
euaggelos, the messenger of joy. The term signifies both the announcement and its content.
As we saw earlier, the temporal structure implied by the apostle’s euaggelion differs
from that of the prophet—the announcement refers not to a future event but to a present
fact. Thus, there is an underlying connection between the trio announcement-faith-presence
(euaggelion-pistis-parousia), exemplified by Origen’s writing: “Euaggelion is either a
discourse [logos] which contains the presence [parousia] of a good for the believer, or a
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discourse which announces that an awaited good is present [pareinai].”290 What is a logos
that can enact a presence for whomever hears it and believes in it?
Paul’s letter, according to Agamben, which contains the term euaggelion (and
appears in the incipit and at the same time coincides with the content of the message
announced) is thus the impossibility of distinguishing between the announcement and the
content. At every point, the text of the letter is indistinguishable from the announcement
and the announcement from the good announced.
This zone of indistinction is called pistis, faith, by Paul. “Paul defines,” writes
Agamben, “the essential relation between euaggelion and pistis in the following terms: ‘the
announcement is power [dynamis] for the salvation of he who believes [panti to
pisteuonti]’” 291 —this definition implies that inasmuch as the announcement entails
dynamis, potentiality (dynamis signifies power as much as it does possibility), it needs the
complement of faith for it to be effectual. Being aware of the Greek opposition of
potentiality (dynamis) and act (energeia), Paul often couples faith with energeia, being in
act, so that faith (in relation to potentiality) is energumen, the principle of actuality and
operativity. This principle is not external to the announcement, but the thing within it that
makes potentiality active; at the same time, it may be presented as the very content of what
is announced. Faith is the announcement’s being in act, its energeia.
Euaggelion is not merely a discourse—logos disconnected from what is announced
and the subject that announces it. It is given as a Plērophoria (pleros, “full, fulfilled” +
phoreō, “carrying,” “be transported”), something that is brought into fullness without any
gap left over. It is not an announcement empty in itself, but nevertheless could be believed
and verified. It is born in the faith of the one who utters it and who hears and lives in it
exclusively. Agamben writes: “Faith consists in being fully persuaded of the necessary
unity of promise and realization: ‘[Abraham] being fully persuaded that he who promised
is equally capable of doing.’ The announcement is the form the promise assumes in the
contraction of messianic time.”292
Paul uses the verb Katargeō, a compound of argeō (that derives from the adjective
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argos) meaning “inoperative, not-at-work (a-ergos), inactive.” The compound thus means
“I make inoperative, I deactivate, I suspend the efficacy.” Before Paul, it was in use as the
form argeō in the Septuagint as a translation of the Hebrew word that signifies rest on
Saturday or the sabbatical suspension of work. In Greek, the positive equivalent of
katargeō is energeō (“I put to work, I activate”). The etymological opposition with energeō
demonstrates that katargeō signals a taking out of energeia, a taking out of the act. In the
opposition (that Paul uses) between dynamis/energeia, potentiality/act, the messianic
enacts an inversion, that is, a moment when potentiality passes over into actuality and meets
up with its telos. It does not happen in the form of force or ergon, but in the form of
astheneia, weakness. Paul formulates this principle of messianic inversion in the
potential/act relation: “‘Power [or potentiality] realizes itself in weakness’ [dynamis en
astheneia teleitai] (2 Cor 12:9); and “‘when I am weak, then am I powerful.’”293
In accordance with the Greek principle according to which privation (sterēsis) and
im-potentiality (adynamia) maintain a kind of potentiality, Paul likewise believed that
messianic power does not wear itself out in the ergon, but remains powerful in it in the
form of weakness. Messianic dynamis is constitutively “weak” but precisely for this reason
it enacts its effects. This is the messianic inversion of the potential/act relation. The
messianic power is realized and acts in the form of weakness, not by annihilation or
destruction, but by deactivation, by rendering inoperative, thus giving potentiality back (to
whatever was worked on) in the form of inoperativity and ineffectiveness, and restoring it
(the thing worked on) to the state of potentiality (in order, at the later stage, to fulfill it):
“That which is deactivated, taken out of energeia, is not annulled, but conserved and held
onto for its fulfillment. ... [K]atargēsis is not the destruction of being (aphanisis tes ousia),
but the progression toward a better state.”294
Luther, writes Agamben, translates the Pauline verb katargein as Aufheben—the
word that harbours the double meaning of abolishing and conserving found at the centre of
Hegel dialectics. Thus, a genuinely messianic term becomes a key term for dialectics, and
in this sense Hegel’s dialectic is nothing more than a secularization of Christian theology
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(i.e., Hegel used a messianic weapon against theology furnished by theology itself). If this
genealogy of Aufhebung is correct, then not only does Hegelian thought involve
hermeneutic struggle with the messianic (in the sense of it being a conscious interpretation
and secularization of messianic theme), but so does modernity (as the epoch that is situated
under the sign of the dialectical Aufhebung). Based on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,
which, through its discussion of Aufhebung exposes the structure of linguistic signification
by showing that language is always already caught up in a history and a time, the
connection and difference between the problem of aufhebung and messianic time is shown:
while messianic time (as operational time) also introduces a disconnection and delay into
represented time, it cannot be attached onto time as a supplement or as infinite deferment.
The messianic, the ungraspable quality of the “now,” is the opening through which we
seize hold of time, achieving our representation of time, making it end. The messianic
exigency reemerges in Hegel in the problem of the plērōma of times and the end of
history—he thinks the plērōma not as each instant’s relation to the Messiah (as Paul does,
via the Torah), but as the final result of a global process.
Both important interpreters of Hegel, Alexandre Koyré and Alexandre Kojève (who
think the possibility of the Hegelian system in terms of the end of history), end up flattening
out the messianic into the eschatological, mixing the problem of messianic time with the
problem of post-history (Kojève’s concept of déœuvrement, a good translation of Pauline
katargein, “inoperativity,” appears in his definition of the post-historical condition of
man).295
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1.2.2
The Time that Remains ends with a “threshold” (or Tornada as Agamben titles it). In this
final passage, we come full circle (in our attempt to analyze messianic time, to formulate a
concept of time that will condition a concept of history) back to Agamben’s positioning of
the messianic concept in modern thought, particularly that of Benjamin.
Benjamin’s image of the hunchback dwarf, taken from the “Theses on the
Philosophy of History,” assists him in portraying “the very text of the philosophy of history
as a chessboard upon which a crucial theoretical battle unfolds, and which, we are to
assume, is even lent a hand by a hidden theologian concealed between the lines of the
text.”296 Who is this hunchback theologian?
In order to answer this question, according to Agamben, we have to better
understand the role of citation in Benjamin’s work. Citation serves a strategic function; it
is the mediator that enables secret meetings between past and present generations, as well
as between past and present writings, thus citation is required to perform in secrecy.
Sperren, in German, is translated as “spacing”—it refers to the method in typography of
substituting italics with a script that places a space between each letter if that word is to be

Derrida critiques the primacy of presence in the metaphysical tradition by showing how metaphysics
always already presupposes non-presence and signification. His idea of “originary supplement” is not
something that is added externally to something else, but comes to supplement a lack and non-originary
presence, both always already caught up in a signifying. The concept of the “trace” names the impossibility
of a sign to be extinguished in the fullness of presence. The trace must be conceived as “before being,” the
thing itself, always already as sign, the signified always already in the position of signifier. There is no
nostalgia for origin since there is no origin; the origin is produced as a retroactive effect of non-origin and a
trace. Although these concepts call into question the primacy of presence and signification, they do not
question signification in general; they presuppose the impossibility of an extinguishing of the sign, they
presuppose that there is still signification beyond presence and absence, that non-presence still signifies
something, it posits itself as an “arch-trace,” a sort of archiphoneme between presence and absence. The
arche-trace shows its link and difference from the Hegelian Aufhebung with its messianic theme. The
movement of Aufhebung, which achieves signification, becomes a principle of infinite deferment. A
signification that only signifies itself can never seize hold of itself, rather it is displaced and deferred in one
and the same gesture, thus the trace is a suspended Aufhebung that will never come to know its full plērōma.
Deconstruction thus is a suspension of the messianic.
A metaphysical concept which takes as its prime focus a moment of foundation and origin coexists with
a messianic concept which focuses on a moment of fulfillment. Messianic and historic is the idea that
fulfillment is possible by retrieving and revoking foundation. If we drop the messianic theme and focus only
on the moment of foundation and origin (or their absence), we are left with empty, zero-degree signification
with history as its infinite deferment.
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highlighted. Benjamin himself uses this method, which, from a palaeographic standpoint,
represents the opposite of how authors use abbreviations (in order to be read in full or
because some words should not be read at all). As Agamben writes: “These spaced words
are, in a certain way, hyperread: they are read twice, and, as Benjamin suggests, this double
reading may be the palimpsest of citation.”297 In the second thesis, Benjamin writes: “Like
every generation that precedes us, we have been endowed with a w e a k messianic
power.”298 He refers, so it seems, back to Paul and his conception of the weakness of
messianic power. Thus, the hidden Pauline text within the theses makes Benjamin’s use of
words and typography a form of citation without quotation marks, “and it is precisely this
hyperlegibility, this secret presence of the Pauline text in Benjamin’s Theses, that is
signaled discretely by this spacing.”299
Now we can better identify the hunchback theologian who secretly guides the
puppet of historical materialism in Benjamin’s text. Benjamin’s concept of the “image”
(wherein the past and present are united in a constellation, and wherein the present
recognizes the meaning of the past and the past finds its meaning and fulfilment) relates to
Paul’s “typological relation,” where the past and the future enter a similar constellation,
where a moment from the past must be recognized as the typos (figure) of the messianic
now.300 The fact that Paul writes, “[H]e who is an image of the one who was to come,”
causes Benjamin to speak of an image and not a figure; additionally, Benjamin’s own
words “the true image of the past f l e e s by,” propels Agamben to claim that Benjamin
took from Paul the idea that the image of the past runs the risk of disappearing completely
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if the present fails to recognize itself in it.301
Benjamin’s concept of “the now of legibility” (or knowability) defines a genuinely
hermeneutic principle (in opposition to the idea that any work may become the object of
infinite interpretations at any given time) according to which every text contains a historical
index indicating both its belonging to a determinate epoch, as well as its only coming forth
to full legibility at a determinate historical moment. In The Arcades Project, writes
Agamben, Benjamin included the following note (N3, 1) that confided his “most extreme
messianic formulation,” a note that also serves Agamben as his final conclusion to the
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Elsewhere in reference to Paul, Agamben mentions Benjamin, who writes (as we recall) that
“[e]very day, every instant, is the small gate through which the messiah enters.” (Quoted in Agamben, The
Church and the Kingdom, 5.) The accurate quote, taken from Benjamin’s addendum to the “Theses on the
Philosophy of History,” reads as follows: “For every second of time was the strait gate through which the
Messiah might enter.” (Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 264.) Benjamin’s conception of
messianic time is an emphasis of the redemptive potentiality of the non-chronological present that, in the
context of the Pauline epistles, bears a relation not only to Judaism but also to the Church. [On the Jewish
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shows in The Church and the Kingdom, since messianic time does not mean chronology but a qualitative
change in how time is experienced, in the original positioning of the Church it makes no sense to speak in
terms of chronology—there is no time for delay. Thus Paul, when addressing the Thessalonians, speaks about
the “Day of the Lord” in present tense; or in the Gospels, when referring to the Messiah, he is called ho
erchomenos, “he who comes,” he who never ceases to come. Messianic time (the term Agamben was using
in The Time that Remains to replace the term “kairology” in Infancy and History) is set in opposition to the
historical dialectic of progress and its logic of deferral, for example, the future coming of the Messiah who
will redeem mankind and bring history to an end. Instead, both Agamben and Benjamin conceive of the
messianic event as a potentiality of the present situation, or, as Benjamin once described his surrealist alarm
clock, a clock that rings “sixty seconds every minute.”
The Greek term Paroikousa means the manner in which foreigners (and those in exile) dwell, as opposed
to the Greek verb, katoikein, which designates how a citizen of the city dwells. Paroikein designates how a
Christian ought to live in this world as well as his experience of time or messianic time. The experience of
time proper to the Church is defined by the ecclesiastical tradition as “ho chronos tē paroikias” (Agamben,
The Church and the Kingdom, 2), that is, parochial time (in the sense of sojourning like a foreigner).
Sojourning here does not mean a fixed period of time nor is it to be understood in the sense of chronological
time, but in the sense that the Church sojourns on earth for a prolonged period of time without altering its
messianic experience of time. This position preceded, according to Agamben, the Church’s later position that
took place on the background of the “delay of the parousia” (Ibid, 4): “Paroika and parousia, the sojourn of
the foreigner and the presence of the messiah, have the same structure, expressed in Greek through the
preposition pará: a presence that distends time, an already that is also a not yet, a delay that does not put off
until later but, instead, a disconnection within the present moment that allows us to grasp time.” (Ibid, 26.)
The initial Christian community expected the imminent arrival of the messiah (and thus the end of time) but
was confronted with an inexplicable delay and thus had to reorganize its institutional and juridical
organization, a repositioning resulting in the Christian community ceasing to paroikein (to sojourn as
foreigners) so as to begin to katoikein (to live like a citizen), and as a result, lost its messianic experience of
time.
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seminar:

Each now is the now of a particular knowability (Jedes Jetzt das Jetzt einer
bestimmten Erkennbarkeit). In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with
time. (This point of explosion, and nothing else, is the death of the intentio,
which thus coincides with the birth of authentic historical time, the time of
truth.) It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is
present its light on what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has
been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other
words: an image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the
present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what has been to the
now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but imagistic [bildlich]. Only
dialectical images are genuinely historical—that is, not archaic—images.
The image that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its
recognisability—bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous
critical moment on which all reading is founded.302
1.2.3
We will now attempt to show the connection and interrelatedness between Benjamin’s
conception of the messianic (and the philosophy of history, at large) and a few ideas [such
as montage, image, (semantic) void, melancholy, and angels] that characterize his writings
on aesthetics and art. Illuminating the connection between these domains will assist us
(among others) in progressing to section II.
A note (N1, 10) in The Arcades Project states the following: “This work has to
develop to the highest degree the art of citing without quotation marks. Its theory is
intimately related to that of montage.”303 What is a montage-based method of “citation
without quotation marks”? How does it relate to history?
Benjamin, as it is well known, wrote increasingly on aesthetics and particularly on
(imagery-core) photography. Thus, it comes as little or no surprise that the idea of “citation
without quotation marks” is also referred to in these terms, that is, as the idea (or method)
of “dialectical image.”304 Benjamin uses “image” in a broader sense than we are often
accustomed to, using it as more than a visual image, and thus escapes what seems to be a
paradoxical term (i.e., “dialectical image,” an image at once frozen and dialectical). His
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method (further formulated as “dialectics at a standstill”) brings together two parties in
dialogue and into dynamic contact—that is, dialectical images represent the conjuncture of
past and present and are considered by Benjamin as the only genuine images. A dialectical
image is charged with an energy that is capable of “blowing elements out of the historical
continuum” once they achieve a special legibility that Benjamin calls the “now of
knowability.” Agamben notes that “Walter Benjamin writes that the historical index
contained in the images of the past indicates that these images may achieve legibility only
in a determined moment of their history,”305 as well as characterizing Benjamin’s idea of
the dialectical image as “the fulcrum of [Benjamin’s] theory of historical
consciousness.”306

Agamben refers to the artistic method of montage and its relation to history also in his
essay on the poetic characteristic of Guy Debord’s cinema. The specific function of the
image that Agamben identifies in Debord’s work (though not exclusively) is what ties
cinema and history together—its operation no longer as an immobile entity. The image is
not an archetype, nor is outside history, rather (similarly to Benjamin’s “dialectical image”
as Agamben writes) “it is a cut which itself is mobile, an image-movement, charged as such
with a dynamic tension.”307 The mobility of the image pertains also to painting, according
to Agamben, who conceive of it as a still charged with movement, a still from a film that
is missing. The kind of history that Agamben thinks about, in this regard, is not our
accustomed chronology, but messianic history, which he defines by two major
characteristics: a history of salvation (“something must be saved”) and an eschatological
history (“something must be completed, judged”)—messianic history where something
happens right here, but in another time, and outside chronology, but without entering some
other world. This characterization renders the messianic incalculable, but simultaneously
makes every moment (and image) “the door through which the Messiah enters,” 308
(paraphrasing Benjamin) right here, right now. This messianic historical situation equates,
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for Agamben, to Debord’s cinematic situation. Debord’s compositional technique in the
field of cinema is, in fact, montage. The conditions of possibility (“transcendentals” in the
philosophical jargon) for Debord’s montage, Agamben explains, are double: repetition and
stoppage. There is no need to shoot the film anymore, he writes, “just to repeat and stop,”
thus montage is shown as such. Debord’s montage is understood by Agamben as an epochmaking innovation in cinema; it ushers in the time in which “cinema will now be made on
the basis of images from cinema.”309 Repetition for Agamben, building upon the works of
previous thinkers, is not the return of the identical as one would imagine, but “the return of
the possibility of what was”—it restores past possibility, and renders it possible anew.
Repetition here relates to memory as the latter does not repeat the past as such, but “restores
possibility to the past.”310 This is, according to Agamben, the theological dimension that
Benjamin’s ascribes to memory when he writes that “memory makes the unfulfilled into
the fulfilled, and the fulfilled into the unfulfilled.”311 Images thus charged with a historical
and messianic importance because they are able to deliver potential possibilities to that
which is impossible by definition, “toward the past.” The centrality of the act of repetition
in Debord’s montage comes from the opening it produces between the possible and the real
as a “zone of undecidability” into which what might become possible again happily enters.
The second transcendental is stoppage—the power to interrupt, “the ‘revolutionary
interruption’ of which Benjamin spoke,”312 which brings cinema closer to poetry than to
prose, since both cinema and poetry, writes Agamben, exclusively share the concept of the
caesura and the enjambment: “This is also why Hölderlin could say that by stopping the
rhythmic unfolding of words and representations, the caesura causes the word and the
representation to appear as such. To bring the word to a stop is to pull it out of the flux of
meaning, to exhibit it as such.”313 This is exactly how stoppage works in Debord’s practice,
as constitutive of a transcendental condition of montage. The cinematic power of stoppage
works on the image itself, causes it to become separated from continuous narration and to
be shown as such. Both repetition and stoppage form a single system of montage in Debord;
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as per Agamben, together they “carry out the messianic act of cinema.”314
We return now to Benjamin. “For Benjamin,” writes Agamben in The Signature of All
Things, “history is the proper sphere of signatures. Here they appear under the names of
‘indices’ (‘secrets,’ ‘historical,’ ‘temporal’) or of ‘images’ (Bilder), often characterized as
‘dialectical’.” 315 The precarious, dialectical and fleeting characteristics of the image
“become clearer when restored to their proper context, namely, the theory of historical
signatures,”316 thus, since an image is always accompanied by an index or signature, it is
constituted temporally and becomes legible precisely by that index or signature. For this
reason, the success of a historiographic research (which necessarily has to do with
signatures) is determined, for Agamben, by the researcher’s ability to read ephemeral
signatures and follow their “subtle and obscure thread.”317

However, the success of a historiographic research is determined not only by an effective
reading of signatures, but also by recognizing them as a means of understanding. How do
signatures generate understanding? What form of epistemology do they contain, which
enables understanding? What do signatures (or Benjamin’s “dialectical images”) offer to
Agamben, in terms of generating knowledge, that language cannot?
Earlier we mentioned that the signature, as the exposition of intelligibility, is akin
to the paradigm and contains a few elements that refer back to the logic of the paradigm.
Identifying signatures (that are crystallized historically) with a means of understanding, as
well as the signatures’ structure and tensive functionality (that relate to a new event of
meaning), indeed echoes the epistemological dimension of paradigms. This identification,
in the context of Agamben’s epistemology, will help us to answer the above mentioned
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questions.318
A similarity exists between Benjamin’s dialectical images and Agamben’s signatures. Both
terms represent a constellation of moments beyond mere elements in a historical archive,
and functions as “a potentially dynamic means of understanding—and changing—the
present situation, one that acquires its potentiality only at specific, and fortuitous,
points.” 319 These points are crystallizations of historical experience in a moment of
unprecedented relevance. This functionality of the dialectical image, as well as that of the
signature, determines its possibility to appear at a certain moment, which is also related to
language and meaning.
In Nymphs, Agamben addresses the linguistic perspective of the functionality of the
“dialectical image”: “Where meaning is suspended,” he writes, “dialectical images appear.
The dialectical image is, in other words, an unresolved oscillation between estrangement
and a new event of meaning. ... [T]he dialectical image holds its object suspended in a
semiotic void.” 320 The life of the image can thus be characterized by a pause highly
charged with tension between the two poles. Not only dialectic is inseparable from the
objects it negates, “but also that the objects lose their identity and transform into the two
poles of a single dialectical tension that reaches its highest manifestations in a state of
immobility.”321

We see that the functionality of the dialectical image (and signature) results in a state of
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immobility and the suspension of meaning, which also causes the image to gain its fullness
and legibility, to be unprecedentedly known. But how exactly does this epistemological
process come about?
In chapter 1 of The Signature of All Things, Agamben examines dichotomy-based
(particular-general) epistemological processes and the dialectics between them; that is, the
processes of acquiring knowledge that is based on binary logic. By contrast, the
epistemological model of the paradigm is based on analogy and advances from singularity
to singularity. The epistemological mechanism of the paradigm (as well as that of the
dialectical image) is not logical (as in Hegel) but analogical and paradigmatic (as in
Plato)—its formula, for whose explication Agamben credits Enzo Melandri, is “neither A
nor B,” and the opposition it implies is not dichotomous and substantial but bipolar and
tensive. The two terms are neither removed nor recomposed in a unity, but kept in an
immobile coexistence charged with tension.322 Each paradigmatic example becomes an
exemplary case of a general law that could not have been stated a priori. Thus, the
hermeneutic circle (which was previously discussed) is in fact a paradigmatic circle; there
is no circularity between pre-understanding and interpretation, meaning does not precede
the phenomenon but stands, so to speak, beside it—the phenomenon shows the general,
which is the paradigm.
This non-dichotomous model or multi-polar field of forces entails a methodological
principle that prevails when dealing with dichotomies. That is, how exactly does one need
to understand a dichotomy? How does a dichotomy form? What kind of relation keeps a
dichotomy intact? And perhaps more importantly, is it possible to understand both elements
not as relating, but connecting, touching one another? For when we think about two
factions, elements or concepts, we create a relation between them, we create a
representation of one in the other. We then tend to think that richer representation amounts
to a stronger connection between them as a result of a greater degree of affinity, and the
stronger the affinity, the closer they get. But contrary to common opinion, they will
ultimately be articulated or joined together, they will be in real contact, only as a result of
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a complete absence of representation.323 This is an opposite definition of infinite proximity
to the one we usually give. As long as there is a degree of representation between both
elements, as long as we do find a relation of one in the other, they are related but not yet
unified. By absolutely unravelling all their connections, both factions disappear in and of
themselves, making space for a third thing to emerge for the first time as a figure of their
unification. This is the meaning of the verb “to coincide,” from medieval Latin coincidere,
meaning literally “to fall-upon-together.”
Moreover,

recall

Agamben’s

critique

of

deconstruction—although

he

acknowledges its questioning of the primary precedence of origin and presence, he at the
same time maintains that deconstruction fails to question signification itself. Thus it never
really escapes from the realm of representation, and “does not yet find a way beyond the
implicit hold of representation.”324 In the context of the present discussion, [that is, the
understanding of how knowledge is generated through movement on the basis of the
analogical model as opposed to the dichotomous particular/universal model (“littered with
exceptions”) that characterizes the realm of (deconstructionist) representation], Agamben
puts forth the example “as a contrast figure, found stated in the model of the paradigm.”325
An epistemological difference in thought models exists between the rule-based norm of
representation or, in other words, the rule-based movement from the universal (norm) to
the particular (application), and the paradigmatic example (through which others construct
their own unique, always singular, identities), since the paradigm presents (not re-presents)
neither the “original” nor the “copy,” but its own point of origin. As Agamben writes: “A
paradigm implies the total abandonment of the particular-general couple as the model of
logical inference.”326

As mentioned earlier, Agamben reminds us, on various occasions throughout his oeuvre,
of the primacy of the cognitive paradigm in present Western culture, as well as of the fact
that philosophy has become, after Kant, a doctrine of knowledge rather than one of
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anthropogenesis (that is, the becoming human of man). This claim challenges the
epistemological threshold of the human sciences, and in this sense, by adopting the
Benjaminian art of citing without quotation marks and the epistemology of the dialectical
image/signature, Agamben is able to call into question “the automatic support of a tradition
turned into a ‘fortress of knowledge’ and vindicates an anti-authoritarian experience of
language which measures its truth value only against its own merits.”327

We can strengthen these claims by momentarily turning back to an earlier period in history
(the Renaissance), where the connection between art and theory enables epistemology
beyond discursive language. We will find, here as well, the relevance of the analogy‒based
model and its special epistemic functionality.
In The Unspeakable Girl, Agamben refers to Odo Casel’s Liturgy as Mystery
Celebration (1921), a manifesto for what will become the Liturgical Movement, which had
an immense influence within the Catholic Church. Casel claimed that liturgy is not a
doctrine but a mystery (thus having a generic relationship to the pagan mystery cults).
Originally, mystery simply meant “gestures, acts and words through which divine action
was effectively realized in time and in the world for the salvation of mankind.” 328
Similarly, in Christian liturgy, the redemptive work of Christ is rendered present in and
through the Church—what is rendered present in this mystery is not Christ as a historical
individual but his “saving act,” communicated through the sacrament. According to Casel,
the force of liturgy lies in its “fullness of actuality of the saving action of Christ.”329
The “fullness of actuality” is what the theological tradition attached to the doctrine
of the efficacy ex opere operato of the liturgical act, that is, to the idea that the saving
power of the sacrament was unaffected in the case it was administered in an “impure”
manner (because the effective power of the sacrament is not depend upon the celebrant but
on Christ, the “mystical presence” who guarantees its efficacy through God). This
“irreducible liturgical operatively”330 is, however, quite remote from what we find in the
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pagan mysteries, where salvation is described as “precarious” rather than as something of
certainty.
The mystical experience is expressed through the verb “to see” (opopen), and
“vision” (epopteia) is the term given to the supreme stage of initiation. Epoptes means both
“initiate” and “spectator,” and the mysteries they were contemplating “were ‘living
paintings’ composed of gestures, words and the presentation of objects.” 331 This
constitutes, according to Agamben, the connection between the mystery cults and painting
that was so active in Renaissance art. The philosophical tradition links supreme knowledge
to mystery visions, knowledge that is experienced through seeing, touching, and naming,
thus painting offered to this knowledge the most apt expression. Agamben builds upon the
work of Edgar Wind (in particular Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance), according to
which even though Renaissance culture (including the act of painting) regarded obscurity
and mystery as necessary, the scholar (iconographer) must strive for clarity against the
intention of the artist since any unresolved residue of meaning is an obstacle to the
enjoyment of art. But, contrary to this, Renaissance allegories (like Eleusinian mysteries)
are not “mysterious” because of some concealed content but because in them form and
content have become indistinguishable. The third element, neutralizing both form and
content, is mysterious because “in it there is no longer anything to conceal.” 332 Thus
because there is nothing left to say on the discursive level, “thought and vision coincide.”
Form and content coincide not because the content is now exposed, but because they “fall
together” (as previously stated), reduced and reconciled, and what we are then given to
contemplate is pure appearance. For this reason, one cannot discursively present the
knowledge depicted in such paintings but merely title them.
If the Renaissance allegories offer a richer expression of thought than contemporary
philosophical treaties, then not only painting is returned to its true theoretical foundations
but “the very nature of thought is illuminated.” According to Wind, writes Agamben, the
pagan mystical tradition exercised a decisive influence on German Idealism, particularly
on how Hegel and Schelling conceived of the dialectical movement of thought (after the
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model of coincidentia oppositorum). The “profoundest mysteries of art,” claimed
Schelling, consist in conceiving at once the extreme discrepancy of opposed elements and
their point of coincidence: “The third element, in which opposites meet, cannot be of the
same nature as them and requires a different form of exposition, one in which the opposing
elements are at once maintained and neutralized. It is the content but nothing contains it; it
is form but it no longer forms anything—exposing, thereby, itself.”333
Thus, Benjamin’s idea of “image philosophy,” that is, the “image of thought” or
Denkbild (which will be discussed at a later stage), should not be taken as a metaphor but
understood literally—like Renaissance allegory, writes Agamben, it is “a mystery wherein
that which cannot be discursively presented shines for a moment out of the ruins of
language.”334 ֹ[ אMessianic Language]
Agamben’s essay “The Melancholy Angel”335 further elaborates Benjamin’s concept of
citation without quotation marks. Quotations, according to Agamben, draw their power not
from their ability to retrieve the past and enable the reader to relive it, but from their
capacity to expel from context while destroying the past in the course of happening.
Agamben points to Hannah Arendt’s notes on this idea. According to Arendt, the
transmission of the past relates to tradition and authority; “[T]he break in tradition and the
loss of authority” 336 that Benjamin identified in his own time, writes Arendt, were
irreparable and thus required new ways of dealing with the past. Benjamin’s solution, so to
speak, was to replace the notion of the past’s transmissibility with its citability (or that there
is a modern function of quotation), a solution that was born out of “despair of the present
and the desire to destroy it,” 337 albeit with the hope “that something from this period
[would] survive.”338
Decontextualizing a fragment from the past makes it lose its character of authentic
testimony while granting it an aggressive force, much like, according to Agamben, the
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artistic action of the readymade in which an object loses its meaning (guaranteed by the
authority of its daily use) and is charged “with an uncanny power to traumatize.”339 The
radical break of this fragment from its past is linked to its hazardous state of alienation but
also to the possibility of self-healing: “The past can only be fixed in the image that appears
once and for all in the instant of its alienation, just as a memory appears suddenly, as in a
flash, in a moment of danger.”340 The particular way of entering into a relation with the
past resembles for Benjamin, according to Agamben, the figure of the collector who
“quotes” objects outside of their context and destroys the order given to them by the
internal order of their original disposition, or of the figure of the revolutionary for whom
the new can appear only through the destruction of the old.
As tirelessly repeated, the image of a man who has lost the link with his past and
can no longer find himself in history is identified and described (in Benjamin’s “Theses on
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the Philosophy of History”) as the angel of history (Angelus Novus). 341

342 343

If Paul

Klee’s angel that Benjamin refers to is the angel of history, writes Agamben, then Albrecht
Dürer’s famous engraving depicting a melancholic angel is its analogy, the angel of art.
Dürer’s angel, however, “appears immersed in an atemporal dimension, as though
something, interrupting the continuum of history, had frozen the surrounding reality in a
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In “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and Historical Redemption” (Agamben,
Potentialities, 138–59), Agamben attempts to show that Benjamin’s reflection on the philosophy of history
is shaded with a melancholic light as a result of Gershom Scholem’s interpretation (Scholem, “Walter
Benjamin and His Angel,” 198–237) to Benjamin’s angel as it is portrayed in Benjamin’s prose titled
“Agesilaus Santander.” (Scholem, “Walter Benjamin and His Angel,” 208.) The angel (which has a
redemptive role in Benjamin’s conception of history), claims Scholem, hides the dark, demonic traits of
“Angelus Satanas.”
Agamben’s essay aims to open Benjamin’s text to another possible interpretation and to trace Benjamin’s
lines of ethics. “Ethics” is referred to here in the sense of the use the Greeks had made of the word as “doctrine
of happiness” as they linked the demonic to happiness. Benjamin’s text also ties the figure of the angel to the
idea of happiness.
Since in the second thesis from the “Theses on the Philosophy of History” we find that happiness and
redemption are inseparable, the presentation of Benjamin’s theory of happiness, according to Agamben, must
proceed only by clarification of his ideas on the philosophy of history, which have at their centre the concept
of redemption.
Scholem’s reading of Benjamin’s text is based on a hypothesis that the name “Agesilaus Santander” is
in fact an anagram, a “secret name,” for der Angelus Satanas. However, Scholem’s formulation is preceded
by a “disquieting shadow on the image of the angel” (Agamben, Potentialities, 139), which makes it hard to
verify whether the hypothesis is necessary, whether it economically explains the text without leaving
unresolved the most problematic aspects.
Scholem thus anticipates the Luciferian reading of “Agesilaus Santander” without having demonstrated
its validity, immersing Benjamin’s text in a demonic light.
Scholem’s interpretation is also based on iconographical elements of the Satan, claiming that only Satan
possesses claws and talons; however, this is not accurate, since in the European iconographic tradition, “there
is only one figure that brings together purely angelic characteristics and the demonic traits of claws” (Ibid,
141)—this is not Satan but Eros, Love. A descriptive model, found for the first time in Plutarch, represents
Eros as a winged (and often feminine) angelic figure with claws.
Thus, Benjamin’s figure of the angel with claws and wings leads to the domain of Eros, that is, not to a
demon in the Judeo-Christian sense but a daimōn in the Greek sense (“in Plato, Eros appears as the demon
par excellence”). Additionally, Benjamin was aware of this specific iconographic type as he mentions it in
his essay “The Origin of the German Tragic Drama” (which makes Agamben’s claim more probable) as well
as in his essay “Karl Kraus,” where the angel is in no sense to be considered a Satanic figure. Benjamin’s
portrayal of the claws of Angelus Novus does not have a Satanic meaning, but instead characterizes the
“destructive—and simultaneously liberating—power of the angel.”
Thus, there is a correspondence between the clawed angel of “Agesilaus Santander” and the liberating
angel who (at the end of the essay on Kraus) celebrates his victory over the demon “at the point where origin
and destruction meet.” This (Agamben’s) reading nullifies Scholem’s reading as the textual element that
supports Scholem’s reading (of the Luciferian nature of the angel) disappears. This does not mean that
Scholem’s reading is erroneous but, as Agamben writes, “that there is all the more reason to measure its
validity only on the basis of its capacity to explain economically the most problematic aspects of Benjamin’s
text.” (Ibid, 142.)
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kind of messianic arrest.” 344 The past that becomes incomprehensible for the angel of
history “reconstitutes its form in front of the angel of art; but this form is the alienated
image in which the past finds its truth again only on condition of negating it, and knowledge
of the new is possible only in the nontruth of the old.”345 Agamben thus grants aesthetics
the role of the redeemer as it performs the same task that tradition performed before its
interruption, resolving the conflict between old and new, and “opening for man a space
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The Angelus also appears, however only in passing, in Benjamin’s essay “Karl Kraus.” Here the
Angelus is mentioned in the context of the messenger in old engravings who announces anticipated disaster.
Kraus, as per Benjamin, is described as someone who “stands on the threshold of the Last Judgment”
(Benjamin, “Karl Kraus,” 443) and thus resembles those saints in Baroque paintings who face, so to speak,
an angelic flood. “Just as, in the most opulent examples of Baroque altar painting, saints hard-pressed against
the frame extend defensive hands toward the breathtakingly foreshortened extremities of the angels, the
blessed, and the damned floating before them, so the whole of world history presses in on Kraus in the
extremities of a single item of local news, a single phrase, a single advertisement.” (Ibid.) Benjamin refers
here to the concept of citation, Kraus’s basic polemical methodology, that further on becomes Benjamin’s
most adequate methodology reflecting (as we have just analyzed) the structure of his philosophy of history—
the presentation of the whole through a cited part, or in other words, the attempt to capture most accurately
the historical image through the revelation of its most trivial elements, its remainders or leftovers. The
excavated fragment contains within itself the figure of the whole (Benjamin, as previously noted, was
influenced in this regard by Goethe’s Urphänomen).
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between past and future in which he can find his action and his knowledge.”346

347

The Man Without Content reserves a particular temporal status for the communicative,

346
Agamben, The Man Without Content, 110. Man’s inability to recover his space in the tension
between past and future history is exemplified most accurately, according to Agamben, in an image depicted
by Kafka where train travellers entering into a tunnel are met with an accident causing the train to halt and
the travellers to lose a sense of spatiality, not knowing whether they are at the end or the beginning of the
tunnel. Kafka, writes Agamben, “thus replaces the idea of a history infinitely unfolding along an empty, linear
time with the paradoxical image of a state of history in which the fundamental event of the human condition
is perpetually taking place; the continuum of linear time is interrupted, but does not create an opening beyond
itself.” (Ibid, 113.) Thus, Kafka’s image of a state of history is positioned side by side with Benjamin’s idea
of “now-time” understood as a halt in happening. The creation of an opening beyond itself is likewise the
theological horizon that the messianic opens up, working from within “given representations to de-stabilize
them, as an eschatological horizon against which all particular identifications are rendered null and void.”
(Dickinson, “Canon as an Act of Creation,” 158.)
347
It may be the case that epistemological questions or discourses of knowledge have merely moderate
significance for a research process intertwining theoretical and practical artistic tendencies, since the act of
research alone (physical rummaging, working with materials, archive searching, etc.) creates a
comprehensive diapason of acquaintances, comprised of diverse degrees of relation of, by, and with its object;
and this familiarity at least equally pertains to ontology and certainly no less to ethics. For the inquirer, one
of the fundamental difficulties, whether in the conceptual or studio-based research phase, is that of
communicating the insights thus accumulated to an interlocutor, most adequately and to the best of one’s
abilities. Also, the interpreter’s act (as well as that of the reader or the listener), in and of itself, always
remains partial and limited in its means to appropriate the knowledge generated, and presented as if
objectively, by and with the (art)work. A historical and epistemological dishomogeneity is constitutive of
any attempt in art. Furthermore, even under the assumption that the process of sending and receiving
knowledge is completed as fully as possible (after all, this is just an assumption, as well as a tentative process
that might not necessarily include other possibilities of acquiring knowledge), knowledge formation is
subjected to social conditions and restrains; in other words, as tirelessly repeated, knowledge is conditioned
by the episteme and the operational power struggle that derives from it. Knowledge that is accepted as a
norm, as a crystallized discourse, is forever liable to individuals’ exchange of words, forever understood as
“to the best of our knowledge,” thus endangered in becoming outdated and nonstandard.
Somewhat ironically, in this sense, it was none other than Michel Foucault who marked that knowledge,
as a field of historicity, as free of any constitutive activity, liberated from referring backwards to an origin or
forwards to a historical or transcendental teleology. Knowledge, according to this definition, is a “series of
denials,” it is not constitutive of anything, and thus is “epistemologically natural—not value-free, but
saturated with all values ... knowledge is ... the possibility of everything we know.” (Said, Beginnings:
Intention and Method, 313.)
By means of contemplative concepts, philosophy—so it seems—does not constitute “substantive”
knowledge but, as the word’s etymology indicates, simply (not so simply) the love or passion for knowledge
and wisdom (Socrates, we recall, never really defines the subject matter he interrogates but joyfully hovers
over it; Aristotelian rhetoric uses enthymemes; etc.).
Art is likewise a manner of reflection, but also simultaneously a (graduated) material attempt to actually
intensify epistemological precariousness while standing in contrast to two reductive and opposite attempts
for acquiring knowledge of a thing: what it is made of and/or what it does. What is then the consequence of
art epistemology?
Artistic research is a meadow for creating ideas. The research is not made in order to find facts and/or to
present certain ideas, but in order to generate them. Knowledge that was supposedly generated by artistic
research cannot, in principle, be ultimately defined since any (artistic) knowledge always already carries with
it the whole of Being, with its multiple and diverse knowledges thus accumulated prior to research.
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aesthetic gesture of the artist. If, in fact, the problem of art is to redeem the ever-possible
conflict between past-present-future, it is obvious that the work of the artist, the poiesis
(being a lead to the presence, an unveiling independently of the will), must have access to
“a more original temporal dimension.”348 All this is configured as a sort of messianic arrest
of time, as a caesura that projects art into an “atemporal dimension” that is given, however,
only in the transience (or lapse) of the work.349

350

Agamben continues:

The work of art ... allows man to attain his original status in history and time
in his encounter with it. This is why Aristotle can say in the fifth book of
the Metaphysics351: ‘arts are also called “beginning,” and of these especially
the architectonic arts.’ That art is architectonic means, etymologically: art,
poiesis, is pro-duction of origin, art is the gift of the original space of man,
architectonics par excellence. ... [I]n the work of art the continumm of linear
time is broken, and man recovers, between past and future, his present
space.352
The relationship between aesthetics and epistemology (and the relevancy of this relation to
the fractured structure of Western culture at large) is analyzed by Agamben in his relatively
short but dense book Taste.
According to Agamben, the Western cultural tradition understands taste, in contrast
to sight and hearing (the “theoretical” senses Hegel calls them in Aesthetics), as unrelated
to the faculty of knowledge, and thus to ethics (mostly exemplified by Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics). On the other hand, one finds a complete vocabulary in Greek and
Latin languages that etymologically and semantically connects taste with the act of
knowledge (Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies, Nietzsche’s Pre-Platonic Philosophers are
the main references for Agamben).
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One recalls that in The Time that Remains, Agamben retakes the problem of time, and more
accurately, the problem of the caesura of messianic time. Messianic time seems to be an underground alley,
dug under the internal history of the West, in order to access salvation through the suspension or deactivation
of chronological time and the works that are contained in it. I return to Agamben’s idea of the caesura, as
art’s atemporal dimension, at the end of part I (of section II).
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Seventeenth‒ and eighteenth‒ century aesthetics, which centres around the
judgment and enjoyment of the beautiful, indicates taste as “this special form of knowledge
that enjoys the beautiful object and the special form of pleasure that judges beauty.”353
Kant describes taste as the “enigma” that intertwines knowledge and pleasure (The Critique
of the Power of Judgment, 1790).
The problem of taste presents itself as that of “another knowledge” (knowledge that
cannot account for its judgments but rather enjoys them) and “another pleasure” (a pleasure
that knows and judges).
Modern aesthetics, beginning with Baumgarten, attempts to investigate this other
knowledge and to establish its autonomy alongside intellectual cognition (“intuition”
alongside “concept or logica”). Aesthetics describes this relation as “one between two
autonomous forms within the same gnoseological process,”354 though failed to investigate
the fundamental problem: why is knowledge originally divided, and likewise originally,
why does it maintain a relation to the doctrine of pleasure, that is, to ethics? Can one
reconcile the fracture between knowledge and the beautiful (between knowing the truth
and enjoyment)?—“that science knows the truth but cannot enjoy it, and that taste enjoys
the beauty, without being able to explain it?”355
These fractures (the division of the epistemic object into truth and beauty, and the
division of human ethical telos356 into knowledge and pleasure), that characterize Western
metaphysics, can be illuminated by the discussion of taste.
In Plato’s account (in Phaedrus) of the relationship between beauty and wisdom, Agamben
writes, one finds “the original metaphysical problem of the fracture between visible and
the invisible, or appearance and being.” 357 The lack of an image of wisdom, and the
particular visibility of beauty as per Plato’s definition, means a paradox of the visibility of
the invisible or the sensible appearance of the Idea. In the Symposium, Plato defines Eros’
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“(which in the Aristotelian ethics still appeared undivided in the notion of a theoria that is also teleia
eudaimonia, ‘perfect happiness’)”―(Ibid.)
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(love) status in the epistemic realm as a medium between wisdom and ignorance,
“knowledge that judges correctly and grasps the truth without, however, being able to
justify itself,”358 or in other words, “right opinion” (orthe doxa). Plato assigns to the theory
of love a paradoxical task of guaranteeing the relation between beauty and truth. One of
Plato’s most profound intensions is to exclude the visible from the domain of science (see
book 7 of the Republic—the truth [of astronomy] cannot be grasped from the standpoint of
appearance and visible beauty). “The episteme, by itself, cannot ‘save appearances’ in
mathematical relationships without presuming to have exhausted the visible phenomena in
its beauty”359—this intertwining of double impossibility (that beauty cannot be known and
truth cannot be seen) is at the core of Plato’s theory of Idea and Eros’s “other knowledge.”
The significance of the term “Idea” is contained in the play between truth and beauty. “Only
because the supreme act of knowledge is split in this manner into truth and beauty, ...
wisdom must be constituted as ‘love of knowledge’ ... [Wisdom] must present itself as
philosophy.... as a medium between science and ignorance―between a having and a nothaving.”360
“The formation of the concept of taste, ... betrays its metaphysical origin through the secret
solidarity it presupposes between science and pleasure. Taste appears from the beginning
as a ‘knowledge that does not know, but enjoys’ and as a ‘pleasure that knows’.”361
“In its most radical formulation, eighteenth-century reflection on the beautiful and
taste culminates in the return to knowledge that one cannot explain since it is grounded on
a pure signifier; ... and to a pleasure that allows one to judge since it is sustained not on a
substantial reality but, rather, on that which in the object is pure signification.”362
The concept of taste, which Western culture established as an ideal of knowledge (“one
that could suture the metaphysical scission between the sensible and the intelligible”),363
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appears as an impossibility for the subject since it cannot be explained. Taste is an empty
or excessive sense, situated at the very limit of knowledge and pleasure. The object of this
knowledge is designated as beauty: according to Plato’s conception, it is given to sight, but
a sight of which there can be no science, only love. Thus, this impossibility of grasping the
object of vision as such drove Plato to account for it not as “wisdom,” but as the desire for
wisdom. Beauty means that “there is a subject of desire (a philosophos) but not a subject
of wisdom (a sophos),” 364 therefore Plato’s theory of Eros aims at bridging these two
divided subjects.
In the last part of the book, Agamben discusses the expression “excessive signifier”
that derives from the work of Levi-Strauss, in particular his theory of signification that he
developed through the concept of mana in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss
(1950). Levi-Strauss presumes “a fundamental inadequate relation between signification
and knowledge that translates to an irreducible excess of the signifier over the signified.”365
According to Levi-Strauss, the process of meaning-granting was a gradual transformation
(and which had no counterpart in the field of knowledge), thus an opposition exists (in the
history of the human mind)

between symbolism which is characteristically discontinuous, and
knowledge, characterized by continuity.... The categories of the signifier
and the signified constituted simultaneously and interdependently, as
complementary units; whereas knowledge ... got started very slowly.... The
universe signified long before people began to know what it signified; ...
but... from the beginning, the universe signified the totality of what
humankind can expect to know about it.366
The surplus of signification, which maintains the relationship of complementarity, “is the
very condition of the exercise of symbolic thinking.”367 For Levi-Strauss, the notion of
mana means “that floating signifier which is the disability of all finite thought.”368
Extending Levi-Strauss’s conception, we can conclude that, since Plato was unable
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to exhaust the visible phenomena as such (through its explanation) and thus had to seek the
invisible, “ancient science left free in the phenomena what was pure appearance in them
(that is, pure signifier), opening beside itself a space that divinatory science could occupy
without contradiction.”369 Thus astrology, which picks up the pure signifier that astronomy
could not fully explain, treats that signifier as “a supplement of signification to distribute
at its whim.”370
This structure can be extended to incorporate the entire epistemological status of
Western culture, claims Agamben. Thus, in the ancient world there are two types of
knowledge: one that is known (that is founded in the adequation of signifier and signified),
and one that is not known (divinatory science, founded on the excessive signifier). Emile
Benveniste’s distinction between the semiotic and the semantic as the “double
signification” inherent in human language means, in this sense, that the first is semantic
knowledge (which has a subject and can be explained) and the second is semiotic
knowledge (which does not have a subject and can only be recognized). Philosophy is
placed by Plato between these two forms of knowledge, but since it perceives the
phenomena as beauty it is not limited merely to the distribution of the excessive signifier,
but “thanks to the mediation of Eros, is able instead to save the phenomena in the Idea.”371
Since the eighteenth century, divinatory science was excluded from knowledge, and
science negated the possibility of any knowledge without subject. But this form of
knowledge did not disappear completely since “hard” science was unable to fill or reduce
the excessive signifier. Modern aesthetics (and other forms of knowledge such as
philology) substitutes divinatory science as the knowledge of the excessive signifier (of the
beautiful). In political economy, too, we see a connection to aesthetics in this sense—Georg
Simmel, according to Agamben, defines money as a “pure relation without content,” thus
the “value-form, like Levi-Strauss’ mana, is a zero symbolic value or pure signifier that
simply indicates the necessity of a supplementary symbolic content.”372 At the end of the
nineteenth century, another science replaced the vacancy left by divinatory science based
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on the assumption that there is a knowledge that is not known but that is revealed in
symbols and signifiers: psychoanalysis. In a way, the more modern culture and science
attempt to “save appearance,”

the greater becomes the residue of the excessive signifier (the quantity of
knowledge that is not known) that must be explained by the divinatory
sciences. Semiotic science and semantic science, divination and science
strictly appear together linked through a relation of complementarity, in
which the one guarantees the possibility and the function of the other.... The
fracture between signification and knowledge―the semiotic and the
semantic―is not in fact something produced once and for all outside of the
human, but instead is a fracture of this very same subject of knowledge: man
as Homo sapiens. Since, as a speaking and thinking being, the human is held
between signification and knowledge, its cognition is necessarily split and
the problem of who knows knowledge (the problem of the subject of
knowledge) remains the fundamental question of every epistemology.373
Philosophy and modern science, since Descartes, tried to guarantee the unity of cognition
through the fiction of an ego cogito, the I as a pure self-consciousness and the only subject
of knowledge. Yet this subject of knowledge is called into question in recent developments
of human science—psychoanalysis’ id as the subject of a knowledge that is not known;
structuralism’s structure as an unconscious categorical knowledge without a reference to a
thinking subject; or linguistics’ identification in the phoneme of a knowledge independent
of the speaking subject. All of these are examples of an Other as the subject of knowledge.
Thus, a problem arises—that is, the passage between knowledge that is known and
knowledge that is not known (knowledge of the Other and knowledge of the subject). Yet,
this gap cannot be bridged, similarly to the way Benveniste showed the impossibility of
bridging the gap between the semiotic and the semantic. Thus, semiology cannot constitute
itself as a general science of the sign (as a knowledge founded upon the unity of the signifier
and the signified), since, in order to do so, it would have to reduce the signifier’s excess
and suture the scission between semiotic knowledge (knowledge that is known) and
semantic knowledge (knowledge that is not known), a scission that is inscribed into the
very notion of the sign—a conclusion that brings Agamben’s discussion of taste to an end,
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and section I of this thesis nearly to its end.

Before we end, it is necessary to conclude this section with a minor reservation, put forward
by Agamben in Creation and Anarchy: The Work of Art and the Religion of Capitalism
(his book most recently translated to English), regarding art’s (and artists’) capacity to act
in and upon the world. If it appears, somewhat justifiably, as if Agamben ascribes art (or
the aesthetic gesture of the artist) with unrealistic, grandiose power and potentiality, let us
consider his suggestion that we “abandon the artistic machine to its fate.”374 What is the
artistic machine?
In “Archeology of the Work of Art” (the book’s opening essay), Agamben raises
the following question: what is the place of art in the present? 375 The essay tries to
archeologically analyze the problematic (as per Agamben) position of the syntagma “the
work of art,” to determine “whether the decisive element is the work or the art, or a mixture
of them that is no better defined, and whether the two elements proceed in harmonious
agreement or are instead in a conflictual relationship.”376 The decisive crisis in the notion
of “work,” as we experience it today according to Agamben, causes the work’s
disappearance from the sphere of artistic production—today art is more and more realized
as an activity without a “work,” because “the being-work of the work of art had remained
unthought.”377 Agamben thus calls for a genealogy (in this short essay, though, he merely
focuses on three key moments) of this fundamental ontological concept, by means of
language analysis (since “philosophical problems are in the last analysis questions about
the meaning of words”), in order to resolve our contemporary problematic relationship with
the “work of art.”
In classical Greek, writes Agamben, artists are conceived as “technicians” who do
not possess their own telos, their own end, because they produce a product that is exterior
to them. Artists are constitutively incomplete beings (unlike the ones who contemplate or
the visionaries, for example, who are philosophically superior to artists and hold within
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them their energeia, the being-in-act or being-at-work) since “in unproductive activities,
as thought (theöria) precisely is, the subject perfectly possesses his end.”378 Praxis, the
action that has its end in itself, is superior to poiësis, the activity whose end is in the work.
Beginning from the Renaissance, Agamben writes, art becomes an action that no longer
has its energeia in the exterior object, but is slowly transformed into one of those activities
(like knowing or praxis) that have their being-at-work in themselves. Art no longer resides
in the work, but in the mind of the artists, in their ideas, while they produce the work. This
concept has its model (as we previously saw in the gloss “The Before of the Book”) in the
theological idea of divine creation, according to which God created the world with a preexisting model in His “mind”; likewise, the artist already acquires the idea of the work of
art before its realization. This is the theological vocabulary of creation in today’s art writing
as per Agamben. This process results in the modern status of the art object itself, as an
unnecessary remainder with respect to the artist and its creative act. Thus, “ergon and
energeia, work and creative operation, are complementary yet incommunicable notions,
which form, with the artist as their middle term, what I propose to call the ‘artistic machine’
of modernity. And it is not possible, … either to separate them or to make them coincide
or, even less, to play one of against the other.”379
Further into the essay, Agamben attempts to juxtapose, in regard to the present, the
practice of the avant-garde and liturgy, based on the (also previously mentioned) writing
of Odo Casel (the manifesto of the Liturgical Movement of the 1920s). Based on the idea
that liturgy is not a “representation” or “commemoration” of the salvific event, but is itself
the event, and thus is carried out ex opere operato (“in that moment and in that place”),
Agamben hypothesises that a strong analogy exists between sacred action of the liturgy
and the praxis of the artistic avant-garde and of the art called contemporary. These arts
abandon, writes Agamben:

[T]he mimetic-representative paradigm in the name of a genuinely
pragmatic claim. The artist’s action is emancipated from its traditional
productive or reproductive end and becomes an absolute ‘performance,’ a
pure ‘liturgy’ that coincides with its own celebration and is effective ex
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opere operato and not through the intellectual or moral qualities of the artist.
… [L]iturgy and ‘performance’ insinuate a hybrid third, in which the action
itself claims to present itself as a work.380
With the “invention” of the ready-made, Duchamp, according to Agamben’s third and last
genealogical moment, attempted to free art from what was blocking it, namely the “artistic
machine.” Duchamp attempted to deactivate this machine by forming a new place for the
ready-made—"neither in the work nor in the artist, neither in the ergon not in the energeia,
but only in the museum, which at this point acquires a decisive rank and value.”381 Thus,
in contemporary art there appears a historical conflict between art and work, energeia and
ergon.
In conclusion, not only does Agamben suggest that we abandon the “artistic
machine,” but with it the idea that there is something like a supreme human activity that,
“by means of a subject, realizes itself in a work or in an energeia that draws from it its
incomparable value.”382
[Continue Reading]
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ֹ[ אMessianic Language]
Benjamin’s philosophy of history is analyzed by Agamben not exclusively from the
messianic perspective offered thus far (Benjamin’s concept of history and the idea of
messianic time as a paradigm of historical time that are at the core of the essay “Theses on
the Philosophy of History”), but also (and perhaps always, as these perspectives are
complementary and interwoven) from a perspective based in language.
A comprehensive discussion of Benjamin’s philosophy of language, its connection
with the problem of history and its messianic intention, is found in Agamben’s early essay
“Lingua e storia. Categorie linguistiche e categorie storiche nel pensiero di Benjamin.”383
The essay commences with a fragmented quote from Benjamin’s preparatory notes to
“Theses on the Philosophy of History”:

The Messianic world is the world of a total and integral actuality. The first
instance of universal history occurs there. Today this term can only denote
a type of esperanto which cannot be realized until the confusion of Babel is
cleared up. It presupposes a language into which every text can be wholly
translated. ... Or rather, it is itself this language; not in written form, but as
it is joyously acted out.384
Benjamin’s argument, writes Agamben, messianically conflates language and history,
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The essay originally appeared in Italian, in the edited volume Walter Benjamin: Tempo storia
linguagio (1983). English translations appeared as “Language and History in Benjamin” in the journal
Differentia (1988); and a later version, albeit lacking a few final paragraphs, also appeared as “Language and
History: Linguistic and Historical Categories in Benjamin’s Thought” in the collection Potentialities (1999).
A further treatment of this theme appears, in Potentialities, also in “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic:
Happiness and Historical Redemption,” 138–159.
Additionally, Agamben also develops this theme in Infancy and History, in an attempt to develop a new
experience of time and history that will be grounded, accordingly, in a new experience of language. There he
picks up on Benjamin’s essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” (Benjamin, Selected Writings,
Vol. 1, 100–110) of 1918 where Benjamin calls for a reinvention of experience beyond the constrains of the
Kantian model, a reinvention that by relating to the Kantian system would likewise be turned into knowledge.
This would be a transformation of the concept of knowledge that begins to manifest itself in the acquisition
of a new concept of experience, and at the centre of this reinvention we find the question of language.
Benjamin writes: “The great transformation and correction which must be performed upon the concept of
experience, originated to one-sidedly along mathematical-mechanical lines, can be attained only be relating
knowledge to language;” (Ibid, 107–108) and, moreover, “a concept of knowledge gained from reflection on
the linguistic nature of knowledge will create a corresponding concept of experience which will also
encompass realms that Kant failed to truly systemized.” (Ibid, 108.)
384
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maintaining that the history of redeemed humanity is the only universal history that
amounts to its language (that is, universal post-Babylonian language), and that this
language comes in the form of joyous celebration rather than writing.
The conflation of historical and linguistic categories, according to Agamben,
should not come as a surprise—in fact, it can be grasped already in the Middle Ages (in
the seventh century) when, for example, Isidore of Seville claims (in the Etymologies) that
“[h]istory pertains to grammar,”385 or in an even remoter reference, Augustine’s De ordine,
where one finds the claim: “Whenever something memorable was to be written down, it
necessarily pertained to grammar. Grammar was thus linked to history, ... a discipline ...
not so much for historians but for grammarians.”386 Every historical process of handing
down refers to the domain of the “letter,” since the Augustinian conflation is based on a
broader definition of grammar, one that also includes (beyond the obvious lingual structural
analysis) “the infinite dimension of historical transmittal.”387 The letter, for Augustine, is
essentially “an historical element.” This conception is a sequel to the long tradition of the
ancient world that reflects on language in terms of being a two-fold system that
incorporates names (as pure denomination) and discourse (in Marcus Terentius Varro’s
words, “a river from a spring” 388 ). Man’s use of words is a result of his historical
participation in this river. That is, history mediates and conditions the foundation of
language for man, who receives names (that proceed him) only through a process of them
being handed down to him, them hierarchically descending to him within a historical
process. Whether descending from a divine or profane source, the crucial thing here is that
“the origin of names escapes the speaker. ... As long as man has no access to the foundation
of language, there will be a handing down of names; and as long as there is a handing down,
there will be history and destiny.”389
Benjamin’s conflation of language and history thus means, writes Agamben, that
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and/or “handing over” in the context of Christian Theology, see Agamben, Pilate and Jesus, 26–29.
127

“[m]an’s historical condition is inseparable from his condition as a speaker, and is inscribed
in the very modality of his access to language, originally signaled by a split.” 390 The
original field of language, as articulated by Benjamin in his essay “On Language in General
and the Language of Men” (1916), is that of names exemplified (according to the story of
Genesis) in the Adamic language. This “pure language” is not our customary (and
bourgeois, as per Benjamin) idea of language according to which a signifying word
transmits meaning from one subject to another, but a language where the name
communicates itself absolutely—in the name, “the spiritual essence which communicates
itself is language.”391 Nothing is communicated in the Adamic language beyond the name
itself; in other words, spiritual essence and linguistic essence coincide, and in such a “pure
language” the problem of the unsayable, which characterizes human language, does not
exist, thus it corresponds with the religious concept of revelation, “which does not know
any unsayable.”392
The original sin of man means, in this sense, language’s fall from its perfect status
of non-signifying names to the signifying word as a means of exterior communication and,
moreover, man’s making of language a means and a sign, a process that ended up in a
Babylonian mayhem. This fallen condition of language is later on thought from the
perspective of messianic redemption via Benjamin’s essay “The Work of the Translator”
(1921). In this essay, Benjamin attempts to explicate the relation between the original,
paradisiacal language and the multiple of languages that comprise it in terms of part and
whole, claiming that a thing can only be understood not by an individual language but by
the “totality of their meanings which become fused together as pure language.”393 In other
words, a meaning conveyed and explained by supposedly only one language is impossible
as it exists merely as a potential waiting to be harmonized with all other languages, in what
Benjamin terms the “messianic end of their history.”394 Both history and linguistics move
forward towards their messianic fulfillment; once this point arrives, language will be a
“‘word without expression,’ which is liberated from the weight and the alienation of
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sense.”395 At the same time, however, once this state is reached, all communication and
sense will extinguish themselves.
What is a word, asks Agamben, that no longer means, that is no longer destined for
the historical handing down of a signified? How can person speak purely, how can they
understand the word, without the mediation of the signified? For Agamben, that which
remains unsayable and unsaid in every language is precisely that thing it wants to say but
cannot, “the pure language, the inexpressive word”; the field of names is that meaning
which it tries to convey but cannot bring “as such into speech.”396 Languages signify and
have sense because they mean, but what they mean—that is, pure language—remains
unsaid. The unsaid of meaning sustains, in each language, the tension between a language
and its historical evolution; and it is what destined the language for its historical
development. The biblical myth of the fall of Edenic language, according to Agamben,
should be understood exactly in this way.397
The relationship between the various historical languages and their one common
feature remains dialectical—on the one hand, they need to cease their meaning to say it,
but on the other hand, this is exactly what they cannot do without (at the same time) abolish
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Agamben will develop this theme in his later book Infancy and History: On the Destruction of
Experience, where he deals with human linguistic infancy or how humans are expelled from language as such
into a linguistic and metaphysical scission. Infancy refers to the interim state between our pure state of grace
in language, echoing that of the animal, and our acquisition of voice. Having language and the privation of
voice are fundamental conditions of human being. “Animals are not in fact denied language ... they are
already inside it. Man, instead, by having an infancy ... splits this single language and, in order to speak, has
to constitute himself as the subject of language—he has to say I. ... man’s nature is split at its source, for
infancy brings its discontinuity and the difference between language and discourse. The historicity of the
human being has its basis in this difference and discontinuity.” (Agamben, Infancy and History, 52.) One can
thus conclude that: (1) humans have no voice of their own; (2) as humans acquire their voice, a division is
developed between speech and language; (3) this division and our awareness of it define human beings, as
well as the way in which we come to have language (not the mere fact that we have one); and (4) we have
language first as bifurcation (language-speech), then as subordination (speech over language), and then as
negation (speech denies the experience of the nature of language as such). Yet because we have infancy we
also have history, and because we have history we are human.
Moreover, infancy first names our coming away from being animal, then it indicates our ability to
conceive of pure thinking not in terms of what cannot be said, but what can, and finally, it names the problem
of human experience. The human experience of language, for Agamben, is always taken within language,
but not entirely within language as if the division between language and speech never occurred. To undergo
an experience within language is to undergo a new form of experience as testing (“experience” is related
etymologically to “experiment” in Latin) or thinking, one that accepts the presence of language as such.
Infancy is to be found in the human at all stages as both remnant of the animal and potential for the posthuman. (Watkin, The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis, 6–9.)
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themselves, since this capacity is only accessible to the totality of their messianic end:
“Inasmuch as the pure language is the only one which does not mean, but says, it is also
the only one in which that ‘crystalline elimination of the unsayable in language,’ can be
realized.”398
Benjamin suggested, according to Agamben, that universal language (or history)
should not be understood in terms of being an “Ideal” or an infinite duty that crosses all
historical evolution; nor that the inexpressive word should be understood in terms of an
infinite task (that could never be fulfilled) towards which the historical experience of
speaking man is moving. Agamben justifies this claim by interpreting Benjamin as a
thinker who “grouped together the social democratic transformation of a Marxist ideal of
a classless society into a never-ending task, with an analogous transformation ... of the
Kantian idea into an ideal;”399 and just as classless society is never actually realized, so the
ideal language never reaches the level of the word. A classless society (which was, for
Benjamin, genuinely messianic) is not the end of historical progress, but its interruption,
“‘so often missed and finally fulfilled.’” 400 According to Agamben’s interpretation of
Benjamin, contemporary hermeneutics (which looks for the unsaid and the infinity of
meaning) tries, in fact, to fulfill the unsaid and the infinity of meaning rather than to
conserve them, which is the exact opposite of true textual hermeneutics. Accordingly, for
Benjamin, “if the letters ... commit human language to an historical handing down and an
infinite interpretation, we can suppose ... that the universal language represents rather the
definite cancelation and resolution of human language.”401
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“Like the origin,”402 writes Agamben, for Benjamin “the language of names is not,
then, an initial chronological point, just as the messianic end of languages, the universal
language of redeemed humanity, is not a simple chronological cessation. Together they
constitute the two faces of a single ‘idea of language’.”403 The universal language can only
be, for Benjamin, the idea of language, “not an ideal (in the neo-Kantian sense) but the
very Platonic idea of language which saves and contains in itself all languages.”404 This
“idea of language” no longer presupposes any other language, it has nothing more to say,
but, simply, speaks. At this radical point of transparency, there is no distinction in the
language between “field of names” and signifying words or between the intended and the
said, and the language reaches its messianic end. Accordingly universal history “knows no
past to transmit, but it is the world of an ‘integral actuality’. Language here disappears as
an autonomous category. ... [M]en no longer write their language, but they act it out like a
celebration.”405 Language (that is, universal language) had become so close to man (and
his history) that they seem, like never before, to perfectly coincide, in the same way as
lovers who have no more room for any image, letter, or grammar to reside between them.
[Continue Reading]
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Section II—Philosophical Archeology Space 2009–2019

Introduction
This section is an integral component of my thesis exhibition titled Philosophical
Archeology Space 2009–2019. The first part of section II is meant to contextualize the
archeological orientation in contemporary art, as well as to generally draw how some artists
have recently worked with archives or collections in their practice. A connection is thus
made between art’s conception of the historical and the archeological, between document
and monument, in order to delineate a material conception of temporality. Consequently,
the messianic conception of time (and its possible temporal realizations) is described in its
relation to artistic, archeological production.
The discussion does not intend to punctiliously demonstrate how philosophical
archeology works regarding our engagement with art, but to picture, in general terms, how
key elements of the methodology (that were presented thus far) are conceived within the
discourse of contemporary art.
The second part of section II (titled “The Archive and the Index”) is meant to offer a further
entry to my artistic practice and thesis installation/exhibition. It does so by explicating the
installation’s two-part structure and the material a priori (as a historiographic
methodology) of my artistic practice; and additionally, by offering terrains of thought
regarding the various art works (or, in the jargon of philosophical archeology, “paradigms”)
that are contained within the archive part of the installation.
I aim to write about these works rather indirectly, without over‒explicating them,
in order to leave enough room for the readers (and viewers) to generate their own self‒
directed archeological interpretation. Moreover, these terrains of thought somewhat shy
away from a discussion mostly based on contemporary art theories or heavily infused with
examples of artworks from the history of contemporary art. 406 I use philosophical
archeology, in writing, to comment upon ideas that lay at the core of (my) artworks and
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artistic practice (as an arche or “historical a priori”), and that has the power to do exactly
that. The important thing for me, given the logic of philosophical archeology, is to unfold
a non-authoritative reading of the concepts (or, in the jargon of philosophical archeology,
“signatures”) that condition and govern my ongoing artistic projects/practice.
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Part I—The Archeological Orientation in Contemporary Art

2.1.1
A key essay in the vigilant articulation of the archeological orientation in contemporary art
was published by curator Dieter Roelstraete in 2009, under the title “The Way of the
Shovel: On the Archeological Imaginary in Art.”407 The essay’s central argument concerns
the identification of a “historiographic turn” in the art of the early twenty-first century, that
is, a preoccupation with “looking back” among the generation of artists active at that time
in the international art scene. Moreover, the essay questions whether this historiographic
mode of artistic production and thinking might overemphasize the romantic notion that
truth lies buried in history, and thus distracts from more pressing issues of the present and
the future.
Roelstraete’s series of subsequent essays and curated exhibitions that he continued
to develop on the subject matter culminated with the publication of The Way of the
Shovel—a catalogue that accompanied an exhibition he curated at the MCA in Chicago
under the same title (November 2013–March 2014). The catalogue contains, among others,
Roelstraete’s essay “Field Notes,” which commences with a quote from an “archeological”
thinker who is perhaps the most appropriate to sound out a culture marked by fragments,
shards and traces—that is, Walter Benjamin: “He who seeks to approach his own buried
past must conduct himself like a man digging.” 408 The metaphor of digging, writes
Roelstraete, seems to be an identifying (though ironic) feature of contemporary art: “that
the one sector of culture most commonly associated with looking forward should appear
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For the reverse orientation, in other words, for the recent influence of the visual arts on the discipline
of archeology, see Renfrew, Gosden, and DeMarrais, eds. Substance, Memory, Display: Archeology and Art.
For their mutual influence, in general, see Renfrew, Figuring It Out. One of the important claims in these
texts is that both art and archeology involve making subtle modifications in the landscape, explore natural
materials and processes of change, as well as ask profound questions about the nature of the human condition.
The difference between them relates to the fact that archeologists explore their field in the form of objective
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so consumed by a passion for looking not just the proverbial other way but in the opposite
direction―backwards.”409 Nonetheless, historical consciousness in the art world “appears
to have reached a critical level, to have become something qualitatively new.”410

A few of the exhibited works in The Way of the Shovel clearly illustrate the archeological
orientation in contemporary art that Roelstraete points to. One of them is Plot (2007) by
Canadian artist Derek Brunen. It is a performance/video work that, in the course of 6 hours
and 12 minutes, shows the artist literally digging his own grave, “recording the laborious
action in real time, solitarily performed in a cemetery in the artist’s former hometown,
Vancouver.”411 This is a philosophically charged work that does not shy away from the
big questions—life, death, fate, infinity—as it seeks answers to them, answers that
inevitably remain somewhat unanswered. This is the way of the shovel at its most literal
sense, as earthly soil is dug out with a shovel in order to prepare for the artist’s ultimate
exiting. “[I]n its appropriation of the endgame motif,” Roelstraete writes, the artist proves
“how the frustrated spectacle of the search for meaning can still engender an experience of
the new.”412

413

Another exhibited work which lucidly speaks to the manner in which contemporary
artists construct their relation to history is Message from Andrée (2005) by Danish artist
Joachim Koester. Drawing on both documentary and fiction, Joachim Koester’s work
reexamines and reactivates certain forms and traces from the past, with the intention of
finding and translating “the buried stories such marks might contain.” 414 While two
prominent recurring concerns in his work are “how ideas and narratives take on a physical
form” and “how stories and history materialize,”
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equally important is the

“dematerialized” question of the “tension between the apparent narrative, which the viewer
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immediately sees, and what remains invisible or illegible.”416
Message from Andrée (usually presented as an installation of a 3:39 minute, 16mm
film and two ink-jet prints) was inspired by a hot-air balloon expedition led by Swedish
researcher Salomon August Andrée, who left Norway to journey across the North Pole in
1897. Thirty-three years later, the explorers’ remains were found with a box of negatives
that told the story of a crash and an ill-fated three-month trek across the ice. Koester
photographed the negatives, which were covered in black stains, scratches, and streaks of
light, and produced a film that just shows black dots of different sizes flicker over a field
of white—those effects of film often ignored by historians. Koester writes: “Most
historians studying the expedition ignored this layer of ‘visual noise’. I, on the other hand,
have made it my focus. If language defines our world, the black dots and light streaks on
the photographs can be seen as bordering on the visible, or marking the edge of the
unknown, pointing to the twilight zone of what can be told and what cannot be told,
narratives and non-narratives, document and mistake.” 417 While the viewer sees only
inscrutable traces of something fluttering across the screen, the film evokes memories of
the tragically optimistic explorers, the forces of time and severe weather conditions
physically acting on the film, and the power of photography to reveal otherwise lost
moments.
Message from Andrée, corresponding to a turning point for Koester, is his first work
to include a film with a flicker effect and whose documentary dimension is a pretext for a
perceptual experiment. From there, the artist concentrated more and more on a quest for
“spirits.” Koester’s “ghost-hunting,” which attempts to bring back forgotten people or
places, often involves occultism or rituals that experiment with different types of
perception. Spirits, for Koester, are all those things never fully realized in history. As Foster
writes on Koester’s work:
Even as modernization obliterates history, it can also produce ‘points of
suspensions’ that expose its uneven development—or, perhaps better, its
uneven devolution into so many ruins. Such are the ‘blind spots’ that
intrigue Koester. An oxymoron of sorts, the term suggests sites that,
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normally overlooked, might still provide insights; and, as Koester captures
them, they are unsettled, an unusual mix of the banal and the uncanny,
evocative of an everyday kind of historical unconscious.418
Foster’s “points of suspension” is borrowed from Koester’s (and Buckingham’s) treatment
and analysis of empty or indeterminate spaces and their relation to meaning embedded in
material forms. They draw on the example of the Free City of Christiania, a 1,200 person
anarchistic squat located in Copenhagen, which since 1971 “exists as a police-free social
experiment, self-governed under a direct-democratic process where all major decisions are
made by unanimous vote. A sign posted at Christiania’s main entrance declares: You are
now leaving the European Union.”419 The representative flag is comprised of three yellow
dots on a red background, a design that seemingly acts in opposition to “usual” symbols
(that attempt to fix meaning against the flow of time) in the sense that it marks transience
and fragmentation. “The three dots resemble an ellipsis, or ‘points of suspension’, the
typographical mark that indicates an omission, faltering speech, or an incomplete thought
in a printed text.”420 The ellipsis marks the indeterminate but can also act as a connector
of any two (or more) sentences, “forming an endless chain of possible thoughts.”421 The
three dots also form a broken horizon line, a limit that at the same time allows the mind
spaces beyond the limit: “Empty spaces urging us onwards, reminding us that the vanishing
point of history is always the present moment.”422
A last example from The Way of the Shovel belongs to the artist that, as Roelstraete
writes, “[N]o survey of the archeological impulse in contemporary art would be complete
without”423—Mark Dion. Dion’s practice has become almost synonymous with the art of
the archeological dig, both as a metaphor and as a literal, physical act. In the exhibition,
Dion presents a series of illustrations of mixed‒media installations that he produced
throughout his vast artistic activity, as well as two, crude and well‒used shovels that have
accompanied Dion on numerous digs. The emphasis of Dion’s work, and in relation to the
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archeological orientation in contemporary art, resides in its epistemological inquiry:
“Dion’s sprawling installations,” writes Roelstraete, “regularly borrow from the aesthetic
Lingua franca of nineteenth‒century Victorian museum culture, consistently reversing the
means and ends of scientific research and its ‘objective’ results or findings, to turn both the
investigation and the locale—a desk, a lab coat, a tool kit—into a work of art.”424

The new height of historical consciousness among contemporary artists, according to
Roelstraete, is partly the result of the current knowledge economy that artists (as well as
art critics, curators, and almost all art-world agents) are subject to; in other words, artists
are part of a larger process of epistemological reorientation underway in society, a clearly
identifiable process that (in the art world) is practiced through research done in the archive
and library rather than in the studio, where such work (traditionally) used to take place.425
In this quest for knowledge, artists aspire to recover long-forgotten artifacts, but also
(sometimes due to the impossibility of the mission of recovery) attempt to enhance our
memory, to reconstruct, reenact, repeat; to engage not only in practices of storytelling but
of history-telling: “Indeed, if the past truly is a foreign country ... it is certainly one many
artists feel called upon to rediscover from afar―the only terra incognita left to map,
perhaps, in a world of total transparency in which everything is always immediately
‘known’.”426
Moreover, in his attempt to answer the question “Why now?” of the historiographic
turn, Roelstraete addresses the current crisis of history both as an intellectual discipline and
as a fundament of contemporary culture more generally. Today’s general state of postideological fatigue as well as the political evacuation of academia are signaled as the
crisis’s symptoms: “If ‘progress,’” he writes, “in contemporary culture is predicated in part
on accelerated oblivion, it is typically art’s role to go against the grain of such dominant,
homogenizing trends and slow down the spiral of forgetfulness, and even to occasionally
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turn back the clock.”427
Another part of Roelstraete’s answer to the question, “Why now?”, relates more
directly to “the straightforward matter of chronology.” The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 [being parts of a series of various political
upheavals in (mostly) eastern Europe at the end of the twentieth-century] mark the first
clear milestones in this process as per Roelstraete; and the current generation of artists who
grew up around that time are the ones who today attempt to, in some ways, preserve in
memory the way of life on the “other” side (of the wall, the border, etc.) or to preserve
what is no longer there. The other key event in this proposed chronology is the September
11, 2001, terror attack in New York, an event that signaled the end of “the age of neoliberal
complacency ushered in by the publication, in 1989, of Francis Fukuyama’s landmark
essay ‘The End of History?’,”428 an event that announced the dramatic return to History
(with a capital H) and renewed calls upon art to take part in this process (as the present
political worldwide climate is overly miserable to handle): “The historiographic turn in
contemporary art, then, was also a turning away from a present that art, as a whole, felt
utterly powerless to change―or ... uninterested in being a part of.”429
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Furthermore, the reason for art’s recent attraction to the archeological paradigm,
according to Roelstraete, is related also to the discipline’s truth claims—that is, “the
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rhetorical assumption that depth delivers truth, that the ground cannot lie.” 431

432

The

archeological, material-based quest or (re)search is an elaborated allegory of the artist’s
quest for the unknown and unknowable. In this quest, earthly soil plays a crucial role.433

2.1.2
If we accept the assumption that the ground cannot lie, and at the same time, recognize that
archeology is practiced (as a form of art) through engaging with its philosophical
dimension, we can perhaps argue that philosophical archeology in artistic practice confines
this term to its proper meaning, that is, as potential truth.
In what he terms as “anteroom thought,” Siegfried Kracauer advocates against the
radical character of philosophical truths, due to their “generality and concomitant
abstractness” as well as their favouring of “either-or decisions” and tendency for “freezing
into dogma.”434 Resisting attempts at mediation, philosophical doctrines tend to leave no
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between “surface” and “depths,” the following: “There is a vision, or at least a glimpse, a moment of
revelation which in some sense explains and reconciles, a theodicy, a justification of what exists and happens,
as well as its elucidation. What does it consist in? ... [W]e are here plainly intended to see that these 'heroes'
of the novel―the 'good' people―have now, after the storms and agonies of ten years and more, achieved a
kind of peace, based on some degree of understanding: understanding of what? Of the need to submit: to
what? ... To the permanent relationship of things, and the universal texture of human life, wherein alone truth
and justice are to be found by a kind of 'natural'―somewhat Aristotelian―knowledge. ... How can this be
known? ... By an awareness, not necessarily explicit or conscious, of certain general characteristics of human
life and experience. And the most important and the most pervasive of these is the crucial line that divides
the 'surface' from the 'depth'―on the one hand the world of perceptible, describable, analyzable data ... [a]nd,
on the other hand, the order which, as it were, 'contains' and determines the structure of experience ... [W]e
are in art living in a world the constituents of which we can discover ... [B]ut in part, we are immersed and
submerged in a medium that, precisely to the degree to which we inevitably take it for granted as part of
ourselves, we do not and cannot observe as if from the outside ... cannot even be wholly aware of, inasmuch
as it enters too intimately into all our experience, is itself too closely interwoven with all that we are and do
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433
In this sense, Roelstraete mentions Georges Bataille’s idea of “Base Materialism” according to
which both art and archeology are forms of work that involve our bodily engagement “in the world,”
diminishing the distance from the material and the work itself, forcing us to touch and scratch it, “intensifying
out bodily bondage.”
434
Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last, 214.
140

room for something to exist in the interstices between these truths. This threatens to
overshadow potential truths that are not conceived as belonging to the “ultimate range of
the general.” 435 Anteroom thought, on the contrary, requires the acknowledgment of
philosophical truths and their claim to objective validity alongside the awareness of their
limitations in terms of absoluteness and controlling power—“[a]mbiguity is of the essence
in this intermediary area.”436

437

2.1.3
Art’s current coupling of historical perspective and archeological digging brings to mind a
previous, similar coupling—between the document and the monument—described perhaps
most elliptically by Foucault in this celebrated passage from The Archeology of Knowledge:
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Siegfried Kracauer’s “anteroom thought” can perhaps be realized in the context of poststructuralism,
and especially its relation to language. In Experiencing the Past, Michael Shanks clearly explains this
multilayered connection. Metaphysical judgments, he writes, are judgments about what really exists, that is,
ontology. The object of study is the origin. The past, present in its traces, is the beginning and end of
archeology. The word itself—archeology—contains all that exists in its project: (arche) meaning origin and
beginning, power and sovereignty; (logos) meaning account, reason, explanation, expression, discourse.
Whether these elements have presence and meaning in themselves is to be questioned in a poststructuralist
account, especially ideas of identity, origin, and meaning.
It is argued that the past has no determinate meaning, but it constantly slips from our conceptual hold.
The reason for this is because it depends on foregrounding language and its structure. Language is argued as
central to human experience, and language is primarily signification—communication in and through signs.
Saussure’s structural linguistics established a fundamental split within the sign: between the (differential,
sensible) signifier, that is, a sound or image that acts as a vehicle; and the (formal, intelligible) signified, that
is, a concept referred to. Signifiers have no necessary meaning in themselves, but hold potential. This
potential comes from signifiers being located in a structure of signifiers that differ from each other. A word
on its own means nothing; rather, its meaning comes from its difference from other words—this structure of
difference enables the signifier to be tied to the signified (both components of the sign, differs from the actual
object in reality, which is called the referent).
We relate the word and its associations with others. The result is a texture; each word is formed on the
basis of traces within it of other words. Nothing is ever simply present or absent, and there is no end to this
differing. We are always delayed in reaching meaning. Meaning is constantly deferred, divided from itself.
There are only webs of signifiers. This entails meaning always being absent, in a way—it is not present in
the sign. Thus, if our “hold” on reality is primarily through language, then identity and meaning are elusive.
When one holds an object in one’s hands, various attributes (decorations, markings, colours, styles, etc.)
are associated with the object that seem to give it its identity. These attributes are not present within the object
but are constantly shifting; the object is becoming and not being. It does not have identity and being so much
as difference and becoming. The meaning of the object is here and elsewhere. The signifier is subverted; the
(object’s) past is not the origin of meaning.
In conclusion, Shanks claims that poststructuralist argument does not question truth to replace it with a
free play of signifiers, but the truth of the past is material and institutional, social and personal; and
archeologists write in the space between past and present.
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“In our time, history is that which transforms document into monument.”438 Foucault’s
critique, being a continuation of a historical tradition that started in France by the
intellectuals of the Annales journal of the 1930s, emphasized a redefinition of the
methodology involved in historical research. This critique of the document and history’s
fundamental relation to it, as well as the manner in which visual and textual materials were
being used in historical research, highlight a more reflective use of the document that was
exercised in academic circles, but also (and perhaps more lucidly than in others fields) in
artistic practices of the 1960s onwards—using the document no longer as a site for
interpretation, but as a site for construction. “The document,” as Foucault writes, “is no
longer for history an inert material,”439 it actively manifests its potentiality in different
ways if one just learns how to question it properly.440 As opposed to the classic work of
the historian, who investigates the document in order to uncover its supposed concealed
truths, the artist is able to produce a document that is no longer part of a group of hidden
evidence, but is part of constructed scenes of knowledge manufacture.441

The idea that, in the hands of artists, the document is no longer an inert material (and that
it has become a site for knowledge production) is reflected by multiple examples in recent
contemporary art. Artists have continuously used archives and collections as a form of
storytelling or history telling, in order to construct a desired narrative or to rewrite the
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historiography of a certain subject matter. To demonstrate that, and to further support the
claim for the historiographic tendency in contemporary art, we can review a few prominent
examples to the way artists have worked with and constituted archives or collections in the
past, while shedding light on important socio‒political consequences of it.
Mining the Museum (1992) was an exhibition curated and installed by artist Fred
Wilson. Wilson was invited by The Contemporary (Baltimore) to create the exhibition
using the archives and resources of the Maryland Historical Society. The society’s
collection is known for holding many objects from the “antebellum period.” These items,
along with their indexation, made the collection itself known for promoting agenda of white
supremacy. When Wilson culled objects from the permanent collection, he juxtaposed the
products of slavery with fine‒art statuary, furniture, and silverware. It constituted an act of
criticism directed at the institution itself, showing the gap between the society’s own blind
spots toward its past and the repressed history of the black population in the U.S. today.
For example, in one room titled “Cabinetmaking,” he placed a set of antique armchairs in
front of a whipping post (that was in use until 1938), as if to allow the audience to watch
the white elite entertained by the abuse and humiliation of the black population. In this
room, as well as others, Wilson mimicked the usual methods of curatorial museum display
(i.e., specially painted rooms, silkscreened wall texts, labels, audiovisual material, etc.) and
through that mimicry radicalized a subgenre of conceptualism—the institutional critique.
Institutional critique became more entrenched in contemporary art from the time
that artists were invited by the institutions themselves to act as critics within their own
walls. An example from two years earlier was Joseph Kosuth’s The Play of the
Unmentionable (1990), which was exhibited in the Brooklyn Museum. Kosuth’s project
was part of a site‒specific series of installations in the grand lobby of the museum, where
artists were asked to “shed further light on the debate with an eye to history,”442 as stated
by Robert T. Buck, the director of the Brooklyn Museum. For this installation, Kosuth
created a dialogue about what art is in its social and political context, and for that he chose
approximately one hundred works from the museum’s permanent collection “that were
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once considered acceptable in the cultures in which they were created, but now might be
viewed by some as otherwise,”443 as noted further in the museum press release.
Howard Halle notes in his essay “Mining the Museum” (1993), that most of the
artists criticizing the institution of art represent minority groups, such as women (like
Louise Lawler, Judith Barry, Silvia Kolbowski and Andrea Fraser) or artists of colour, like
Wilson, as part of a struggle to redefine art history by erasing the demarcations of gender,
race, and class. Claire Bishop (in her essay “Rescuing Collective Desires: Benjamin,
History and Contemporary Art”)444 agrees with Halle’s comments on Wilson’s project, but
notes that most exhibitions curated by artists are not trying to confront any element of art
history, but rather use the art collection as the extension of their own practice, in what
should be considered “archival installation,” as defined by Hal Foster. In “Archival
Impulse” (2004), Foster argues that through the archival‒like installation, artists collect
and rearrange objects as part of an associative dialogue, jumping from one idea to the other,
so that the installation acts only as a module of their taste. Raid the Icebox 1 with Andy
Warhol (1969) is a good example of this. In early 1969 Andy Warhol was invited to select
works for a travelling exhibition that intended to provide a fresh and less academic
interpretation of the collections in the storerooms of the RISD Museum. This landmark
exhibition was not only noteworthy for Warhol’s idiosyncratic choice of objects—
including shoes, parasols, chairs, hat boxes, Native American pottery and blankets,
wallpaper, bundles of auction catalogues, even a ginkgo tree growing in the museum’s
courtyard—but for the radical way he chose to display the works: along with their storage
cabinets, racks, and shelves, as they were stacked and grouped in storage when he first saw
them.
The origins for both approaches to working with a collection, as Bishop notes,
resides in two unfinished projects from the beginning of the twentieth century: Warburg’s
Mnemosyne Atlas (1924–29) and Benjamin’s Arcades Project (1927–40). In the Atlas,
Warburg used pictorial reproductions pinned on wooden panels to show the continuity of
visual elements from the early pagan era to the renaissance of Christianity. By contrast,
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Benjamin’s Arcades Project illuminates a process that locates the decisive shift to the
modern age. Through a montage of quotations from, and reflections on, hundreds of
published sources, arranged in thirty‒six categories, Benjamin tells the history of
nineteenth‒century capitalism and what he calls the “commodification of things.” From
this research, he coined (as previously mentioned) the term “Dialectical Image,” where past
and present interact with one another as a method and subject of critical analysis. In other
words, the juxtaposition of collected archival materials, as organized by Benjamin, can
show how experience from the past can tell us something about present times, and perhaps
even of the future. Artists working with collections in this way could create new readings
of materials, retelling their stories and narratives, leading to new knowledge of the
institution, its collection, and more generally of art history and beyond. But the detailed,
repetitious, laborious act of uncovering buried “treasures,” revealing the process of time’s
passage, etc.—approximate a “scientific” type of art—is needed before any new knowledge
can be founded. In other words, this “new” knowledge has come to be dependent more and
more on the archeology of the past, and therefore, the archeological optic is one of the
founding principles of modern museum culture (which in itself became a site to be
explored) as well as the way contemporary artists work with and through archives or
collections.
Artists are not historians and they should not attempt to be. They may create works
that masquerade as documents and in doing so emphasize the extent to which documents
are the products of conventions of knowledge production rather than vehicles for evidence.
Their interest, in this case, lies less in uncovering than in unsettling historical truths and
narratives. A great example is Walid Raad’s Atlas Group (established in 1999), which
researches and documents the contemporary history of Lebanon, in particular the years of
the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90/91). Through the collection of the continuing effects of
all the individual and collective experiences that constitutes history in the first place, the
archive grows through not only found, but also intentionally invented photographic,
audiovisual, and written “documents” of everyday life in Lebanon. Raad aligns experience
and memories of the past with “actual” photographs and documents from the time of the
civil war; and by doing so, he asks an important question about the authenticity of
documents: why is a memory of the past less valid than a documentation of it? This
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important question is very much related to the world we live in today, where every
experience seems to be photographed and uploaded immediately to humanity’s largest
archive—the Internet.445
In her account of Walid Raad’s work, Eva Respini emphasizes that “the Atlas
Group presented itself as an organization founded to research and document the
contemporary history of Lebanon, specifically the Lebanese Civil War, and as such as
maintaining an archive of documents, films, notebooks, photographs, and objects.” 446
Investigating how photographs, moving images, documents, and first-person narratives
confer authenticity on official histories, be they histories of war or art, Raad’s work weaves
elements of the past, the present, and the future to build narratives that question how
history, memory, and geopolitical relationships are constructed. Each Atlas Group
document was attributed to a source, including the colourful historian Dr. Fadl Fakhouri
who, however, was fictional as was the Atlas Group organization itself. For Raad, it seems,
the opposition between fiction and non-fiction does not apply. A fact in his work
incorporates fantasy and imagination while a fiction is grounded in real events, dates, and
statistics: “Perhaps it is more productive to think of Raad’s work in terms of its imaginary
dimensions rather than its fictive ones.”447 In fact, it seems as if Raad’s work’s success
hinges on our need to believe in official narratives. None of the “documents” produced by
the Atlas Group is essentially faked: but when Raad re-photographs or scans them and
mediates their presentation through story lines, literary titles, narrative wall texts, and
engaging performances, they move into the imaginary realm. Raad’s work turns to fiction
in order to represent historical experience more adequately. He isn’t concerned very much
with “the fallaciousness of the material it presents,”448 but in suggesting that only through
fiction can an adequate image of reality be created.

2.1.4
This methodological research and understanding of history nonetheless transgress the
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proper discourse of art production. Media critic Knut Ebeling hypothesizes that in the
twentieth century a new, archeological thinking of the past appears next to its historical
twin. This form of thinking is constituted via a few major, modern intellectual endeavours
he terms “Wild Archeologies,” that is, the dealing with archeological projects outside
archeology proper. Such projects include, as he mentions, Freud’s “Archeology of the
Soul”; Benjamin’s “Archeology of Modernity”; and Foucault’s “Archeology of
Knowledge.” What all these projects share in common is that they are framed by Kant’s
“Archeology of Philosophy” of 1793, as well as the fact that they “experimented with a
material reflection on temporality.”449
Thus, a shift occurs from nineteenth century’s historical thinking to twentieth
century’s archeological thinking; intellectual history becomes archeological, not historical.
He writes that, nowadays, “]T[hinking temporality in the digital age requires a different
line of thinking than historical discourse: not narrating, but counting; seeing rather than
reading, not historia but archaiologia.” 450 Ebeling’s idea corresponds and supports
Roelstraete’s claim regarding artists’ current enthusiasm for narration and (story‒ and
history) telling strategies, as well as their archeological, material conception of the past.
“Wild Archeologies” present a certain suspicion towards history, in terms of
historical facts, documentations and records, and the “monopoly of scripture” that history
once exclusively obtained. As opposed to history’s constructs, to the printed word and the
textbook version of the world, one finds the archeological effort of uncovering that is
systematically different—from simply “telling a story” to sounding out real debris, detritus
and the world of things, that is, from textual to material reflection of the past. He writes:
“Archeology does not represent the past; it materializes it. Archeologists work with the
materiality of the past, whereas historians work with its written documents.”451 Thus, the
difference is the one we have already mentioned, that of document versus monument,
textuality versus visibility. Both archeology and art secure remnants for visibility as
opposed to history’s telling of them.
Additionally, the encountered objects might tell something different than the
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wishful thinking of self-narration. This is the epistemic difference between document and
monument. The archeologists do not have a causal knowledge of the event or phenomenon,
their knowledge of the contemporary is strictly material, it needs to construct everything
from a post-contemporary position, simultaneously, without sequencing semantics. This is
the archeological image, or as Benjamin called it, the dialectical image.
The second major difference between history and the archeology is that of the
language of inquiry—the historical account, whether written or oral, transforms everything
into language, symbols and digits, whereas the archeological account first brings history
and its object to light in order to consult the remnants themselves, not knowing in which
language or logic to read and decipher them.
The third difference pivots around their conception of time as they sequence past
contemporaneity452 in different ways. Historical narration constructs time chronologically,
linearly and continuously, jumping back and forth on an immaterial axis of time—one
always starts to narrate in the beginning. In contrast, material archeology starts from the
most recent, present moment (from the “contemporary ground,” as Benjamin called it) and
regresses backwards in time, calculating back “from the end, which is the present.”453

454

Thus, history and archeology qualitatively differ in their temporalities, or as
Agamben puts it (according to Ebeling), history explores the documented past that has
already originated, whereas archeology searches for the originating, instead of the always
already originated. The emergence of original temporalities is what interests the
archeologist. He calls it an “event”: “the idea of an ‘operation’ whose effects are yet to
come. ... [F]or the originating, effective past, or, more generally, for all effective
operations—that lie in the past, but effect the present.”455
Agamben, claims Ebeling, is somewhat less wild than the other “Wild
Archeologists” previously mentioned, since his methodology “holds no materiality, it
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swallows and ignores the conflict between paper and stone, reading and seeing, text and
technique,” up to the point where it is “completely absorbed and assimilated by
philosophy.”456 Is archeology without materiality, asks Ebeling, still archeology? To that,
I want to suggest, Agamben might reply with his proposition for a “minimal definition of
thought” (in accordance with Aristotle’s identification of the blank page as the pure
potentiality of thought): “To think means to recall the blank page while we write or read.
To think―but also to read―means to recall matter.”457 My suggestion emphasizes that
even when the idea of “archeology without materiality” is pushed to its extreme (that is,
becomes completely and merely “thinking”), the materiality of the blank page always lurks
in the background—thoughts, in this sense, resemble readymades. Thus, my suggestion
responds to Ebeling’s question with a “yes.”458
In his book on Agamben’s work, Kishik has an insight that can offer another
pertinent angle in this regard. He writes:
This attitude [i.e. the idea that philosophical prose must be ‘poeticized’ or
else it runs the risk of falling into banality] partly explains the mosaic-like
nature of his work. The tesserae that make up his texts are fragments
chiseled from larger stones, or texts, written by others. It is a kind of
historical materialism, not in the sense of a historical analysis directed at
material processes but in the sense of a philosophical process that uses
history as its material, indeed, as its capital, and thus wins over history itself
by going against its grain.... A preliminary name for this method might be
détournement: the cutting, pasting, and altering of found materials in the
process of creating a new work.459 460
Materiality, according to Ebeling (as previously mentioned), is the common denominator
of all “Wild Archeologies,” which try, in varying ways, to construct archeology outside
archeology proper. Materiality operates as other, as the other of history and historical
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knowledge.461 “Wild Archeologies” of the modern period thus “transformed” the very idea
of materiality—from immaterial idea to material understandings of it—which is,
essentially, the base matter of archeology.
The formulation of a new archeological object (Metaphysics in Kant; Media in
Kittler; Souls in Freud; Knowledge in Foucault, etc.), as per Ebeling, enables a culture to
define and describe itself. The archeological action can be interpreted as the art of
constructing the missing link to the self.

2.1.5
In recent history, the art world (operating as a site of cultural discourse) has attempted to
encounter, document, and interpret the past in various ways: the antiquarian endeavors of
the eighteenth century (with its display technologies); the alignment of the advent of
modern photography with archeological pursuits of the nineteenth century; and the artistic
responses to the formal aesthetics of archeological artifacts of the early twentieth century
are perhaps the most prominent constructions. In the second part of the twentieth century,
according to curator and writer Ian Alden Russell, one witnesses a shift “from purely
formal responses to archeological aesthetics toward more reflective and critical treatments
of the manifestations of traces of human agency in the world”462—a shift that was carried
out by the works of a large and diverse group of artists (such as Henry Moore, Barbara
Hepworth, Richard Long, Keith Arnatt, Cornelia Parker, Mark Dion, and perhaps most
notably Robert Smithson), all contributing to the development of archeological awareness
as a mode of ecological sensitivity.
Moreover, Russell claims that in the latter half of the twentieth century, archeology
extends its metaphor to become an allegory, a historical development that refocuses critical
engagement “from rhetoric of layers, depth, and progress (as in the twentieth century) to
affect, performance, and meaning-making,” so that the return to the past is not carried out
primarily for the sake of inspiration, but “is a deployment of the past as a technique in
itself—a search for liberation through the subaltern past as a means of resistance to and
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critique of the teleology of technological progress.”463 Thus, the first decade of the twentyfirst century witnesses a strengthened relationship between archeological and artistic
practices and an ongoing effort towards a renewed conception of the past, so much so that
“we may be witnessing a revival of an avant-gardist past that is not confined by disciplinary
structures or epistemic conventions, where the past is not the destination but the way.”464

2.1.6
An avant-gardist, renewed conception of the past might be a different rehabilitation that
Roelstraete seeks for the “tragic flaw of the historiographic turn in art,” although not
necessarily in the form of another “ism.” Rethinking the past, or more generally, rethinking
time as the medium in which the objects of historical research in art are taking part, is
perhaps not an “ism” as such, but is at least a radical shift that has equal value in our
thinking and making, and which has the potential to open up renewed possibilities outside
linear chronologies and against the blockage of the cultural imagination that art seemed to
have reached.
In a feature for Frieze in late 2012 (“This Is So Contemporary!”), writer Amelia
Groom surveys how a number of recent exhibitions have been integrating the past with the
present, seeking to do away with correct chronological sequence and the confines of
cultural context, in order to suggest that the time and place in which a thing was made
should not shut it off from other times and places.
Groom offers heterogeneous examples: The Russian Linesman (2009) at London’s
Hayward Gallery, curated by Mark Wallinger, suggested surprising correspondences
between vastly different objects spanning two millennia; History of History (toured
between 2003–9), organized by Japanese contemporary artist and collector Hiroshi
Sugimoto, established intricate dialogues between new works and material culture from
distant pasts; Intolerance (2010) by the Dutch artist Willem de Rooij, organized at the Neue
Nationalgalerie in Berlin, presented a series of animal portraits from the Golden Age of
Dutch painting alongside feathered ceremonial headdresses from eighteenth-century
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Hawaii, referred to the display as part of his ongoing work with “spatial collage”; Never
the Same River (Possible Futures, Probable Pasts), curated by Simon Starling at London’s
Camden Arts Centre in 2010–11, slipped between different histories in the present as the
artist restaged works from Camden shows of the last half-century; Shaped by Time (2012)
at the National Museum of Denmark, organized by artist Julie Sass and curator Milena
Hoegsberg, positioned (in relation to the museum’s prehistoric collection) fragmented pasts
in dialogue with the present in order to consider the construct of history and reveal its
fluidity; or when the 54th Venice Biennale (2011), curated by Bice Curiger, included
paintings by Tintoretto amongst its line-up of new art.
These lines of thought, writes Groom, can be dated back to the art of the early 1960s
(framed today as Minimalism, Conceptualism, and Land Art), which involve practices that
were theoretically influenced by the Mesoamerican art historian George Kubler, and his
book The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (1962). Dismissing the rhetoric
of progress in favour of more chaotic models of time, Kubler outlined how artistic
innovation, replication, and mutation never unfold in a single unbroken direction. History’s
movements are turbulent, and art will always refuse to tell a fixed, unified story. The Shape
of Time emphasized that the segmentation of the past is purely arbitrary and conventional,
and that an imposition of linear order on something that is infinitely more fluid and
complex is problematic. Kubler further claimed that historic time is always at once
progressive and regressive, in the same way that art modifies our conception of what went
before it and what comes after it (for instance, one’s knowledge of Auguste Rodin forever
changes one’s understanding of Michelangelo, according to Kubler).
Groom concludes:

When we are presented with old art and new art together on equal terms,
divisions become slippery and the past is made available for communicative
interaction with the present. We form new associations, and possibly face
up to contradictions we’d rather not acknowledge. The inclusion of things
in displays of contemporary art that are neither strictly ‘contemporary’ nor
‘art’ is not, as some have suggested, a mere fleeting curatorial trend. It’s
part of a broader growing awareness of the anachronism inherent in all time.
After the failed productive-progressivism of modernity, we’re dealing with
the fact that then and now and later aren’t proceeding along a flat line;
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they’re synchronized and woven through each other.465
2.1.7
What entails a cultural condition that denies linear chronology and advancement along a
flat line but nonetheless is considered and executed at the present time? What kind of
(temporal) present does it present and represent?
In his meditation on the (cultural) contemporary, theorist Boris Groys addresses the
present and its position within and in relation to chronology. He writes: “The present has
ceased to be a point of transition from the past to the future, becoming instead a site of the
permanent rewriting of both past and future.”466 The artistic medium that best reflects this
contemporary condition is, for Groys (and not without a touch of irony), time-based media:

[B]ecause it thematizes the non-productive, wasted, excessive time—a
suspended time ... it captures and demonstrates activities that take place in
time, but do not lead to the creation of any definite product. ... But it is
precisely because such a wasted, suspended, non-historical time cannot be
accumulated and absorbed by its product that it can be repeated—
impersonally and potentially infinitely. ... Hence, practicing literal
repetition can be seen as initiating a rupture in the continuity of life by
creating a non-historical excess of time through art. And this is the point at
which art can indeed become truly contemporary.467
Time-based art (as opposed to traditional artworks) is thus not based on a solid foundation
of time, but rather documents time “that is in danger of being lost as a result of its
unproductive character.” 468 This change in the relationship between art and time also
changes the temporality of art itself—it ceases to be present, ceases to be “in the present”
or “in time,” and begins to document a repetitive present that can be prolonged into the
indefinite future. The temporality of contemporary art, according to Groys, is thus “with
time”—being contemporary, as the essay’s title suggests, means being a “comrade of
time.”
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For the most part nowadays, the actual conditions of spectatorship in time-based art
(as it is often exhibited in art spaces) seem to support Groys’ analysis. In modernity, the
attitude of passive contemplation was discredited by celebrations of the potent movements
of material forces. He writes: “While the vita contemplativa was for a very long time
perceived as an ideal form of human existence, it came to be despised and rejected
throughout the period of modernity as a manifestation of the weakness of life, a lack of
energy.” 469 Contemporary spectators, on the other hand, can no longer rely on having
infinite time resources or perspectives (“the expectation that was constitutive for Platonic,
Christian, or Buddhist traditions of contemplation”); contemporary vita contemplativa
coincides with permanent active circulation. It is a repetitive gesture that leads to no result,
to no “well-founded aesthetic judgment.”470

471

The growing disbelief that characterizes the contemporary—the disbelief that
cultural projects can realize their (past and future) promises in a way that reflects the
disbelief of socio-political structures—causes Groys to speculate on a particular, acute
need of the contemporary: “The contemporary is actually constituted by doubt, hesitation,
uncertainty, indecision—by the need for prolonged reflection, for a delay. ... [A] prolonged,
even potentially infinite period of delay.”472

2.1.8
Paul, as we recall from section I, used the expression ton kairon exagorazomenoi, “buying
up time,” to convey the temporal condition of messianic time against the representation of
chronological time that separates us from ourselves as impotent spectators.
Ceal Floyer’s video work “Drop” (2013) 473 is a clear example which seems to
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fulfill the contemporary’s need (as per Groys) for potentially infinite deferment that will
allow for the messianic to “seep in.” The sublime emptiness of the present moment is
manifested in her portrayal of the passing of time (and the present moment) in a material
form—water drops accumulating very slowly until a breaking point occurs and gravity
pulls it down, causing the drop to fall and shutter. The agonizing time of the viewer, who
waits for the drop to disconnect, stretches out endlessly and becomes pure duration. The
piece is not only a time-based work, but also takes place in time—that is, it criticizes the
metaphysics of presence in the sense that it shows the before and after of presence, of the
present moment by stretching the past and the future to its extreme.474 The actual moment
of falling happens almost too quickly for the human eye to catch, the present withdraws
and appears as if never took place. One is never contemporary with the present, as there is
no now; the now is always deferred.

2.1.9
What seems to undergo a profound change is not the water drop itself, as an essence or
material entity in and of itself, but something in our understanding of it, in our appreciation
of the drop perhaps like never before. The messianic world, in a return to Agamben,
introduces a small displacement that does not affect the identity of the Absolute and our
concrete world, does not concern the state of things, but “their sense and their limits,” as it
takes place “in the space of ease between everything and itself.”475 In his questio about
halos, Saint Thomas, writes Agamben, addresses this displacement by characterizing it as
a “halo”—a surplus that makes the essential more brilliant, a supplement added to
perfection, a “vibration of that which is perfect, the glow at its edges.” 476 “This
imperceptible trembling of the finite,” writes Agamben, “that makes its limits
indeterminate and allows it to blend, ... is the tiny displacement that everything must
accomplish in the messianic world. Its beatitude is that of a potentiality that comes only
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after the act, of matter that does not remain beneath the form, but surrounds it with a
halo.”477
In a short essay on Cy Twombly’s sculpture Untitled (dated Gaeta, 1984), 478
Agamben refers to beatitude (or beauty) and its conditioning by the concept of “caesura.”
The theory of the caesura is developed, writes Agamben, by Hölderlin’s annotations on his
translation to Sophocles according to which (as per Hölderlin) “in the textured cut in the
line made by the caesura,” what appears is “representation itself, the ‘pure word’.”
Likewise, writes Agamben, Twombly’s sculpture, as a material artistic manifestation of
this caesura, “has succeeded in giving form to a caesura, in displaying its sculptural
equivalent.”
According to Agamben, the image of beauty (in every genuine creative journey)
that was thus far pursued as a continual ascent, suddenly inverts and starts falling directly
downwards. Twombly’s sculpture is not a representation of caesura but is “the caesura
itself, in its movement, ... the caesura that exposes the inactive core of every work, the point
at which the will of art supporting it seems almost blinded and suspended.” The movement
of falling beauty, for Agamben, has no weight; it is a sort of inverse flight that Twombly’s
sculpture makes apparent, “in which every ascent is reversed and suspended, almost a
threshold or caesura between an action and a non-action: Falling beauty.”
This point is a point of de-creation on the part of the artist, understood by Agamben
in theological terms, or more precisely, as a messianic moment “which has no possible title
and in which art miraculously stands still, almost thunderstruck, fallen and risen at every
moment.”479

477
478
479

Ibid, 55.
Agamben, “Falling Beauty,” 13–15.
Ibid.
156

Part II—The Archive and the Index

As inquired of in section I, one of the fundamental questions in regard to philosophical
archeology is the following: What is an origin? Origin (or arche), as we recall, means both
beginning and commandment; that which gives birth to something and that which governs
its development in time. Within the framework of this part, I am interested in my personal
origin: What gave birth to, and still commands, my personal identity and meaning of self?
And more specifically: What conditions my various artistic engagements in the world, and
how? In other words: What is the material a priori of my practice? How does it manifest
itself in Philosophical Archeology Space 2009–2019?

***

2.2.1
The archive and the index constitute the installation’s two-part structure. The first part, the
archive, delimited in roughly one-third of the exhibition space, is not fully accessible. A
perforated metal door blocks the physical entry to the archive, so that one can merely view
and listen to (remotely behind the door) what’s inside. The archive contains previous works
of mine from the past decade: some of them are boxed, some are fully exhibited, and some
in between. The second part, the index, situated in the main part of the gallery space, is a
series of photo-litho prints (Japanese Washi paper sheets, 30 x 55 in. each) infused with
collage work, sounds, and ephemera, forming a constellation rendered and conceived by
archeological art-making.
Based on what he defines as “the culmination of twentieth-century linguistics,” 480
Benveniste’s well‒known scholarly study Dictionary of Indo-European Concepts and
Society (1969), Agamben points out the philological finding that the word “index” derives
from the Latin verb dico which originally means “to show”—to show by words, therefore,
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to say. The lexical family of dico, as observed by linguists and philologists, is joined by an
essential bond to the sphere of law, thus index “is ‘the one who shows or indicates by means
of the word,’ just as iudex481 is ‘the one who says the law.’”482 The term “vindex” (“which
denotes the one who in a trial takes the place of the accused and declares himself ready to
suffer the consequences of the proceedings”),483 Agamben indicates, belongs to the same
group and is derived etymologically from vim dicere (“to say or to show force”).484 The
force in the action of vindex is thus the force “of the efficacious formula, as the originary
force of the law. That is to say, the sphere of the law is that of an efficacious word ... [and]
if this is true, the law is the sphere of signatures par excellence, where the efficacy of the
word is in excess of its meaning (or realizes it).”485
It follows, then, that the index is not simply a neutrally configured locus designed
to indicatively and expressively function as a means for communication and orientation,
but is inherently a locus that incorporates dimensions of authority, constraint, and even
coercion as it literally forms itself in the figure of a biding locus of signatures. In this sense,
one could find in the presented index an illuminating relation, if not an equivalent (albeit
in an artistic form), to the arche that has been conceived thus far. The exhibited archive
and index function (under the framework of my artistic modus operandi) in parallel to
Agamben’s paradigms and signatures (under his method of philosophical archeology)—
the various works in the archive participate in, and are conceived under, signatures
gathered together by the index.486

The index is comprised of three complementary and interwoven signatures (that I titled as

481
In English, judge.
482
Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 74.
483
Ibid, 74–75.
484
Ibid, 75.
485
Ibid.
486
This indexical, material “historical a priori” is encapsulated within its paradoxical title: in spite of
the historical dimension in which it dwells, at the same time, it harbours the ahistorical. Its metaphor is that
of the crystal, the poet’s refractory tool, which reflects the very structure of living. “Reading” the crystal
enables the poet to escape history altogether, since living and history are in opposition. The crystal “appears
as the index of a certain aesthetic occurrence” (Whyte, “Studio as History,” 1) that represents reality in an
ahistorical manner, as something primordial that happens before judgment or language.
However, the index is materially produced, it sprouts from the depths of the ground, and in this sense
the studio is for the artist what historiography is for the historian: “it is what says what can be said, how, and
for whom.” (Ibid, 2.)
158

follows):
(1) Impassability—Impassibility—Impossibility;
(2) Anchorite—Anchorage—Bridging; and
(3) Remnants—Relics—Fragments.

The first signature (Impassability—Impassibility—Impossibility) refers to the discussion
of dishomogeneity, to the gap that can be identified within the evolution of historical
phenomena or the gap within the creative process that prevails between preliminary thought
and executed action. Here, a fracturing of unity marks both the need for artificial
construction of meaning and the point where artistic historiography begins. In terms of a
cultural critic’s vocabulary, this signature alludes to the discussion of the crisis in
representation and its reference to the ontological problem. This signature thus also touches
upon ideas of reconnection and relations formation. The first signature is a reminder and a
call for unification.

The second signature (Anchorite—Anchorage—Bridging) aims somewhat to offer a
response to this call, and in this sense can be seen as a complementary part to the previous
signature, but at the same time, it stands independently. This signature incorporates various
elements of bridging—fulcrums to be based upon. Several theoretical and material
elements are presented as tools to process and generate meaning, interpretation and
understanding—such as techniques of ekphrasis, acts of translation, mental maps,
hermeneutic strategies, etc.—tools that the works use, although differently in each
occurrence.
But beyond these tools that are primarily based on spoken, written, or visual
language, the works themselves are also forms of bridging—they attempt to convey to a
certain viewer, through their materiality, the subjective experience of the artist. Discussing
his own practice, the British sculptor Antony Gormley articulates this very point while
emphasizing the potential of materiality in addressing this issue. When asked about the
problem of bridging intense, subjective experiences, he replied:

That for me is the real challenge of sculpture. How do you make something
159

out there, material, separate from you, an object amongst other objects,
somehow carry the feeling of being―for the viewer to somehow make a
connection with it.... That idea that in some way there are things that cannot
be articulated, that are unavailable for discourse, which can be conveyed in
a material way, but can never be given a precise word equivalent for.487
The various fulcrums of this signature are attributed to a subject that, historically
developed, has a special function that pertains to the signature’s theme. As Alain de
Libera’s archeological analysis (on the basis of Foucauldian concepts) portrays, the
concept of a subject was conceived mutely and non-linearly prior to Descartes, throughout
the history of (Western) philosophy. He writes: “Descartes did not bring about a
comprehensive concept unifying subjecthood, personality, identity, egoity, agency, and
causality under the single word subject. Before being decentered ‘the’ subject had to be
centered. It had to become a ‘centre’ of perception, a ‘centre’ of acting and suffering. Such
a concept had been delineated in the Middle Ages.”488 Thus, the modern subject emerged
through the combination, in late scholasticism, of two conflicting “models of subjecticity”
inherited from late antiquity—the Aristotelian philosophical conception and the
Augustinian theological conception—“enabling us to grasp the ‘modern subject’ as a
‘bridging’, transdisciplinary entity.”489
In this sense, artistic practice (and this installation-based thesis exhibition that takes
into account the historical discussion in terms of the medium of presentation, and the
certain historical charge of presenting art “archeologically”) involves a subject as a focal
point of perception that also has an active, participatory role in the construction of the body
of work. Allying itself with poststructuralist theory at large, and in contrary to a perspective
rooted in the Renaissance, art-historian Claire Bishop advocates for installation art’s
potential, however tentative, to propel in the viewer/subject (after recognizing its
fragmented and decentered subjectivity) a form of emancipation, because the activation of
the subject is analogous to the subject’s engagement in the world. A tension prevails
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between the fragmented model subject of poststructuralist theory and a self-reflexive
viewing subject capable of recognizing its own fragmentation, since installation art “insists
upon the viewer’s physical presence precisely in order to subject it to an experience of
decentering.” 490 What installation art offers, then, “is an experience of centering and
decentering: work that insists on our centered presence in order then to subject us to an
experience of decentering.”491

The third signature (Remnants—Relics—Fragments) emphasizes the material aspect that
is at work in the index, speaks to the archeological momentum the index manifests, and the
various acts of digging and unearthing that were employed at hand.
Additionally, this signature echoes the recurring, interpretive theme of the
hermeneutic circle (as it is comprised by pairs such as general–particular, object–subject,
text–interpreter, and classic–romantic), albeit in a material fashion, by the use of scattered
pieces of various kinds in relation to a (supposedly or imaginary) complete material entity.
It underlies a material practice that continuously negotiates parts and whole within the
artwork.
This material negotiation entails an epistemic dimension, in accordance perhaps
with Foucault’s crossing of dispersed remnants and the existence of knowledge: “[T]he
epistemic is not a grand unifying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open field of
relationships and no doubt indefinitely describable.... [T]he epistemic is not a slice of
history common to all the sciences: it is a simultaneous play of specific remanences.... The
Epistemic is not a general stage of reason; it is a complex relationship of successive
displacement in time.”492
The fragmentary, material-based characteristic of this signature establishes a
relation to the dishomogeneity characteristic of the first signature. In the same manner that
(as previously mentioned) Jabès’ writing is a succession of textual fragments that (due to
printed spaces that separate them from one another, as well as its mixing together of
different times, places, and levels of language) constitutes a structure of dishomogeneity
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and openness to further elaboration; so the fragmentary signature allows the artwork to stay
open to unforeseen possibilities, whether on the interpretive dimension or the creative one.
New uses become possible only through a perforated structure, between its cracks.

The other material aspect of the index reveals itself in the form of sound (although sound,
beyond its materiality, appears in other ways within the installation at large). In his essay
on listening, Roland Barthes speaks about a first type of listening he terms “alert,” in which
living beings orient their listening to certain indices, similarly to animals. Thus, he writes,
“[T]he raw material of listening is the index, because it either reveals danger or promises
the satisfaction of need.”493 By the human “invention” of intentional reproduction of a
rhythm or rhythmic representations, “listening ceases to be a purely supervisory activity
and becomes creation,” and due to rhythm language becomes possible since “the sign is
based on an oscillation, that of the marked and the non-marked, which we call
paradigm.”494 Barthes raises the example of a child who listens to noises indicating his
mother’s desired return—the child performs alert listening, that of indices. But once the
child stops supervising the appearance of the index, and begins miming its regular return,
the child turns the awaited index into a sign—thus entering the second type of listening,
which is that of meaning. This type of listening is a mode of deciphering in which what the
ear tries to intercept are certain signs. The child no longer listens to the possible, but to the
secret (recall Benjamin’s idea of “secret indices”): “that which, concealed in reality, can
reach human consciousness only through a code, which serves simultaneously to encipher
and to decipher that reality.”495

496

2.2.2
The (visual, textual, and sonic) juxtaposed elements in each signature are not intended to
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be read in direct opposition, nor do they suggest simple forced equivalencies. Rather, they
are deeply entangled notions of coexistence. They refute (as was previously discussed in
relation to the mode of knowledge of the paradigm) dichotomous logic in favour of a
bipolar analogical model, a model that archeologically proceeds by means of reading signs
and their analogies. This reading does not necessarily intend the conception of the signature
as a unity-in-plurality, in accordance with the traditional, aesthetic demand from art, which
was raised by Plato.497 The knowledge the signature generates propagates in time, as it
appears in one place only to manifest differently somewhere else, at another time. The
signature, as said, is a mode of distribution that operates through time and discourses.
Are the written sentences, concepts, images, and sounds imprinted on the paper
actually a call to decipher hieroglyphics as in ancient Egypt, or are they abandoned signs,
which serve only the image? And what does it mean, in this context, to have an aesthetic
experience, that is, to experience beauty?

The three signatures of the index crystallize and unify, transport and disseminate the
different artworks (referred to here as “paradigms”) that are contained within the signed
archive, forming a practice-based historiographic methodology, an archeological modus
operandi. Thus, the index, in its presented materiality and conceptual structure,
corresponds and refers to similar artistic-hermeneutic techniques of historiography. One of
them (previously discussed), for example, in the context deployed thus far, is Benjamin’s
Denkbild in which its further explication will assist in highlighting the index as an artistic,
archeological and historiographic (cross-disciplinary) apparatus.

As of 1923, Benjamin began to publish short narrative prose pieces, so-called Denkbilder,
which bears a relation to the Baroque emblematic technique. 498 The Baroque emblem
contains visual and verbal material in a tripartite form: pictura (icon or pictorial aspect),
inscriptio (motto, written above and describes, somewhat enigmatically, the image), and
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subscriptio (epigram, written below the pictura as an explanatory poem or prose). The
emblem aims to reveal a hidden meaning and significance (res significans) and
additionally, follows the two-fold intention of Darstellen (representation) and Deuten
(interpretation).
Benjamin’s Denkbilder work similarly. They generally have a three-part form
consisting of a title, a narrated image, and a related thought, and present an image as an
integral albeit not immediately recognizable part of the thought. Neither is clear without
the other, and their relation is subject to critical reflection of their interdependence. This
interdependence of parts is characteristic of the Baroque emblem, and likewise in
Benjamin’s Denkbilder these parts are supposed to provide information about the hidden
signatures of reality. The objects of the Denkbilder become signs for hidden, fabricated
human meaning about the world (as opposed to divine meaning in the Baroque emblem).
Because the emblematic structure is intimately bound to the concept of res significans, the
author must believe in the possibility and necessity of uncovering a secret meaning in the
world, whether religious (as for the Baroque writer) or materialist as for the modern artist.
The reader is not presented with a clear meaning, but is compelled to find the description
of their own reflective process, to be led into a careful contemplation of the world. Thus,
the Denkbilder relate to the hieroglyph—in the tension between image and thought, it
conveys polysemy. It is this polysemy that, once reflected upon prudently, may reveal the
world’s hidden meaning. This significance, however, may never be grasped fully,
according to Benjamin. But nevertheless, his Denkbilder are intended to illustrate that
reality may be constructed in multiple ways.
The Denkbilder urge the reader to turn backwards upon history, to recognize in
itself “the past” as philosophical material which has yet to be re-presented “visually,”
wishing for the reader to discover it as a paradigm of (Benjamin’s) experience of reality.
Consider, for example, the following Benjaminian Denkbild titled “Heidelberg Castle”:
“Ruins jutting into the sky can appear doubly beautiful on clear days when, in their
windows or above their contours, the gaze meets passing clouds. Through the transient
spectacle it opens in the sky, destruction reaffirms the eternity of these fallen stones.”499
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The view through the castle ruin reveals the dependence of eternity on its contrast to
transience—the ruins serve as an allegory for the lost past when it is identified by the
observer as a permanent loss, also a loss that could be one’s own. Simultaneously, the
Denkbild of the castle ruin illustrates the multidirectional temporality of history, when the
past is revealed (for a fleeting present moment) in its future, revolutionary potentiality. The
observer’s perception of the ruins is revealed as the rubble of historical hegemony. The
aesthetic appreciation that was produced by the tension between eternity and transience
turns into the understanding that the once-ruling historical protagonists have been
overthrown and are permanently destroyed. Benjamin’s Denkbild provides an insight into
the tragically self-inflicted catastrophe of human history, a catastrophe stemming from a
lack of understanding of the discontinuous relation of the present and the past. Benjamin,
writing within the discourse of historical materialism, refers to this revelation as “profane
illumination,” which can occur only if the historian will recognize the reappearance of the
past in the present; only then will past events gain their true significance. In this sense, as
per Benjamin, history can be pictured as a kaleidoscope—infinite, ever-changing
constellations of past and present moments (accordingly, for example, the calendar reveals
itself as a document of historical time). From this perspective, the past does not progress
linearly toward the present, but (as the Denkbild demonstrates) rather endures in the
present. As such, time is charged with a redemptive quality. Thus, the Denkbild gains
importance as a historiographic narrative form. In 1928, Benjamin seems to further develop
his thinking of the functionality of the Denkbilder—he writes: “[T]he function of artistic
form is ... to make historical content ... into a philosophical truth.”500

2.2.3
This part thus introduces comments on my own work—comments (or terrains of thought)
that refer to issues of materiality in my works, to questions I asked myself as an artist while
making the works, to questions (however pressing) I was unable to formulate. For example:
What is a historical a priori inquiry in art? What is an artistic a priori inquiry into history
or historical phenomena? How does one perform philosophical archeology in art? What is

500

Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 182.
165

a material-based philosophical archeology that addresses the past via objects containing
their own epistemologies?

These questions are addressed primarily by and through the exhibition, but also in my
writing that supports the exhibited installation. How should one address, in writing,
material art objects? According to Pedro Erber, 501 the critique of art objects tries out
different approaches for sounding out an object, not in order to impose a specific, “correct”
theory on it, but rather as a process of negotiation through which its infinite potentiality of
possible meanings is gradually revealed. The unsayable in an art object cannot be
straightforwardly explained nor translated into a conceptual discourse or a form of
narration. Nonetheless, the repeated attempt to do so is a fundamental task in art writing,
which should be guided by the object and its potentiality to speak aesthetically. This
working‒through resembles an idea by cultural theorist Mieke Bal, according to which an
image is a dialogical partner rather than a case study subjected to the scholar’s scalpel.
Such a “speaking image” speaks back at its spectator, transforms the way the latter looks
at art, and is termed by Bal (following French art historian Hubert Damisch) as a
“theoretical object.”502 Theoretical objects, writes Bal, are “not conceptual as opposed to
material, but conceptual in their very materiality.”503 This claim conceives of materiality
as no longer dependent on visuality but, at the same time, as not in opposition to it either—
thus, a theoretical object proposes a transformation of visuality into a participatory act,
seducing the spectator into a relationship beyond contemplation. Art writing itself is a mode
of “spectator participation,” performed as a response to the object’s seduction (yet
resistance to translation). Conversely, the making of an art object can be seen as a material
translation of something that resists conceptual expressivity. Translation, in this sense, is
no longer understood on the basis of correspondence between clearly defined and separate
realms of significance; what’s missing is correspondence itself as well as its conditions of
possibility, that is, a clear division between the artistic and the theoretical, the material and

501
502
5.
503
84.

See Erber, “Theory Materialized.”
Erber, “Theory Materialized,” 4; Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The Architecture of Art‒Writing,
Erber, “Theory Materialized,” 9; Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The Architecture of Art‒Writing,
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the conceptual. Instead of corresponding, the kind of translation at stake here is more
accurately conceived as responding to what demands (yet resists) translation. This
translation, which adapts itself to its object, refers back to an “origin,” in itself never
completely exhausted in translation.

***
I knew, but didn’t believe it and because I didn’t believe, I didn’t know (2017)

[Plate 1]
In this mixed‒media installation, an analogue TV screen is positioned on the floor in a
defined space. The physical entry to the space is blocked, but the viewer can see through,
and hear through, a perforated metal door. The TV shows a close‒up video segment of a
man (Jan Karski) speaking indirectly to the camera. The video has no sound—sound,
however, is played back from within the space through concealed audio speakers. The
sound includes abstract sounds and field recordings of a forested surrounding. Outside the
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space, next to the door, a text504 is hung—a transcription of the talking head, depicting his
desperate attempts to convey his firsthand report on the unprecedented events of the Shoah.

In 2010, Claude Lanzmann's film The Karski Report was released. It is comprised entirely
of an interview with Jan Karski, an official in the Polish resistance during World War II
whose testimony in Shoah (Lanzmann's seminal film from 1985) remains unforgettable.
The Karski Report outlines Karski's desperate attempts to convey the unimaginable events
to the West from occupied Poland. Did he succeed? What will entail an unheard-of, horrific
story to someone who is unprepared to receive it because it concerns a crime that is without
precedent in the history of humanity? To Lanzmann’s question regarding the early (yet
unfounded) rumours of the fatal events, Karski replied: “I knew, but didn’t believe it and
because I didn’t believe it, I didn’t know.”

504
The text reads: “A few days later the ambassador tells me: “Johnny, now you're going to see Justice
Frankfurter. He will come here.” Again, he gave me his briefing. “Now, Johnny, again be careful.” He always
would brief me. “Now, all knowledgeable people consider this man the most brilliant man in the
administration.” As a justice of the supreme court, the institution is very important. But next, “For years he
is a confidant of the president. All America knows about it.” Now he says: “Johnny,” now “he is a Jew, so
be sure he will be interested in your report.” All right, so I wait again carefully. On the appointed hour – as a
matter of fact I even remember it was between breakfast and lunch, before lunch in the morning hours, on
time – I was sitting in the living room, salon... ambassador comes from the first floor with Justice Frankfurter.
Justice Frankfurter, a little man. He did emanate some brilliance, very alive, his eyes... unimpressive
physically, a little man, Jewish looking. Very friendly, friendly, smiles, towards me all the time friendly,
several times he called me “young man” during our conversation. Well, I introduced myself, we sat down.
He in front of me, Chehanowski on my left. Justice Frankfurter starts: “Mr. Karski, I had been invited by my
very good friend, your ambassador, to come here to see you. I was also advised that I should see you.
Apparently, you have some information that I should know. What do you have to say?” My answer: “Sir, I
don't know what you're interested in. Could you ask me some questions? It will be easier on me.” Frankfurter:
“Young man, do you know that I am a Jew?” “Yes, sir, Mr. Ambassador told me about this.” “Well, tell me
about the Jews. We have here many reports, what happens to the Jews in your country?” Now I become a
machine again, I give my stack. The man sits. I remember he looked like... smaller and smaller, somehow...
like... looking at the floor, but listens, he doesn't interrupt me. I report, as you know from this film, usually it
lasted 15 to 20 minutes. I tell him, Jewish leaders, Ghetto, Belzec. 15 to 20 minutes passed and I stopped.
Now, Justice Frankfurter, he sits, looks at me still at this moment, and tells me the following: “Young man,
as I mentioned, I had been informed about your activities. I was told that you came out of hell, and I was told
that you're going back to hell. My admiration for people like you.” And then now: “Young man, I'm no longer
young, I'm judge of man. Man like me, with a man like you, must be totally honest. And I'm telling you I
don't believe you!” Chehanowski breaks in: “Felix! What are you talking about? Well, you know about him,
he saw the president, he was checked and rechecked ten times, in England, here, Felix! What... he is not
lying!” Frankfurter: “Mr. Ambassador,” formally, “I didn't say that he is lying, I said that I don't believe
him... these are different things. My mind, my heart, they are made in such a way that I cannot except it...
No! No! No!” I mumbled something; that is a shock for me.”
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Thus, in this installation I attempt to address the problem of representation, to point to the
presence/absence split relation and to a possible attempt to close its gap. I try to conceive
of the index as a mediator.505

According to Lanzmann, the catastrophe of the Shoah is non-representable. He thus
employs, in both films, a “non-representability” cinematic principle according to which
any kind of archival images or documents associated with the Nazi killing machine are
avoided, and the common historical archive as well as fact-based fictions are likewise
rejected. Instead, Lanzmann relies exclusively on spoken testimony506 in order to examine,
beyond the memory of the slaughter of Jews during World War II, the discourses of
historical representation and truth.507

I. Historical Representation

505
The relation between an index and the object it represents is a natural relation (as opposed to
agreement-based characteristics of relation or other signification functions such as the symbol or the icon).
The index forms a direct relation between the signifier and the signified; it points to its object. Accordingly,
the pointing finger seems to “penetrate” the object and thus indicates its existence. The indexical signification
diminishes the gap between the signifier and the signified and creates contiguity. The penetration point marks
the conceptual point of incredulity, which therefore subsides but simultaneously generates pain.
Various passages throughout the holy scriptures depict God as experiencing emotions (See, for example,
Jeremiah 14:17 and Isaiah 63:9 in Oei, “The Impassible God Who ‘Cried’,” 238), textual depictions that
afterward had certainly propelled controversies with regard to the Christian doctrine of divine impassibility
(somewhat influenced by Hellenistic philosophy) according to which God is not subject to emotion—on the
one hand, an impassible God is too distant and thus inferior and incapable of redemption; on the other hand,
an emotional God entails His dependency upon creation and the contingency of the world, clearly an
impossible theological situation that diminishes God and enables His vulnerability. The doctrine of God’s
impassibility (by nature), the idea that God is indifferent to human life, poses a serious theological problem—
if God cannot weep, it is claimed, He cannot love either. To modern Christian theologians, who witness (like
all others) the terrible suffering of modern times, this problem becomes perhaps more acute than ever: if man
can enter into a relationship with a caring God, they say, God must be capable of entering into man’s pain;
sheltered under God’s compassion and empathy, man can overcome its pain. Hence, their search for what is
called “a God after Auschwitz.”
506
German anthropologist Johannes Fabian terms the temporality of the ethnographical fieldwork as
“coevalness”: the sharing of time between subject and object, “the temporality of dialogical interaction.”
(Erber, “Contemporaneity and Its Discontents,” 30.) It indicates an attempt to correct the betrayal of the
anthropologists who distinguish themselves from the time of their subject of knowledge, often constructing
the Other in terms of distance, spatial and temporal. This distance means a denial of contemporaneity, and is
established in the transition from oral, dialogical knowledge to the written medium. Fabian terms this
fallacious situation as “allochronism,” which is grounded in a primacy of seeing and observing, transforming
the other into an object of contemplation—it amounts to “a sort of aestheticization of the other” (Ibid) instead
of an inquiry into the other based on linguistic communication. Thus, one finds a different mode of
temporality that originates by the “oral-to-written” displacement.
507
On reenactments of the Shoah in art and imaginative literature, see Van Alphen, Caught by History.
169

Lanzmann’s categorical choice in favour of spoken testimony emphasizes a fundamental
absence—a missing and impossible image—that is indicative of the irreducible totality of
the catastrophe. But can verbal testimony be considered as a withdrawal from
representation? Can we even indicate clearly when the threshold of representation has been
crossed and a phenomenon has reached the area of non-representability? Certainly, we
cannot be satisfied with the lack of visual material only, as spoken testimony is a crucial
part of the film’s archival material. Perhaps the threshold is crossed if we are left with
abstract tones only, sounds supposedly devoid of meaning, as a testimony only to the land
that involuntarily hosted the monstrous events.
Thus, I decided to extract the full soundtrack of Shoah, which runs for roughly
eleven hours. I then deleted all the sound scenes and sonic materials that could be
associated with even the minor conveying of meaning (dialogues, field recordings of folk
songs, train sounds, etc.). Eventually, I ended up with about fifteen minutes of sound. This
ratio came to me somewhat as a surprise, since I’d expected it to be much higher. My
surprise was a result of a direct encounter with the film and the overall impression of it as
a slowly progressing, meditative, lamenting, and silent cinematic work—an impression that
was in clear contradiction with the minor degree of semantic, verbal, and sonic material.
How could one reconcile this supposed paradox? Perhaps it means that an audible space,
its sense of volume and density, is not necessarily and solely a result of sonic information.
As my editing action over Shoah’s soundtrack showed, a large degree of meaningconveying sounds of various forms and textures can still constitute a sense of
contemplative, silent space (mental space as well as cinematic space).
Exemplified by the lack of visual imagery, the impossibility to represent the Shoah
as a historical event is further emphasized, in addition, by the abstention from using
meaning-conveying sounds. This makes evident the radical lack of context and the
meaninglessness itself, unrelated to a certain historical event—a crossed threshold. The
threshold (from meaning to meaninglessness) is crossed backwards. In an attempt to
inversely cross back over it, meaning does not constitute positively but as a subtraction of
information, knowledge, history and time from a place (or space) beyond us, beyond our
bodies. The soundtrack is an archive that lacks the use of language as a means of
representation—what meaning does it thus generate? I was wondering whether, because it
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lacks the language of representation, a certain context is required to form the entry to the
work without, at the same time, diminishing its interpretive dimension that is subjectdependent.
We can even imagine an archive, apparently devoid of context, presented without
the perspective of whomever constructed it. In such a scenario, it seems, the archive is
understood and constituted differently each time according to the viewer’s ideologies that
have been embedded through many years of education and social involvement. Is this an
archive that, instead of supplying more knowledge, intensifies disinformation and
speculations just as a drama is spun in a child’s mind? What role does the imagination play
in this sense? Experiencing such an archive does not guarantee the reception of meaning,
but its mystery generates an imaginary dimension aroused by the physicality of the archival
material and the wish to make sense of it. It seems as if the act of searching and sorting the
archive, randomly digging its depths with one’s hands (or ears), has an importance of its
own because it slows the viewer’s experience and thus discharges the excess of
imagination.

II. Truth
One of my intentions in this work, following Lanzmann, was to think about the truth-fiction
relation. I was wondering whether information becomes knowledge when completed with
faith. Faith, for its part, is dependent in the sense of the truthfulness and verity one grants
this information with—this appears to be the relation between information and knowledge,
as well as between truth and fiction. One believes in the story one tells oneself, as the story
is based on the long-lasting actions of narrative plotting and sketching. I suppose that a
work of art does not necessarily tell a captivating story in and of itself, but constitutes a
rich, symbolic meadow for the viewer and the entry into the work in terms of an adequacy
with one’s branched psycho-ideological array at the core of consciousness. This array is
perhaps the condition for giving faith in the feasibility of a certain event. One can know
something informatively but deny its possibility or existence due to a mental block. Thus,
the story we tell ourselves conditions what we believe to be real.
In “On Fiction” (1966), Vilém Flusser maintains that reality is not given or
discoverable, it is invented. Reality is fictitious. There is no comparative reference (or
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external world), fiction is the only reality. Each type of fiction is a reality in its respective
discourse. No specific perspective is more “real” than another. All points of view are
relative and equivalent. Eliminating perspectives leaves nothing. A thing is the sum of its
perspectives, Flusser claims, and the reality of a thing is the sum of the fictions that form
it. If all perspectives are fictions, then the human beings who project these perspectives
form reality—but aren’t we exactly what we project? We, ourselves, without things to
project on, are nothing. Without things, we are mere fictions, mere virtuality. Reality is
thus not in objects and also not in subjects (since they are both fictions). Perhaps reality is
the relationship between subject and object—but what if there are many relations as points
of view? Does it mean they are all reality, ontologically equivalent? Then, according to
Flusser, reality is fiction and fiction is reality, and only faith can provide reality.

***

Silent Maps (2016)

[Plates 2–7]
This body of work is presented as a mixed‒media installation in variable dimensions. It
includes maps made out of various materials (paper, wood, stone, resin, wax, and rusted
metal) and formations (photolithography prints, collage, text‒based works, sound works,
and a display cabinet). My work on it began with a reflection on what I perceived as a
peculiar intersection of two things: a material I often use in my works—damar resin—and
a story I was once told.
From preliminary research towards the exhibition, I observed that inclusions
trapped in amber are often found in the Baltic Sea region of Northern Europe. Fossilized
from tree resin and formed through a long period of petrification, these inclusions don’t
easily share their mysteries. Early amber hunters of the region used to measure the amber’s
value according to the inclusions found within it. Their assessment was based not only on
the object caught within the resin, but also on the narrative they could generate from the
particular inclusion. Vernacular Baltic legends about how a certain insect or plant ended
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up trapped within this once viscous material highly affected their overall evaluation. By
contrast, an inclusion found and presented as an orphan fragment caused great confusion.
Mysteries entangled and exchange rates followed promptly. Extensive landscape
descriptions, maps, and drawings were made by the hunters for future reference. Their
outlines had to be reliable; however, if mistakes occurred, one could always revisit the
landscape to decipher the problem.
Can we apply this methodology to a textual landscape? Can we follow the same
path, back and forth, between a text (as a system of representation or as an abstract map)
and the world supposedly outside the text? Can we revisit the world in order to decipher an
error or a problem in comprehension that occurs within a textual landscape? Will it still be
the same world?
My grandfather once told me about a story he was planning to write. It was about a
journey he had taken from his hometown of Vilnius to the Curonian Spit, which separates
the Curonian lagoon from the Baltic Sea’s southeastern coast. He departed on that journey,
as a somewhat modern Baltic hunter, in search for the earliest catechism written in Old
Prussian, around AD 1400, and said to be buried within the dunes of the spit. The catechism
also included, so he was told, a mysterious “footnote” written in Hebrew and serving as an
important key to the text, without which the text could not be fully deciphered. Being fluent
in both languages, he was hired by a local archbishop eager to find the original text and its
footnote (though he already held a printed copy in his hands from the 16th century). He
equipped my grandfather with a crumbled map that indicated the catechism’s exact
location. Because it seemed completely hopeless, my grandfather was astounded to find
the catechism, including its footnote, in the exact place indicated by the map. But he could
not immediately recognize nor read the footnote, because it was written densely, by an
encumbered hand. Back in Vilnius, feeding the archbishop’s discontent, all he managed to
ascertain was its subject matter.
I then asked myself: what if I’ll retrace my grandfather’s journey?

In Eastern philosophy one finds the idea of subtle realms—experiential inter-worlds and

173

realms of unconscious associations that form intuitive perceptions of physical reality.508
The territory of subtle realms is a territory that runs parallel to physical reality but interacts
with it, so that a person is effectively living in two worlds at once, subtle and physical.
When one searches for the subtle realms, one develops an intuitive awareness through the
use of the imagination. As a faculty yoking the sensible and the intelligible, the imagination
operates in the experience of the beyond and in the construction of imaginable worlds.

With this work, I ask myself (as an artist) the following questions: How can one draw the
territory of the subtle realms? What does it mean to enter its landscape? How does one
form its map as a mode of external symbolic storage?509 What is the relationship between
the concept of “landscape” and environment or world. In the history of art, landscape
painting is a genre; in Geography, it is part of nature, etc. What does it mean to see a
landscape? Is it something exterior? Is it something psychological or internal? The concept,
I assume, can be understood in various ways.
When anthropologists and historians treat the concept of landscape, they often
claim it is a modern invention and refer to a letter by Petrarch who describes his climbs up
Mont Ventoux in Provence to gaze at the landscape.510 This is considered, in the West, as
the first description of man looking at landscape (similarly, art historians claim that
“landscape painting” begins with fifteenth‒century Flemish painters), a false consideration
since even Petrarch himself mentions the ancients climbing the mountain to contemplate
and look down at the landscape, or even Roman frescoes with beautiful landscapes, and so
on.

For a philosophical perspective on landscape, one can possibly turn to a seminar Heidegger
gave in Freiburg in 1929/30 titled “Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World,

508
“Such is the case with the Kehai of Kami as well, where Kami come and go into the interstices of
being but leave their faint signs, and where sensitive humans, by emptying themselves into the midst of now
(naka ima) may directly experience the time/space gods embodied—however fleetingly—in the signs,
sounds, and sights of the world. It is an ‘experiential, mysterious place’ created as a third place between all
other places and as an accumulation of experienced ch’i beyond all distinctions, boundaries, orders, and
descriptive constructs.” (Pilgrim, “Intervals (‘Ma’) in Space and Time: Foundations for a Religio-Aesthetic
Paradigm in Japan,” 271.)
509
For a thorough discussion of mental maps, see Gould and White, Mental Maps.
510
Cassirer et al., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, 36–46.
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Finitude, Solitude.” In this, perhaps his most important seminar, Heidegger tries to define
the fundamental structure of Dasein (of human beings) as a passage from the poverty of
the animal world to the building of a world that defines humanity. In order to do this, he
must define the essence of the environment of the animal, thus to understand the difference
between animal environment (a poor world, in his terms) and human one. The animal’s
environment is defined, as per Heidegger, by the idea that each animal selects (in the natural
world) one crucial element that defines its environment and is absorbed in it without being
conscious about it. On the contrary, what defines the building of human world is the fact
that man is never unconsciously absorbed but perceives being as such. Deep boredom,
according to Heidegger, is a good example: when we are bored we suspend any relation to
the world (cannot do anything or are not interesting in anything). Thus, in the suspension
of animality one becomes human.
Looking at a landscape we see everything, all elements at once, and perceive it in
another dimension, suspending all animal relation as well as human relation (being as
such); we are absorbed in the landscape as if we lose our subjectivity while observing it,
becoming an integral part of it. In Heideggerian terms, the human world is the making
inoperative of the animal relation to its environment, while landscape is the making
inoperative of the human world itself—this is a third stage after animality (environment)
and human (world).511

***

Vaalbara (2014)

[Plates 8–13]

This body of artwork is constituted of several overlapping narratives, manifest in varied
artistic mediums, that unfold by means of a series of artistic revelations in dialogue with a
fragmented, poetic manuscript of my late grandfather. Since he passed away when I was

511

See Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 45–50.
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nearly fourteen years old, I have been left with a strong sense of loss. His diverse
manuscript and artistic work, although insignificant for me at that time, has become
increasingly important to me. By telling a story and reimagining its narratives, I interpret
in and through this personal archive. This work tries to recreate the possibility of a shared
biography through an artistic dialogue.

The first narrative displays the manuscript, which is placed inside a covered cabinet. A
sound that resembles that of a Morse code emerges from within and fades in and out. It
was necessary to divide the voluminous manuscript into several piles due to presentation
constraints, but also due to issues such as fragmentation, meaning construction, and the
relation between parts and whole. How should I divide the manuscript? Which pages
should I explicitly show, at the expense of others?
The second narrative is made out of many sheets of paper, stitched together and
bathed in a mixture of resin and beeswax (as an encaustic medium)—materials I use in
several of my works. The papers are thus grouped together to form two main strata that
correspond to the left and right audio channels. Sound comes from beneath the thick layers,
portraying abstract, unpleasant (even appalling) murmurs, perhaps that of a little child at a
pre‒verbal stage who tries, but fails, to communicate.
The third narrative combines two rusted metal plates and sound. The plates are
leaned against the wall, connected to one another by a hidden sound device that works both
as a speaker and a tactile transducer—it simultaneously plays the distant sound of faint,
slow piano playing and, by rumbling, causes the plates to sound out low metallic noises.
The last, fourth narrative is a diptych made out of Japanese washi paper and a few
texts from the original manuscript. The papers are treated with diluted resin, which causes
them to rearrange in layered forms as they become transparent in various degrees. The
original texts combine together to become a partly deciphered unity.

These narratives seem to suggest the signified yet obscure and unreachable nature of a
literary work sealed shut. I was thinking about them as trying to traverse a gap, to bridge a
physical presence that will cause them to materially seep into the archive. I felt that the
textual depth of this archive is suspended to present the gravity of the work as a physical
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mass; as if the manuscript is rendered as an object. Deleuze writes: “Time becomes a
subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, forces every present into
forgetting, but preserves the whole of the past within memory: forgetting is the
impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal.”512 The outside entity, the
manuscript, is folded in, and as such, is preserved in memory. My intention was for the
overlapping narratives to be the renewal—not interventions but parallel responses, like
light rays aligned in parallel, communicating as collimated spirits in non-linear time. It was
written that they indicate wormholes where the dialogue becomes possible, taking place,
and by avoiding semantic translation and representation, the aura of the literary manuscript
is maintained.513

***

To Return to a Place, Is, Like Dying (2016)

[Plates 14–15]

This is a multidisciplinary body of work in sound, installation, printmaking, and text. The
geographical and spiritual remoteness from home constitutes the exhibition’s core, as a
fundamental contemplation on distancing, exile, retreat, and nomadism. However, more
personal questions guided me in this work: how much of my cultural, biographical, and
subjective background comes into the writing and the making of exhibitions at present?
And even: what is the tension between the (Israeli) foreign and the (Canadian) local
perspectives in this process? The exhibition space, coloured in shades of yellow and brown,
brings to mind an ancient appearance, an old photograph or a cave revealed in an
archaeological dig.

I. Re(moteness); Re(treat); Re(turn)

512
513

Deleuze, “Folding, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation),” 327.
See Abraham, “Collimation,” 10–12.
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The late Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai wrote: “To return to a place, / is, like dying. / It is,
to fulfill prophecies / or empty them.”514

In the previously mentioned interview between Jabès and Ettinger Lichtenberg, we find the
following dialogue:
Ettinger Lichtenberg: At the moment when it’s impossible to fixate something, it’s
impossible to separate one thing from another.
Jabès: Here you touch at the heart of the nomadic writing. You’re at the heart of nomadic
writing.
Ettinger Lichtenberg: Which is the inability to fixate, to strike roots?
Jabès: This is the desert, nothing strikes roots here.515

And finally, Shapira summarizes:

Quoted from his poem “Ein–Gedi”; my translation.

514

“To return to a place,
is, like dying.
It is, to fulfill prophecies
or empty them.”
“

,
.

,
,
.”

The aforementioned quotation is at the same time formal and semantic; inasmuch as the quoting action itself
by which the quotation’s content is concerned with—its meaning—is happening (again) “in-itself,” we
perceive as a drawing. Because it is also semantic, in its simple textual sense, it seems to achieve, without an
insignificant extent, an almost automatic precedence. The double move is in fact a second order abstraction;
a reverberation of a reverberation, a quote of a quote—a return to something alienated and familiar.
How should this be understood? Perhaps, by a pre-understanding (what is pre-understanding?) that it is
of great significance to correctly position a question, any question, in order to fulfill, even temporarily, our
basic curiosity drive. But this temporality points more than anything else, to the significance that a properly
given answer will leave the question open yet stable. The punctuation marks condition the thought, and being
conditioned by repetition and sense fixing—it is impossible for the thought to reveal itself in its pureness;
however clear methodological forms, through their interrelations, can determine between various senses that
“seep into” the thought from the outside. The mark requires repetition and sense, iteration and sense... until
the question’s deep foundations will (again) collapse into themselves.
The double operator of the punctuation marks—multiple roles become possible—as an organizing
element, structures, balances, calms, permits a relation a relationship to be established and again soothes, or
rather, emerges, reveals, breaks, bubbles, floats from above, in trauma? The assumption is that the experience
of art requires from us a certain disregarding, even if against our natural and humane will.
515
Routes of Wandering: Nomadism, Journeys and Transition in Contemporary Israeli Art, 248.
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The archeologist conducts a journey to discover relics of an extinct culture.
The fragments that he exposes do not exist, in effect, without his gaze, and
their chronicle is formulated by him by means of the language of his
discipline. But this discipline (even when it is conscious of its reflective
activity) represents the historical processes that it contextures as events that
happened in the past (before the language of archeology which constitutes
them). Hence, archeology conditions itself upon a prior time that it itself
signifies—a time signified as an artificial product, and not as an origin or
an authentic basis.516
The voice of the past is combined with that of the present.

II. (Re)—Time
The prefix (Re‒) inevitably includes a certain conception of time. What is the time of
return? Different philosophical approaches view the present as the most important time; it
is the atemporal time, the time which all other times refer to. The more it becomes possible
to connect the past to the present experience, the richer and deeper the present
consciousness gets. The larger the liaison with past events, the more the contemporary,
present consciousness gains through sprawl and burgeoning horizon. According to the
philosopher Edmund Husserl, the experience of the present works to bring into focus its
strength as well as the contents of all times of the past and of the future. For this he coined
the term “standing–streaming”—a formalistic expression that measures the consciousness’
static dimension of the present against its dynamic flow of experiences.517
In Jewish sacred and literary sources, a certain time is mentioned that is “not day,
and not night.” It is a time described as uniting all times, a time that designates a conscious
space of abstruseness: a conscious space of numerous intellectual contradictions into which
coherent, logical reasoning tools collapse.518
This conception of time brings to mind (as previous mentioned) Agamben’s
conception of messianic time, and the form of time at the basis of Benjamin’s dialectical

516
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Ibid, 209–10.
To return to a place, is, like dying, ii–vi.
Ibid.
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***

Galut (Diaspora) (2011)

[Plate 16]
This is an eight‒channel sound installation (in the form of a radio drama) that is presented
in a dark space alongside a painting. The installation is inspired by the artistic work of my
grandfather—this time, by a painting he made of his late parents who were exiled to an
unknown concentration camp during WWII (the ultimate diaspora). The content of the
installation is made out of fragments of my grandfather’s literary works, which were
removed from their original context and rejoined to tell a story.
Some of the questions I asked myself in the making of this work were as follows:
how is it possible to reuse old decontextualized fragments in order to produce a new literary
meaning? What role does sound take in conveying and representing meaning? Is this role
unique to sound? Can I return from this metaphorical (even physical) exile? What is the
relationship between the three figures of the radio drama, which are actually one and the
same? Where do our histories converge?

It seems as if an unavoidable gap exists between the work and its interpreter, between the
work and the text written about it; as if, enforced by various techniques of
defamiliarization, the interpreter becomes an exile who faces itself. If these alienations will
not be resolved, one is left in suspension as an exile in one’s own land.
In the radio drama, a man is transformed into a number. 56698 is his new, alienated
and estranged name. He dwells in a place without a place, where there are no openings. In
the eternal night that prevails this place, no face is revealed in the mirror. The sole traces

519
On the application of current theoretical examinations of time to the field of contemporary art, see
Ross, The Past is the Present; It’s the Future Too: The Temporal Turn in Contemporary Art.
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of a meaningful world are barred shadows upon a missing floor, merely projections.
When listening to the installation, the sonic garden of forking paths seems to resist
a linear melodic motif; it rather forms a multidimensional, atemporal space. It is an exilic
space in the deepest sense, detached and forever irrelevant. A fabric of distancing.

***

Between Things (2010)

[Plate 17]

This installation is based upon a few (poetic, philosophical, scientific) texts that attempt to
articulate time. The texts are hung in the air, while various leftovers of paper, ink,
accompanying materials, and sound are piled up on the floor beneath them. In this
installation, time is contemplated and expressed as a plastic thought, as image and sound.
This is a work about a concept (time) that prevails perhaps in any work of art, but is here
conceived within an ongoing series of works that attempt to formulate a specific form of
time—a form of time that evolves into the conception of time as messianic time, and that
lies at the basis of this thesis exhibition. What kind of trace does time generate in this
installation?520

A leftover is a testimony to an act that took place at the interval between things. This act
occurs in relation to time—it is carried out in light of an expected final result, and therefore
desperately clings to the speed of change and its purpose, or alternatively, through an
involuntary and temporary act of conspicuousness (as a deviation from somewhat predicted
and routine path). This act is temporally carried out, in the world, even as pure abstraction.
Time is expressed through numerous descriptions (in parallel with the characteristics of the
act itself) that complement each other in different modes, and their nature is often remains
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For a survey of contemporary art and theory that proposes alternative to outdated linear models of
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unclear to us. Each action matches a different relation and it seems as if we cannot
comprehensively generalize the exact nature of this relation. Moreover, perhaps other,
infinite relations exist and therefore infinite types of time exist as well; these time essences
will always refer to various actions in themselves and in relation to other actions.
Leftovers are piled on the floor. The space divides and separates them as it divides
and has been divided by time. Therefore, a series of question arise in the making of this
work: what exists between successive events that come to be in time? Does time exist
within time? Can we at all speak about a “between things” mode of existence? Or whether
this is a different type of time that requires a different comprehension?

Personally, in making this installation, the most interesting aspect of time occurs between
things. An action occurred, a body appeared, an object was installed, a cat crossed the
street, stopped and sat down on the sidewalk. What happened at the point of transition, a
moment before it started and a slight moment after it ended? Could we at all split or bound
the action and consequently the time it took for it to happen? Does this mean that time
stands still? Or alternatively, that infinite essences of time correspond to infinite types of
events whose theoretical summation is “the” time that we talk about or intuitively relate
to? How, if at all, does time exist between things?
Time indicates life, whether intensive or almost static, short or long, fulfilled with
actions or reduced to the smallest measure needed to keep life going. Time means living
souls, it cycles, from morning to the next, it always exists within things but also (and
especially) between things, where it exists perhaps in the strangest way. The breath
indicates life, life within the body, alive, which continuously helps time to be formed.
Every breath feels differently. So is time.

***

The archive includes other, undiscussed previous works or only minute fragments of these
works. The scale, both physical and symbolic, of the leftover or fragment is occasionally
the reason for not discussing the work or for not offering any terrain of thought in regard
to it. However, sometimes the reason is of a different register, as in the case of the following
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works (that are nonetheless included in the archive) which present a challenge for thinking.
This challenge, so it seems, sometimes overpowers an attempt for critical analysis; at other
times, the work is utterly intuitive, and does not easily lend itself to words.

These works are (in chronological order):
Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) [Plates 18–23];
Teca (everything you tell me I keep in my body) (2015) [Plate 24];
The Revisit II (2014) [Plate 25];
Had We but World Enough and Time (2014) [Plate 26];
From the River Archive (2014) [Plate 27];
Quiet Whispers in the Hallway (2013) [Plates 28–29];
A Revisit (2012) [Plate 30];
The Revisit (2011) [Plate 31];
Attentiveness Foldings (2010) [Plate 32];
If the Walls Could Speak (2010) [Plate 33];
Moraine (2010) [Plate 34]; and
15 Maps for Becoming a Concept (2009) [Plate 35].
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Conclusion

“There will be no conclusion. I think, in fact, that in philosophy as in art, we cannot
‘conclude’ a work: we can only abandon it, as Giacometti said of his canvases.”521

This research revealed philosophical archeology to be multifaceted—it is a research
methodology (a historiographic framework) in the humanities at large, which essentially
embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic research (as extensively exemplified
in section I, part I); a metaphor (allegory);522 (art) content or subject matter as well as a
material-based historiography or method of historical inquiry in art;523 a critical force that
conceives of its (past) objects as (future) prototypes or blueprints; and, lastly, philosophical
archeology embodies a certain (messianic) conception of time that conditions a conception
of history.524 The originality of philosophical archeology, as a critical methodology, does
not necessarily stem from the nature of its tools, but from the integration of threads drawn
from various disciplines and broad fields of knowledge.

As a historiographic methodology in use throughout research across the humanities at
large, philosophical archeology aims at researching the “historical a priori” dimension of
a certain historical phenomenon, a dimension (“point of emergence”; “moment of arising”)
that cannot be identified as the phenomenon’s diachronic origin, but as an active tendency
within it that conditions its development in time. The “historical a priori” designates a
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See p.55 where Freud speaks about archeology as a metaphor for the mind; p.58 where, for Foucault,
archeology is a metaphor for “knowledge as a substratum that ‘lies beneath the surface’”; p.45–46 and p.131
where Agamben uses the idea of vortex as a metaphor for the origin or arche (and vice versa); p.149 where
I suggest that “archeology”, in its extreme sense, can be understood as a metaphor rather than as a material
discipline in practice; and p.150 where Russell claims that in the twentieth-century archeology extends from
being a metaphor to being an allegory (that is, it now employs narrative, not just a single word, in order to
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sequential past, yet not simply as an older prehistoric unified phase nor as an a-historical
structure; as a past that still commands in the present, it is an operative force within the
historic phenomenon that guarantees its intelligibility and consistency. Philosophical
archeology is thus “a ‘science of signs’, an inquiry into the signatures left by the origin on
the living body of history.”525
The “historical a priori” dimension is synchronic, contemporaneous with the
present and the real, and therefore the archeologist withdraws, so to speak, towards the
present. Once the archeologist reaches this phase or dimension, the past that was never
really experienced (and thus remained a present) becomes a real or true present, thus it has
the temporal structure of future anterior, a past that will become a past in the future once
the archeological work is complete.
The “historical a priori” dimension is qualitatively different from the historical
dimension. Like the child in psychoanalysis (which is a continuous active force within the
life of the adult) or the “big bang” (which we assume took place and the effects of which
we can feel, though we cannot locate chronologically), the “historical a priori” is not an
event or substance that precedes the phenomenon diachronically or which can be dated or
chronologically situated. Neither is it a metahistorical construct that narrates the
phenomenon from the outside, as in the common sense of an origin. Lacking a concrete
time and space, it is a heterogeneous fracture existing between history and prehistory, a
field of bipolar historical tensions that spreads between the phenomenon’s arche and its
becoming, between arch-past and present.
From an epistemological perspective, the “historical a priori” dimension, through
various processes of canonization, conditions the potential to constitute knowledge of and
by the phenomenon while at the same time being conditioned itself as it is embedded within
historical constellations. Fulfilling the paradox of an a priori condition embedded within
history, it is thus paradigmatic and transcendent. Once the archeologist, through a critique
of origins, reaches this dimension that is covered and concealed by the long-lasting effect
of tradition, the past that was never really experienced becomes accessible for the first time,
and with it, its buried epistemologies. Hence the “historical a priori” (the arche) elucidates
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the phenomenon from within.

***

In this doctoral research I attempted to show that philosophical archeology is constituted
as an interdependence between three inseparable pillars: history, archeology, and
philology—any historical investigation requires not only archeological vigilance, but must
also give an account of language. The articulation between language and world is disclosed
as “history” by the continuous process of anthropogenesis—that is, the continuous event
experienced by Homo sapiens of becoming human and remaining inhuman. This
articulation is humankind’s (and philosophy’s) historical a priori. Philosophical
archeology is immanent and constitutive to philosophy; it means going back
archaeologically to the continuous event of anthropogenesis in an attempt to bring to light
the various historical a priori that condition the history of humanity. Thus, philosophical
archeology entails coming to know the means and ways by which a thing articulates itself
and its historical development, based on the a priori principles that it possesses.
Moreover, philosophical archeology’s tripartite structure (as indicated above)
always involves a messianic moment of thinking. This moment (as elucidated mainly in
Paul, Benjamin, and Agamben), although originally theological, is prevalent throughout
the length and breadth of secular time. Secular time incorporates another time, messianic
time, that (illustrated via Guillaume’s idea of operational time) operates in it from within—
messianic time enables chronology by the construction of “time images” (or “time
representations”) that, only at that point, are still charged with potentiality (“the time which
is left to us”). Messianic time is in opposition to historical dialectics of progress, since the
messianic is the pure potentiality of the present moment. This messianic conception of
time, this concept of temporality and history, shows a structure with bipolar tensions: linear
chronology (which supposedly ends in an origin), and a radial form whose manifestations
all revolve around an Urphänomen in a non-linear manner. Based on a dialectic of
“oneness” and repetition, the origin is (at the same time) inside and outside chronology, it
is (at the same time) independent and inseparable from chronology. Like the arche, the
origin is a historical a priori that remains immanent within history, within the phenomenon.
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The origin is not a factual event nor a mythical archetype, but a vortex in the stream of
becoming; it is that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance while
it swallows the material involved in the process. As materiality, worldly things disrupt (in
this process) the balance between the infinite and time—the infinite (the apeiron, as per
Anaximander), although an arche, is crossed by time and cannot overrule it. Material things
thus defy the infinite due to (their movement in) time, but also defy time due to their
inevitable return to the infinite. As we saw, for Aristotle, the infinite is not a force of the
cosmos but the intermediary between its elements; a mediatory field or space that is named
“the middle (meson).” The infinite (and, it could be argued in regard to the exhibited
installation, the Washi paper) is a central space from which all elements are equally
distanced due to the balance they are forced to maintain. Thus, as an arche, the infinite is
not understood as a fixed point of origin and primary rule. The arche is not a whole, but a
perforated concept—a characteristic that enables it to be a mediator; similarly, time is
formed as a porous structure.
In section I, part II, we encountered another mediator—Benjamin’s (and Debord’s)
montage or the concept of “citation without quotation marks.” Related to Benjamin’s idea
of the “dialectical image” (or “dialectic at a standstill”—the image at once frozen and
dialectical), this mediator enables secret meetings of times, images, and texts and, similarly
to Paul’s “typos,” can disappear (as past occurrence) if the present moment does not
recognize itself in it. An image or text carries an index within itself which will cause it to
burst only at a specific moment in the present when the past and present form a
constellation—Benjamin’s concept of messianic time (as opposed to historical progress)
thus emphasizes the redemptive potentiality of the non-chronological present. Understood
as a conjuncture of past and present, and containing a historical index (or signature, which
is a mode of distribution as it is characterized by a signatory displacement, a pure historical
element due to its connectivity characteristic and its working outside chronology), an image
is constituted temporally to achieve legibility in the future—it is thus, more than a visual
image pure and simple, the fulcrum of Benjamin’s theory of historical consciousness. A
dialectical image appears when both of the objects it negates freeze and become immobile,
thus suspending meaning. The image becomes full, legible and produces knowledge by
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adhering to the analogy-based epistemological model/process that consists of a bipolar,
tensive opposition between its elements. The elements do not unite, but remain in an
immobile coexistence charged with tension. This form of knowledge, formulated and
developed also by Benjamin’s Denkbild, seems to offer Agamben what discursive language
epistemologically cannot—the Denkbild (which “shines for a moment out of the ruins of
language”), and perhaps art at large, is the pre-conceptual knowledge of the world.
The concept of “citation without quotation marks” expels from context, and thus
destroys, the past. The problem of transmitting the past is thus replaced by the aspiration
to cite it. This action resembles the way artists work with ready-mades—an artistic action,
and a relation to the past, that brings to mind (art) collectors or revolutionaries in terms of
destroying the common, bourgeois order. This action, however, carries within it a potential
for renewal and healing. Benjamin’s methodology of citation (like Kraus’s) becomes his
main tool for reflecting on the kaleidoscopic structure of the philosophy of history—the
whole is presented through the part or fragment; the cited leftover contains the image of
the whole within it. Similarly, it could be argued, in his writing style, Agamben works like
a curator, as per the previously described method of “brachylogy.”
In the footsteps of Benjamin, Agamben thus grants aesthetics (or aesthetic
operations) the role, however modest or limited, of the redeemer—aesthetics opens for us
a space between past and future as a messianic arrest of time. Messianic time is a gap
between our conception of the present and our experience of it, a gap that exhibits our
inadequacy of being fully present “in-time” but also our ability to aesthetically work it out.
This opening is the theological (and epistemological) horizon reflected in the messianic.
The artist (or aesthetics), as a redeemer, must have access to an original temporal
dimension. This is the messianic dimension that deactivates chronological time, as a
caesura that transports a work of art into an atemporal existence. Messianic time resembles
an underground alley—dug beneath history and enables its redemption. Thus art, poiesis,
is a beginning, the pro-duction of origin, as it breaks the continuum of chronological time,
and can conceive of history as a blueprint for science fiction.

In section II, part I, the historiographic turn in contemporary art, characterized by the
metaphor of the archeological dig and the need to look backwards, is depicted as
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contributing to artists’ historical consciousness and in particular with regard to the societal
knowledge economy. The constant artistic search for the unknown is exemplified, as an
expanded metaphor, by the soil and buried past, that is now understood as the only terrain
left for further explorations. History’s traditional inert materials (documents, archives, etc.)
are charged by artists with active forces, and are archeologically transformed into sites of
knowledge construction. Various cultural, archeological projects reformulate a conception
of time by materializing the past—examining and interpreting the material object, beyond
the constrains of language, these archeological projects constitute a porous,
multidirectional conception of time, and thus propel an epistemological difference between
history and archeology in regard to the object. In the hands of (some) contemporary artists,
so it seems, the avant-gardist return to the past becomes a cultural production technique,
capable of opening up new possibilities rather than being a merely romantic, inspirational
caprice. This return is thus transformed into a deferred present where past and future are
constantly rewritten, where (against the dematerialization of the ephemeral art object) the
present moment is the only possible thing left to document. The artistic present requires a
constant deferred reflection—messianic time. The messianic time of contemporary art, its
beatitude, as Agamben defines it is conditioned by a caesura that shows the pure
representation and the silent core that are constitutive to an authentic work of art. This is
an image of beauty that is weightless and postponed, existing in a standstill between
passivity and activity—a messianic moment of de-creation. This beatitude is made possible
due to the unforeseen, non-linear flow of time—like Benjamin’s kaleidoscopic conception
of history, time is an ever-changing temporal constellation charged with a redemptive,
messianic force.

The final part of this thesis unfolds from my artistic work, where I ask: What is an origin?
As we recall, origin (arche, in Greek), etymologically speaking, means, in the Western
tradition, both beginning and commandment; that which gives birth to something (the
principle where things begin, the arche) and that which commands its history, governs its
development in time (the principle where order is given, the archon). I inquired into the
concept of the origin as such, but also into my personal origin: what gave birth to, and still
commands, my personal identity and meaning as self; what conditions my artistic
189

engagement in the world, and how?
In this inquiry, I practiced philosophical archeology—a research methodology that
is nowadays associated mostly with the theoretical work of Agamben; however, in this
research, I applied this methodology both theoretically and artistically as two different but
complementary means of generating knowledge. This bifurcated research was befitting of
the substantial purposes of philosophical archeology: that is, to transform the present
through a unique approach to the past (or to historiography); to liberate oppressed
epistemologies; and (more broadly) to render inoperative the binary logic of Western
Metaphysics, to deactivate the conceptual machine, since the understanding of its working
in history frees us from its tyranny and presents the past as “a work of fiction.”
Moreover, philosophical archeology attempts to examine the structure of the
investigation and the subject, to research the dimension in which an artistic practice is
deactivated and contemplated as such—thus, by a “poetic of inoperativity,” this research
revealed a series of three artistic signatures that constitutes the material a priori of my
practice. Acknowledging this material a priori dimension is perhaps the most important
outcome of researching my artistic practice, that no other force, element or theory can
compare itself to—since, with this acknowledgement, the potentiality to transform my
artistic practice from within, and open it up for a new possible use, gains new meaning.
As Agamben writes:

What is poetry if not an operation in language that deactivates and renders
inoperative its communicative and informative functions in order to open
them to a new possible use? ... [W]hat poetry accomplishes for the
potentiality to say, politics and philosophy must accomplish for the
potentiality to act. Rendering inoperative economic and social operations,
they show what the human body is capable of; they open it to a new possible
use.526
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Plates

Plate 1: I knew, but didn't believe it and because I didn't believe it, I didn't know (2017)
Installation view. Katzman Contemporary, Toronto, 2017.
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Plate 2: Silent Maps (2016)
Exhibition view. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 3: Silent Maps (2016)
Exhibition view. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 4: Silent Maps (2016)
Exhibition view. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 5: Silent Maps (2016)
Untitled, 150 X 140 cm. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 6: Silent Maps (2016)
Untitled, 48 X 39 cm. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 7: Silent Maps (2016)
Untitled, 53 X 73 cm. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 8: Vaalbara (2014)
Exhibition view. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 9: Vaalbara (2014)
Exhibition view. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.

211

Plate 10: Vaalbara (2014)
Untitled, 100 X 100 X 30 cm. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.

212

Plate 11: Vaalbara (2014)
Untitled, Variable dimensions. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 12: Vaalbara (2014)
Untitled, 90 X 30 cm. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 13: Vaalbara (2014)
Untitled, 40 X 30 cm. (each). Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 14: To Return to a Place, Is, Like Dying (2016)
Exhibition view. Hansen House, Jerusalem, 2016.
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Plate 15: To Return to a Place, Is, Like Dying (2016)
Exhibition view. Hansen House, Jerusalem, 2016.
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Plate 16: Galut (Diaspora) (2011)
Installation detail, Painting by Kopel Gurwin
Audio Documentation—www.idogovrin.net/galut(diaspora).mp3
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Plate 17: Between Things (2010)
Installation detail. P8 Gallery, Tel-Aviv, 2010.
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Plate 18: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017)
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017.
Not Quite the Highest Point consists of multiple sets of objects, ephemera, sounds, leftovers, miniatures,
books and perishable instances which form various paradigmatic historical constellations or thought-spaces,
rendered and conceived by archeological art-making.
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Plate 19: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017)
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017.

221

Plate 20: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017)
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017.

222

Plate 21: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017)
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017.
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Plate 22: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017)
Installation detail. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017.
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Plate 23: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017)
Installation detail. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017.
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Plate 24: Teca (everything you tell me I keep in my body) (2015)
Mixed media—Sound, Wood, Cotton. 51 X 31 X 20 cm.
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Plate 25: The Revisit II (2014)
Mixed media—Bees Wax, Resin, Paper, Ink. 39 X 29 cm.
227

Plate 26: Had We but World Enough and Time (2014)
Mixed media—Bees Wax, Resin, Paper, Ink, Bamboo. 23 X 15 cm.
228

Plate 27: From the River Archive (2014)
Mixed media—Audio speaker, Bees Wax, Resin, Paper, Bamboo. 23 X 15 X 7 cm.
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Plate 28: Quite Whispers in the Hallway (2013)
Video Installation.
Projected text reads:
The sound of a tongue in a dried mouth, quiet whispers in the hallway, and the door closes. I could hear the
morning newspaper's pages turning; again, and again, and again... squashing. His heavy breathings. The
sound of a cellophane wrap being constantly folded. Salty almonds crushing, grinding, crumbling, and then
he growled: “Are you coming?”
The sound of vigorous footsteps, and fatigued ones, slowly going in and out of phase. A burst of an engine,
and sounds of asphalt grains tightly pressed against each other; again, and again, and again... Slowly halting.
I could hear a thin stream of air being forcibly released, silently he mumbled: “Are you going?”
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Plate 29: Quiet Whispers in the Hallway (2013)
Installation detail
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Plate 30: A Revisit (2012)
Mixed media—Print, Paper, Ink, Tape. 53 X 48 cm.
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Plate 31: The Revisit (2011)
CD
The album’s title, the revisit, indicates its metaphysical foundation. Comprising of five pieces, the album
exhibits several revisits to contemporary classical music which in the end reveal nothing of the original sonic
material, yet dwell in the pieces’ worldliness.
No sampling was taken; everything was recorded live and was later on digitally processed and edited.
The revisits became possible, on the one hand, due to the pieces’ initial character of openness and, on the
other hand, due to my interest in artworks that leave the horizon relatively open, in this case, for further
composition.
What occurs at the liminal moment in time of the revisit?
Audio Documentation—www.idogovrin.net/therevisit.mp3
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Plate 32: Attentiveness Foldings (2010)
Installation view. CCA, Tel-Aviv, 2011.
Mixed media—Seashells, Sound, Paper. Variable dimensions.
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Plate 33: If the Walls Could Speak (2010)
Site-specific sound installation. Variable dimensions. Yafo 23 Gallery, Jerusalem, 2010.
The structure, literally, is a material that exists as limited information, defined in a closed and finite reality.
Sound is contained in the structure as part of the happening within the structure, and around it; but even when
the happening had past, the sound remains intact, floating, burned into dense layers as simultaneously existing
derivatives, as a known testimony to the thing itself, and as an unknown testimony to the thing which was
lost. This installation attempts to carve the layers of sound, to unfold time, and to decipher the local history
that existed, and still exists.
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Plate 34: Moraine (2010)
CD
Audio Documentation—www.idogovrin.net/moraine.mp3
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Plate 35: 15 Maps for Becoming a Concept (2009)
Graphic score (detail).
Audio Documentation— www.idogovrin.net/15maps.mp3
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